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Cover and Title Page
The cover image is a cross section looking
west through the dramatic main lobby of
McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War
College. Shown are the glass canopy lead-
ing to the second-floor main entrance, the
lobby vestibule, the connection to Conolly
Hall, and the lobby. As built, the main
entrance (where the figure in the white
shirt stands) features an automated secu-
rity turnstile. At the lower right is the
entrance to the auditorium; above it is
the balcony overlook. The Boston-based
architectural firm of Shepley Bulfinch
Richardson and Abbott designed the
building to complement the existing
Naval War College academic complex
in siting, massing, rhythmic expression,
color, and materials. In particular,
McCarty Little Hall takes many of its ar-
chitectural cues from the center building
of that complex, Conolly Hall, to which
the building is connected by an enclosed
bridge.
The title page image is an aerial view of
McCarty Little Hall, focused on the main
entrance plaza. This, in the architectural
concept, terminates the dignified approach
for visiting game participants and promi-
nent visitors from the on-axis entry drive.
The symmetrical building is organized
around four corner towers that flank the
four distinctive facades; they facilitate the
grade change from the two visible floor
levels on the south and east facades to the
three visible levels on the north and west
facades. The slate-blue roof serves as a
distinctive “fifth facade” and landmark,
particularly when viewed from the New-
port Bridge.
Both images courtesy Shepley Bulfinch
Richardson and Abbott, which designs fa-
cilities for education, health care, science,
and civic institutions. The firm also de-
signed the research library at the U.S.
Marine Corps University in Quantico,
Virginia.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The lead article in this issue of the Review continues our exploration of contem-
porary developments in the maritime domain in Asia. James Holmes and Toshi
Yoshihara, in their tour d’horizon of Japanese naval thinking from the late nine-
teenth century to the present, offer an intriguing contrast between the decline of
Mahanian navalist theory in Japan following World War II and the theory’s re-
cent rise in the People’s Republic of China, and they challenge the Japanese mili-
tary leadership to face up to the implications of the current lack of a broad
strategic concept governing Japan’s approach to regional maritime threats.
Alfred Thayer Mahan is a recurring point of reference in these pages. In his
discussion of the relationship between the thought of Mahan and the strategy of
Admiral Jackie Fisher of the Royal Navy prior to World War I, Jon Tetsuro
Sumida usefully reminds us that this giant of American (and not only Ameri-
can) maritime strategy was often seriously misunderstood in his own time and
that the problematic relationship of theory and practice in naval and military af-
fairs, reflecting as it does the shifting interplay of history and technology, is part
of what makes strategy formulation hard.
Strategy is also hard, of course, because of the bureaucratic and cultural divides
too frequently separating military strategists from political decision makers. Dur-
ing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, as discussed here by Alexander Fursenko, So-
viet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s ignorance of naval matters might have proved
fatal had it not been for a decisive and hitherto unknown intervention by the head
of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Fursenko’s paper, based on research
in newly opened Soviet archives, was originally presented at a conference on “The
Cold War at Sea,”sponsored by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in May 2004.
This issue of the Review, it will be noticed, introduces a new feature. “In the
Journals” will bring to our readers’ attention on a regular basis a small selection
of what in our judgment constitute the most original or significant articles on
national security matters appearing in the latest issues of English-language for-
eign affairs and defense-oriented journals. Readers are invited to make their
own nominations for inclusion in this feature, with a brief explanation of the
significance of the particular article. To do so, please contact our book review
editor, Ms. Phyllis Winkler, at bookreviews@nwc.navy.mil.
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KOREA: THE EAST ASIAN PIVOT
Korea: The East Asian Pivot, edited by Jonathan D. Pollack as the second in the
Policy Studies Series of the Naval War College Press, extends the focus on East Asia
evident in the first volume of this series, Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations
in the Early Twenty-first Century (2003), also edited by Dr. Pollack. The papers in
the volume, by an international and highly distinguished group of scholars and
analysts, were first presented at the Naval War College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of
August 2004. They examine from a variety of perspectives how, nearly sixty years
after the establishment of rival states on the 38th Parallel and fifteen years after
the end of the Cold War, “the ground is shifting in Korea.” This book is a ground-
breaking contribution to the study of contemporary Northeast Asia and to the
wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy and policy. The book is
available from the U.S. Government Printing Office; visit its online bookstore at
bookstore.gpo.gov/.
NEWPORT PAPER 24
Professors and other instructors of university courses touching on naval, mari-
time, and national security matters may want to consider our twenty-fourth
Newport Paper—Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Peter
Dombrowski and issued in July 2005—as a reading. This anthology of recent ar-
ticles originally printed in the Review “that particularly deserve a second or third
look” (as Professor Dombrowski suggests in his foreword) addresses the changing
security environment, the emerging roles and missions of the Navy, and naval
transformation. Copies are still available, free of charge while they last. Ask the
editorial office for an examination copy or visit the Newport Papers page of our
website.
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PREPARING TO PREVENT CRISES
Address delivered at Naval War College graduation ceremonies on 16
June 2006, by Senator Dick Lugar
It is an honor to celebrate the graduation of another remarkable class from theNaval War College. I congratulate you on the hard work that has led to this day.
This is a high moment in the lives of our graduates and in the lives of all who
have given inspiration and support to them. We are especially appreciative of the
families of the graduates. The work the graduates have done in the past and will
do in the future is sometimes dangerous and often personally consuming. It re-
quires patience, courage, and love from family members. Their sacrifices have
made this day possible, and they are an indispensable element of our national
security.
I am excited to be with so many individuals who have dedicated their lives to
protecting our country and building international order. Since its establishment
in 1884, the Naval War College has been a prolific contributor to the intellectual
inquiry and skill development that our government and our military need to ad-
vance peace in the world. It has brought together representatives from all the
military branches and numerous civilian agencies, as well as students from every
corner of the globe, for shared studies and discussion.
Around the United States during the last two months, ceremonies have com-
memorated the graduation of students from institutions of higher learning. But
few graduates, if any, are poised to have as much impact as you on our world in a
historic moment of need. We are now sending you back into a geopolitical cli-
mate that is uncertain and dangerous. We are asking you to take on burdens that
will weigh heavily on you and your families. We are asking you to perform ex-
traordinary acts of leadership on a routine basis.
Seeking Global Transformations
In May, I had the pleasure of delivering a graduation address at St. Joseph’s Col-
lege, a small liberal arts college in Rensselaer, Indiana. It was a picturesque and
memorable occasion—though far more landlocked than today. The class con-
sisted of 150 bright graduates, mostly twenty-one- and twenty-two-year-olds
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from the Midwest. It would be difficult to pick two more different graduating
classes to address in the same year. In fact, some of you may have children who
have graduated from college or will soon do so. But despite the differences in
your ages and circumstances, my message to you today has some similarities to
what I said to them—namely, that the world is never far from transformational
events. In your world, this means that no matter how many threats appear on the
horizon or how intractable our national security problems appear, we should
not rule out transformations that change the fundamental circumstances of the
world order. We should be planning for these transformational events, and in-
deed, even attempting to make them happen. A nation such as ours that led alli-
ances to victories in two world wars, helped rebuild Western Europe and Japan
after World War II, won the Cold War, and expanded NATO to include
twenty-six nations should not see any transformation as beyond the realm of
possibility.
Political leaders and military planners continually attempt to foresee danger-
ous contingencies involving nations with whom we have current differences or
whose fundamental interests may conflict with ours in some future scenario.
This planning is a normal and necessary part of protecting our national security,
and no institution has done it better than the Naval War College.
In a world as dangerous as ours, with terrorist groups and rogue states seek-
ing weapons of mass destruction, it is natural to fix on the most imminent and
dangerous of these problems. But we must always guard against defining foreign
policy solely as a response to negative contingencies.
Much has been made of President Bush’s rhetorical flourish in his January
2002 State of the Union Address that identified an “axis of evil” made up of Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea. There is no doubt that these three countries each pre-
sented grave foreign policy dilemmas requiring concentrated attention. That
continues to be the case.
But to the degree that the American military and foreign policy establishment
responded by defining foreign policy as a campaign to address the threats posed
by these three small to midsized nations, we subordinated strategic thinking to a
set of standing crises. Crisis decision-making tends to compress options and of-
ten fails to allow for broader strategies that might require more time. Ironically,
if we define U.S. foreign policy primarily in terms of crisis management, we usu-
ally make solving crises more difficult.
Often we need to pause to remember that the practice of foreign policy is not
defined by a set of crisis decisions. Unfortunately, reporters, politicians, and
even most historians portray foreign policy as a series of great diplomatic events.
This perception is reinforced by books and movies about dramatic moments in
diplomatic history, such as the Cuban missile crisis or the Berlin airlift. These
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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events capture our imagination, because we relive the struggles of leaders during
times of great risk as they weigh the potential consequences of their actions. We
ask whether presidents and prime ministers were right or wrong in adopting a
particular course.
But crisis decision-making is a very small slice of a nation’s foreign policy. A
successful foreign policy depends much more on how well a nation prepares to
avoid a crisis. When a nation gets to the point of having to make tactical choices
in a time of peril, it almost always faces a choice between a bad option and a
worse option. Crisis decision-making is to foreign policy what a surgeon is to
personal health. Whether a body will resist disease depends on good nutrition,
consistent exercise, and other healthy preparations much more than the skill of a
surgeon employed as a last resort after the body has broken down. The prepara-
tion for good health and for a strong foreign policy is the part that we can best
control, and it is the part that must receive most of our energies and resources.
No amount of skillful decision making can make up for a diminishment of
the core strength of U.S. foreign policy. Maintaining this core strength is pains-
taking work. It can be measured in alliances, trading partners, diplomatic capa-
bilities, exchange programs, international agreements, global respect, and
numerous other factors. With this in mind, each of you should think how you
can contribute to the retooling of U.S. foreign policy. And you should think
about how we can undertake broad diplomatic offensives based on that core
strength, which will achieve transformational outcomes. The United States must
be ambitious at working with other nations to shape the world, because this is
what will prevent crises in the future.
India Nuclear Agreement
Let me discuss with you a current debate before the Congress and our country. I be-
lieve it is critical that the U.S. Congress come to conclusions about President Bush’s
proposed civilian nuclear agreement with India. The India agreement represents the
most important strategic diplomatic initiative undertaken by President Bush, and
it represents a fundamental departure from the crisis-management mentality that
has dominated foreign policy in both the executive and legislative branches in
recent years. By concluding this pact and the far-reaching set of cooperative
agreements that accompany it, President Bush has embraced a long-term out-
look that seeks to enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that
will give us new diplomatic options and improve global stability. With this
agreement, the president and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are asking
Congress to see the opportunities that lie beyond the horizon of the current
presidential term.
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As such, a congressional rejection of the agreement—or an open-ended delay—
risks wasting a critical opportunity to begin to expand beyond our Cold War al-
liance structures to include dynamic nations with whom our interests are
converging.
Many members of Congress, including myself, have been studying the impli-
cations of the nuclear pact on nonproliferation policy. India has not signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and it has developed and tested nuclear weap-
ons. The U.S.-India agreement would allow India to receive nuclear fuel, tech-
nology, and reactors from the United States—benefits that were previously
denied to it because of its status outside the treaty. We should be concerned
about the precedent set by this action, and we must ensure that this agreement
does not undercut our own responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
But I believe that we can do that satisfactorily. Both houses of Congress are
working through language that would guide our policy toward India. I believe
that we can help solidify New Delhi’s commitments to implement strong export
controls, separate its civilian nuclear infrastructure from its weapons program,
and place civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. This agreement also would be a powerful incentive for India to coop-
erate closely with the United States in stopping proliferation and to abstain from
further nuclear weapons tests. These outcomes could represent important ad-
vancements for nonproliferation policy.
The administration’s declaration that we would welcome India’s advance-
ment as a major economic and political player on the world stage represents a
strategic decision to invest political capital in a country with a vibrant democ-
racy, rapidly growing economy, and increasing clout. With a well-educated mid-
dle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an anchor of
stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth.
It can also be a key partner in countering global extremist trends. Both of our
countries understand the importance of opposing violent movements through
the promotion of religious pluralism, tolerance, and democratic freedoms. As a
country with well entrenched democratic traditions and the world’s second-
largest Muslim population, India can set an example of a multireligious and
multicultural democracy in an otherwise volatile region.
India’s growing energy demand—likely to double within twenty years—
makes global energy security an integral part of our strategic dialogue and provides
important opportunities for cooperation. I introduced S. 1950, the “U.S.-India
Energy Security Cooperation Act,” last November to take advantage of these op-
portunities to cooperate with India on reducing global oil dependence. The bill,
which has been passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, promotes
and authorizes funding for joint research and development of alternative energy
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sources and clean coal technologies. It is essential that we elevate our energy dia-
logue with India and work together to increase the availability of clean energy
and help stabilize world energy markets.
We already are beginning to see strategic benefits from developing closer rela-
tions with India. For instance, India’s votes at the IAEA on the Iran issue last Sep-
tember and this past February demonstrate that New Delhi is able and willing to
adjust its traditional foreign policies and play a constructive role on interna-
tional issues. While acknowledging that India prizes its strategic autonomy, it
will have increasing incentives to use its influence to help sway debates and
events in other areas that serve stability and global economic progress.
Building on Our Relationship with China
Whenever discussions of the strategic vision behind the India nuclear agree-
ment occur, inevitably the subject of China arises. Some analysts contend that
India’s ability to act as a counterweight to China is the primary strategic benefit
of the deal. Though I understand the impulse behind this thinking, it oversim-
plifies global relationships in the twenty-first century, and it underestimates the
broader value of engaging India as a partner in a changing world. Both India and
the United States have reason to be vigilant about the growth of Chinese military
power, but it is far from clear how a U.S.-Indian partnership of the type envi-
sioned by the agreement would contain China or why India would participate
with the United States in such a containment regime.
We should not see India as a card to play in balance-of-power games. Alli-
ances based on shared dangers can have a long shelf life if the threat is intense
enough, but they are rarely transformational. We need more from India than se-
curity cooperation. We need a partner that sits at the intersection of several stra-
tegic regions and that can be a bulwark for stability, democracy, and pluralism.
Seeing India as merely a counterbalance to China also makes the mistake of
presuming that China is destined to be an enemy. Even as the United States must
speak forthrightly about our current differences with China over numerous is-
sues, we should not assume that we cannot build a foundation of mutual inter-
ests with China that will support a positive relationship with that nation over
time. In fact, we have been doing this for several decades, with varying degrees of
success. China is our third-largest trading partner and our fourth-largest export
market. U.S.-China trade has increased from just five billion dollars in 1980 to
$285 billion in 2005. China has become an enormous stakeholder in the interna-
tional economy.
The scope of our relationship with China is circumscribed by that nation’s
lack of democracy and its troubling human rights record. But few problems in
Asia are going to be addressed without the cooperation of China. Beyond trade
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and investment, we have mutual interests in regional stability, combating dis-
eases that know no borders, and developing new energy sources that relieve our
dependence on fossil fuels.
The New Energy Realism
It is no coincidence that the future of our relations with India and China inter-
sect heavily with energy. Although a consumer cartel is probably not a viable re-
sponse, fossil-fuel-dependent nations can forge agreements that further energy
technology and conservation.
The transformational goals about which I have spoken argue against expect-
ing any nation to be an enemy perpetually into the future. But though we may
not have inevitable enemies, we do have inevitable vulnerabilities. Chief among
these is our dependence on oil. This institution understands better than almost
any other what it means to plan for securing the oil lifeline from the Middle East.
But military responses to our energy vulnerability will have decreasing relevance
in a world where the price of oil is determined by leaders of national govern-
ments and spare oil production capacity exceeds daily world oil consumption by
a safety margin of less than 2 percent.
The United States consumes 25 percent of the world’s oil, even though we ac-
count for less than 5 percent of its population. If oil prices averaged just sixty dollars
a barrel through 2006, we would spend about $320 billion on oil imports this year.
Most of the world’s oil is concentrated in places that are either hostile to American
interests or vulnerable to political upheaval and terrorism. And demand for oil
will increase far more rapidly than we expected just a few years ago. Within
twenty-five years, the world will need 50 percent more energy than it does now.
The potential scarcity of energy supplies and the imbalances that exist among
nations create grave threats to global security and prosperity. Up to this point in
history, the main concerns surrounding oil and natural gas have been how much
we pay for them and whether we will experience supply disruptions. But in de-
cades to come, the issue may be whether the world’s supply of fossil fuels is
abundant and accessible enough to support continued economic growth, both
in the industrialized West and in large rapidly growing economies such as
China, India, and Brazil. When we reach the point that the world’s oil-hungry
economies are competing for insufficient supplies of energy, fossil fuels will be-
come an even stronger magnet for conflict than they already are.
In the short run, dependence on fossil fuels has created a drag on the eco-
nomic fortunes of households around the world, as higher oil prices have driven
up heating and transportation costs. In the long run, this dependence is pushing
the world toward an economic disaster that could mean diminished living stan-
dards, increased risks of war, and accelerated environmental degradation.
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Increasingly, energy supplies are the currency through which energy-rich
countries leverage their interests against energy-poor nations. Oil and natural
gas infrastructure and shipping lanes remain targets for terrorism. The bottom
line is that critical international security goals, including countering nuclear
weapons proliferation, supporting new democracies, and promoting sustain-
able development, are at risk because of overdependence on fossil fuels.
These factors require what I have called “the new realism” of energy policy.
Pro-oil advocates have long claimed to be the realists in the energy debate. They
argued that alternatives to fossil fuels were not abundant enough or applicable
enough to our energy infrastructure to relieve us in a meaningful way from our
dependence on oil. The pro-oil commentators maintained that the primacy of
fossil fuels was a choice of the marketplace, and they asserted that our govern-
ment could and should do little to change this. Advocates of energy alternatives
were considered to be unrealistic dreamers who did not understand how the
world worked.
But the rapidly rising price of oil, its increasing concentration in the hands of
state-owned entities, and the threat that energy will be used as a weapon by
petro-superpowers have changed the balance of realism. We have entered a dif-
ferent energy era that requires a much different response than in past decades.
What is needed is an urgent national effort to ensure that American ingenuity
and resources are fully committed to this problem.
I believe that we can develop alternative sources of energy and the means to
distribute them. But this will require national commitment, leadership at the
highest levels of our government, and an aggressive diplomatic campaign to im-
prove cooperation with like-minded nations. It also will require representatives
of every military service and government agency to understand the problem and
cooperate in its solution.
The Task before Us
The Naval War College and its graduates have been in the vanguard of strategic
thinking in this country, and we ask you to continue that tradition. Less than a
year after the birth of the Naval War College, in March 1885, President Grover
Cleveland exemplified the nation’s attitude toward foreign affairs in his first in-
augural address. He devoted just a single paragraph to our relations with other
countries. He defined the American foreign policy perspective as “the policy of
neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambitions on other conti-
nents and repelling their intrusions here.” Some may long for the simplicity of
that time, but most of us believe that our national security is intertwined with
what happens in the furthest corner of the globe. We affirm that the United
States must not only participate in world events—it must provide leadership.
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I am confident that you will not be discouraged or defeated by the difficult
work before you. You will affirm the commitment to excellence that you have
shown here by expanding your abilities to serve our nation and the cause of
world peace.
We bear a huge responsibility in leading our nation to a more secure and
prosperous future and in strengthening the international community to solve
global problems. With patient investments in the building blocks of national se-
curity and attention to long-term strategic opportunities, the United States will
thrive in this new century as we did in the last.
I am heartened by your unfailing devotion to this important work. We are
proud of the accomplishments that you have achieved here, and we look forward
to all that you will do in the coming years.
SENATOR DICK LUGAR
Richard G. Lugar, the senior senator from Indiana (R), is chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina.
He began his career at sea aboard USS Blakely (FF
1072) with follow-on assignments as Operations Officer
in USS Deyo (DD 989) and USS Mahan (DDG 42). He
commanded the missile hydrofoil ship USS Aries (PHM
5), operating extensively throughout the Caribbean,
and USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60), Battle Efficiency
“E” winner, as part of the USS Independence Battle
Group, operating in the western Pacific and Persian
Gulf. In January 1998, Admiral Shuford assumed com-
mand of USS Gettysburg (CG 64), deploying to Fifth
and Sixth Fleet operating areas with the USS Enter-
prise Battle Group. Gettysburg played a prominent role
in operations in the Adriatic during the Kosovo crisis
and in the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT FOX,
acting as Air Warfare Commander for dual-carrier
battle group operations (Carl Vinson and Enterprise)
and successfully firing 100 percent of the sixty-nine
Tomahawk missiles tasked during strike operations.
The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency “E” for
Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
His first shore tour was as the Operations and Plans Of-
ficer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea. In Washing-
ton, he served on the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations in N86 (directing the Surface Combatant
Force Level Study) and in N3/N5 (as Chief of Staff for
the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization). He also
served as speechwriter and Special Assistant to the Sec-
retary of the Navy. On the Joint Staff, he led a division
in J8, the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments
Directorate. From 1999 to 2001 he coordinated the
Navy’s legislative efforts in the U.S. Senate and was se-
lected to flag rank in this assignment. His first flag tour
was as the Navy’s “Head Detailer,” responsible for ca-
reer development and assignment for the 370,000 men
and women of the Navy.
Admiral Shuford was selected as an Olmsted Scholar in
1979, studying two years in France at the Paris Institute
of Political Science. He holds master’s degrees in public
administration (finance) from Harvard and in national
security studies and strategy from the Naval War College,
where he graduated in 1991 with highest distinction.
He was installed as the fifty-first President of the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on 12 August 2004.
Admiral Shuford’s personal awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five
awards), the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service Medal
(three awards), the Navy Commendation Medal (three
awards), and the Navy Achievement Medal.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Creating a Thousand-Ship Navy
DEBATES ABOUT THE NUMBER and types of ships needed in the
American navy have been going on since before we even had a
country! Heated discussions on the purpose and size of a navy took
place at meetings of the Continental Congress in 1775, and the Congress ulti-
mately authorized the construction of only two armed sailing ships. Similar de-
bate continues to this day. The high cost of shipbuilding and the need to balance
land, sea, and air forces have driven the active fleet to below the three-hundred-
ship level. In such an environment, how could we ever realize the “thousand-ship
navy” demanded to meet most challenges to global maritime security? We can
get there by assembling a global fleet of capabilities through active partnerships
with friends and allies around the world.
In his remarks to Naval War College students in August 2005, the Chief of Na-
val Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, noted that the time has come for the U.S.
Navy to look at seapower as a team effort, not just with the Marine Corps and
Coast Guard but also with international maritime partners, based upon shared
objectives and relationships built on trust and confidence. He noted, “As we
build upon ideas like Theater Security Cooperation, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, we find that every nation
has a stake in security, and a distinct, unique capability—as well as a great desire—
to contribute.”
He further advanced his vision with the 148 delegates from seventy-five na-
tions who attended the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium hosted
in Newport in September 2005 and during the Secretary of the Navy’s Current
Strategy Forum held at the College in June 2006, where he called for a “thousand-
ship navy” composed of ships from navies around the world that were prepared
to cooperate and operate routinely with one another. A key to enabling such
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cooperation is naval leaders who are knowledgeable of the regions and sensitive
to the cultures of both friends and any adversaries intent on undermining secu-
rity in the global maritime domain. The Naval War College is playing a major
role in developing the competencies of the men and women from the United States
and around the world who will help conceptualize, build, and operate this navy.
Building Foundations for Engagement and Global Maritime Security
Beginning with the 2006–2007 academic year, all of our educational programs at
the primary, intermediate, and senior levels will meet the requirements recently
established by the Chairman of the Joint Staff for regional expertise and cultural
awareness. This focus was included as a key element of the new Primary Profes-
sional Military Education (PME) course that we launched in May 2006. Our re-
structured intermediate-level and senior-level PME curricula, which came
online last fall, also incorporate significant new content. The new curricula have
been developed with regional expertise and cultural awareness as persistent
themes throughout both intermediate-level and senior-level programs. Re-
gionally focused sessions have increased from 13 percent to 34 percent in our
National Security Decision Making curriculum; a new course theme on “Culture
& Societies” has been added to the Strategy & Policy curriculum; and the Joint
Military Operations curriculum has been redesigned to—among other things—
require students to use regional expertise and cultural skills in a five-week series
of application exercises. Changes will also be reflected in our nonresident pro-
grams, with full implementation in the intermediate-level nonresident pro-
grams by the 2007–2008 academic year. Students will be exposed to regional issues
in each of the world’s five major regions. We expect that our students in both the in-
termediate-level and senior-level courses will be able to:
• Describe U.S. national security interests in one or more countries in each
region
• Describe most elements of culture, geography, government, recent history,
current economics, and religion of one or more countries in each region
• Describe in detail some of the military elements of doctrine, organization,
training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions of one country in
three of the world’s regions.
To develop regional expertise further, many students may choose to use the
20 percent of the academic workload that constitutes their electives program to
study in one of five areas of concentration:
• Asia-Pacific
• Latin America/Western Hemisphere
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• Africa
• The Greater Middle East
• Eurasia.
Students in these regional studies tracks will complete a total of ninety hours
of classroom work supplemented by a twelve-to-fifteen-hour colloquium across
the academic year. Each colloquium will be led by a practitioner/scholar who is a
preeminent expert in the particular region. The Navy is establishing Additional
Qualification Designators, which will be recorded in service records to identify
graduates with this level of regional expertise and cultural awareness so they can
eventually be assigned to billets where they can best leverage this education and
experience. All U.S. military students will be eligible to enroll in one of these
tracks beginning in the fall.
Expanded International Programs
We are now seeing the results of efforts made recently to increase the impact of
our resident international programs. Annual enrollment in our Naval Com-
mand College (our senior-level international course) has expanded from
thirty-nine students to fifty-two, and the U.S. students in each class are now
screened and selected by the Chief of Naval Operations. The intermediate-level
Naval Staff College (NSC) now offers a ten-month course that is fully integrated
with the American students’ College of Naval Command and Staff program.
This ten-month course complements the more traditional five-month NSC pro-
gram, which continues to be offered in the spring of each year. Taken together,
these initiatives now provide opportunity for nearly 150 students annually, an
increase of over 80 percent over the throughput of just five years ago. The objec-
tive of these programs remains building trust and confidence between our inter-
national partners. We will also seek to improve the command-and-control
effectiveness of senior officers from the United States and partner nations, by of-
fering in the fall of 2006 a flag-level Combined Force Maritime Component
Command course, modeled on our successful Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander course. A dozen flag officers from partner nations within specific
regions will join with a dozen American flag and general officers in a week-long
seminar focused on identifying and eliminating barriers to effective operations
among friends and regional/coalition partners.
Global Engagement beyond the Classroom
Newport has been the site of the semiannual International Seapower Sympo-
sium for a half-century. The ISS brings together service chiefs and war college
presidents of over seventy-five navies and coast guards for wide-ranging discus-
sions of issues of mutual interest. Recognizing that most graduates of our
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international programs become admirals—and that many (currently forty-two)
become chiefs of their navies—a recent initiative seeks to build upon these rela-
tionships and those themes developed during ISS by hosting regional symposia
with alumni in various parts of the globe. In October 2005, a conference was
held in Yokosuka, Japan, for over forty alumni from throughout Asia; over two
dozen European and African alumni came together in Naples, Italy, in April
2006 at a similar conference to address many of the issues of concern to navies in
Europe and Africa.
Our five regional studies groups continue to expand their reach and impact.
Through alignment with the major Department of Defense regional security
centers, such as the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, our regional studies groups col-
laborate on curriculum development and sponsor symposia, conferences, lec-
tures, and war games. The college has also recently established the China
Maritime Studies Institute, to contribute to the body of knowledge about mari-
time activities of the People’s Republic of China, through analysis of open-
source documents and databases.
I am particularly excited about the potential in our effort to expand relation-
ships with war colleges and service academies around the world. Formal agree-
ments on curricula, faculty, and student interaction now exist with the Maritime
Staff College in Japan, the Russian Kuznetsov Academy, and the Joint Services
Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom. We have just (in August)
concluded the first of a series of five war games—designed to address issues of
maritime security—with staff of the Kuznetsov Academy. Earlier this year we
conducted what has become an annual two-week war game with the Japan Mari-
time Self-Defense Force; it included over fifty midgrade and senior Japanese of-
ficers who, with U.S. Pacific-theater counterparts, worked through a demanding
scenario focusing on operational issues important to both navies. Discussions
are ongoing with the leadership of eight other institutions, and agreements will
likely be signed in the next twelve to eighteen months.
These “college-to-college” relationships are powerful tools in our ongoing ef-
forts to learn from one another and with one another on issues of mutual con-
cern. We are aided in these initiatives by the remarkable bond of brotherhood
that exists among all mariners around the globe. We all share centuries of sea-
faring tradition and history, and our mutual respect for the sea and for each
other helps us begin to operationalize the thousand-ship navy.
Professional Reading
Regional expertise and cultural awareness will also be enhanced Navywide
through portions of the soon-to-be-launched Navy Professional Reading
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Program. This innovative program will identify sixty books of particular value
for sailors in all ranks, and it will make these books readily available in ship and
station libraries around the world. The books have been arranged in categories
that relate to important competencies that all Navy personnel will need to mas-
ter for success in the future. The category entitled “Regional and Cultural
Awareness” contains both fiction and nonfiction books that address regional/
cultural themes. Books in this category include The Great Wall at Sea: Modern-
izing China’s Military, The Fate of Africa, Recognizing Islam, The Crisis of Islam,
The Sand Pebbles, The Kite Runner, and A Passage to India. Sailors who take the
time to read such books will come away with an increased level of knowledge of
and sensitivity to issues related to these regions and the cultures of some of the
world’s largest populations.
As you can see from the initiatives outlined above, the Naval War College is in-
creasingly playing the role envisioned for it by its founders over 120 years ago.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal work The Influence of Sea Power upon History
was written as “an examination of the general history of Europe and America
with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that his-
tory.” Mahan clearly recognized that what happens at sea has great impact on af-
fairs ashore and that mariners throughout history have had great impact on the
outcome of world events. The Naval War College, through its many efforts fo-
cused on global engagement, seeks to help the U.S. Navy and its partners realize
the thousand-ship-navy concept and ensure global maritime security, as well as
the economic stability, prosperity, and peace it underpins.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 2 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:15 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
27
War College: Summer 2006 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
Toshi Yoshihara has served as a visiting professor at the
U.S. Air War College, in Montgomery, Alabama, for
the past two years and has recently accepted an appoint-
ment at the Naval War College. James R. Holmes is a se-
nior research associate at the University of Georgia
Center for International Trade and Security, Athens,
Georgia. Their work on seapower in Asia has appeared
in such journals as Comparative Strategy and Defence
& Security Analysis, as well as the Naval War College
Review.
© 2006 by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
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JAPANESE MARITIME THOUGHT: IF NOT MAHAN, WHO?
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
The late Colonel John Boyd, who knew a thing or two about strategic thought,was fond of declaring that excellence in warfare and other human endeavors
depended on people, ideas, and hardware—in that order.1 We postulate that Japan
has lost sight of this commonsense axiom, allowing strategic thought to atrophy.
If so, this decline in strategic thought could impede Tokyo’s ability to act outside
the confines of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance—as it might need to, given
the rise of an increasingly capable, seapower-minded China and mounting fric-
tions between Beijing and Tokyo. We ask the following questions to assess the
state of strategic thinking in Japan’s naval forces:
• Why does maritime strategy matter now, in an increasingly interconnected
world? Does economic interdependence eliminate the resort to power politics?
• How did Alfred Thayer Mahan view seapower and its uses? How much
influence did Mahan exert in imperial Japan?
• How strictly did the Imperial Japanese Navy adhere to Mahan’s theories,
and, when it departed from Mahanian theory, why did it do so, and with
what impact?
• How much continuity was there in strategic thinking between the Imperial
Japanese Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force? What impact did any
shifts in strategic thought have?
• Which strategic theorists do Japanese naval officials consult when they are
grappling with vexing issues? If not Mahan, whom?
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• If indeed strategic thought has languished in postwar Japan’s maritime
forces, how might political and military leaders revive it? To which strategic
theorists should they look?
We close with a few observations and policy recommendations for Tokyo’s
naval establishment. Given the preliminary nature of this inquiry, we leave the
article somewhat open-ended, in hopes of starting a sorely needed debate in Jap-
anese and American naval circles rather than supplying answers that are likely to
be premature.
JAPAN, GEOGRAPHY, AND MARITIME STRATEGY
While it may no longer be fashionable to equate geography to destiny, Japan’s
physical position reaffirms this apparently quaint axiom. The concept of mari-
time power is inseparable from its spatial meaning. Maritime power is at its
most basic level concerned with a nation’s ability to exploit the sea—a physical,
nautical medium. The immutable geographic realities that Japan confronts
merit particular attention because they have shaped and will continue to shape
Japan’s interactions with its neighbors. Japan’s maritime posture, then, has al-
ways been and will always be intimately linked to geography. The Japanese often
describe their key national characteristic in nautical terms, with the familiar no-
tion that “Japan is a small island nation lacking resource endowments and is
thus highly dependent upon seaborne commerce for its well being.”Clearly, Tokyo
must always be mindful of the surrounding oceans.
Yet additional geographic features impinge upon Japan’s strategic and mar-
itime postures. It is natural to compare Great Britain and Japan, two insular
powers seaward of great continental landmasses.2 Japan stands considerably
off the Asian continent, with nearly a hundred miles separating Honshu Island
from the Korean Peninsula. By contrast, only twenty miles separate Britain
from continental Europe at the nearest point. Concentrated in a few pockets of
flat terrain on the east coast, major Japanese cities face outward toward the Pa-
cific rather than inward toward the continent. In effect they gaze out at the
United States, whereas Britain’s major population centers physically tend to
direct attention toward their European neighbors. Historically such demo-
graphic positioning has reinforced the isolation and insularity of Japan, while
Britain has interacted regularly with the rest of Europe. Japan’s distinctive geo-
graphic and demographic conformation conditions its strategic preferences,
pulling Tokyo in divergent directions: geographically, Japan is part of conti-
nental Asia, but demographically it inclines toward transpacific ties. Japan has
been ambivalent about whether it is (or wants to be) an Asian or a Western
power, whereas Britain has managed to craft a special relationship with the
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United States across the Atlantic while acting as a traditional offshore balancer
across the English Channel.3
Japanese geography carries strategic implications. The four main home islands
stretch 1,200 miles, roughly the entire north-south length of the U.S. eastern
seaboard. This archipelago, which extends along the Ryukyu Islands to the
south, forms a long crescent that hugs the eastern flanks of Russia and China,
Eurasia’s greatest land powers. Japan seemingly stands in the way of naval power
projection from the mainland.4 Chinese vessels exiting the East China Sea into
the Pacific must contend with the Ryukyus, while the Korean Peninsula, in effect
a half-island appended to Eurasia, thrusts out toward the Japanese archipelago
like the proverbial “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan.” These enduring geo-
graphic traits have been arbiters of interstate relations and wars among the four
powers for over a century.5
Finally, the physical defense of Japan requires credible nautical power projec-
tion. Tokyo is saddled with seventeen thousand miles of coastline to defend. By
comparison with the great powers, India’s shoreline is 4,600 miles long, while
China’s extends eleven thousand miles, America’s twelve thousand miles, and
Russia’s twenty-three thousand miles (primarily facing the empty Arctic). Lack-
ing strategic depth—the widest east-west length of Honshu is a mere 160
miles—Japanese planners must think in terms of defending forward at sea,
much as the Israelis do about land warfare.6 To complicate matters, Tokyo pos-
sesses thousands of offshore islands, with the farthest ones located near the
Tropic of Cancer. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, or MSDF) de-
scribes the nation’s defense dilemma in vivid terms: if Wakkanai, the northern-
most city of Japan, is Copenhagen, then the Ishigaki, Okinotori, and Minamitori
islands are the equivalents of Casablanca, Tripoli, and Alexandria, respectively.7
In other words, Japan’s maritime defense area encompasses an area as large as
NATO-Europe, plus the entire Mediterranean.
Several implications flow from this geopolitical analysis. First, whereas conti-
nental powers have the option of venturing seaward or retreating from the
oceans, Japan enjoys no such luxury. The importance of a coherent strategic
framework for Japanese naval planners is hard to overstate. Second, and closely
related, Tokyo cannot avoid entanglement with immediate neighbors that har-
bor maritime ambitions of their own. Japan is located near enough to the Eur-
asian continent that it must be alert for any realignment or imbalance in regional
seapower. Third, if forced to defend its maritime interests by itself, Tokyo would
not be able to ignore pressures to build up a maritime force far larger and more
capable than its current modestly sized, if world-class, fleet. If Tokyo succumbed
to these pressures, its actions would almost certainly bring about countervailing
actions from its neighbors.
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The bottom line: the direction and quality of Japanese strategic thinking
about nautical affairs will have ripple effects on the international relations of
East Asia and therefore bear careful examination. The following thus charts
trends in Japanese maritime thinking from the prewar era to the twenty-first
century and ventures some policy recommendations.
MAHAN’S SEAPOWER EVANGELISM
A century ago Japanese maritime thinkers, facing similar challenges, looked to
America for guidance on seapower. Writing around the turn of the nineteenth
century, Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted an America long disdainful toward for-
eign political entanglements to amass a kind of “sea power” built on the “three
pillars” of overseas commerce, naval and merchant fleets, and naval bases ar-
rayed along the sea lanes to support fuel-thirsty warships.8 While there was a cir-
cular quality to his theorizing—the navy protected a nation’s trade, which in
turn generated tariff revenue to support the navy—the commercial element of
seapower seemed to be uppermost in his thinking. Mahan’s self-perpetuating
logic beguiled advocates of seapower in his day, and it has a timeless quality.9 In
today’s China, which aspires to its own place in the sun, appeals to Mahanian
theory are increasingly commonplace.10
If there were any geographic bounds to Mahan’s vision of seapower, he did
not say so. While his writings were appropriate to Great Britain or the United
States, maritime nations with far-flung aspirations, they held only limited rele-
vance for a fledgling power such as imperial Japan, whose aspirations were con-
fined to regional waters and coastal areas. Where should an America rethinking
political nonentanglement apply its nautical energies? In East Asia: for Mahan,
seapower would assure the United States an equitable share of trade in China, a
“carcass” doomed to be devoured by “eagles,” namely the great imperial powers.11
If the United States failed to defend its share of the China trade—Mahanian
thought had a strongly zero-sum tenor to it—it would lose out, with dire conse-
quences for the nation’s prosperity.12 Although he claimed to deplore the pros-
pect of great-power war, Mahan seemed resigned to it if a rival injected “the
alien element of military or political force” into peaceful seagoing commerce.13
Both merchant shipping and the U.S. Navy thus needed secure communica-
tions with East Asia. Communications, wrote Mahan, was “the most important
single element in strategy, political or military.”14 The “eminence of sea power”
lay in its ability to control the sea lines of communication, while the power “to
insure these communications to one’s self, and to interrupt them for an adver-
sary, affects the very root of a nation’s vigor.”15 Perhaps his central precept—and
a staple of discourse in contemporary China—was his concept of “command of
the sea” as “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from
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it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great
common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and fro from the en-
emy’s shores.”16 If the United States hoped to assure access to overseas markets,
proclaimed Mahan, its navy must construct forces able to “fight, with reasonable
chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it” in regions vi-
tal to American maritime traffic.17 This ability to impose a local preponderance
of naval force was the hub of a prosperity-minded policy of seapower.
To “maximize the power of offensive action,” which was “the great end of a
war fleet,” the United States needed a modest force of twenty armored battle-
ships “capable of taking and giving hard knocks” in a major fleet engagement.18
Mahan disparaged guerre de course, or commerce raiding, as the strategy of the
weaker power, hopeless in the face of a navy able to exercise overbearing
seapower. His followers instead sought titanic clashes between concentrated
fleets of battleships—in other words, a latter-day equivalent to Trafalgar.19
THE INFLUENCE OF MAHAN UPON JAPAN
Scholars agree that Japanese strategists leapt at Mahan’s theories. Mahan re-
called that his works had been more widely translated into Japanese than any
other language.20 In 1902, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei paid tribute to Mahan’s
analytical skills, offering him a teaching post at Japan’s Naval Staff College.21 De-
clared Captain John Ingles, a British officer who taught at the Naval Staff College
for six years, “Japanese naval officers are much impressed with the advantage in
a land war of superiority at sea. They have been, I think, faithful students of the
American naval historian, Captain Mahan.”22
But the exact nature of Mahan’s influence on the Japanese naval establish-
ment is a matter of some dispute. One view, seemingly predominant among
contemporary scholars, draws a straight line between Mahanian precepts and
prewar Japanese ideas about seapower. Ronald Spector describes the Japanese as
“true disciples of Mahan.”23 Peter Woolley notes that “Japan took Mahan quite
seriously. His books were carefully studied. His proclamation that navies were
strategically dominant in the modern world was strongly embraced.”24 Richard
Turk affirms that the Imperial Japanese Navy, or IJN, imbibed Mahanian
seapower theory “in purer form” than did any other navy.25 Clearly, a sizable
body of scholarship accepts the notion that Alfred Thayer Mahan lent Japanese
naval strategy its founding precepts and doctrine.26
Other scholars take a more skeptical, more variegated view of the Mahan-Japan
relationship. While Mahan earned acclaim from powerful naval leaders in Japan,
in this account, he was far from the only influence on them. Both Akiyama
Saneyuki and Sat Tetsutar—the former commonly known as the “father of
Japanese naval strategy,” the latter as “Japan’s Mahan”—drew intellectual
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inspiration from many sources, ranging from ancient Japanese “water force”
tactics to the writings of the Chinese theorist Sun Tzu. Sat spent six months
studying naval strategy in the United States, but this came on the heels of eigh-
teen months’ study in Great Britain, which after all was the world’s leading naval
power and the model for aspirants to maritime preeminence.27
Japanese strategists read Mahan’s works selectively, moreover, using his ideas to
ratify preconceived ideas about how Japan should configure and use its navy. Even
in the United States, some analysts have intimated, in a similar vein, that Mahan
was more a propagandist than a perceptive strategic theorist. One, Margaret Tuttle
Sprout, dubbed him an “evangelist of sea power.”28 Roger Dingman, a leading
skeptic, questions the extent of Mahan’s sway over the Japanese naval establish-
ment: “I am skeptical of these claims about Mahan’s influence across the Pacific
for several reasons. They are, in the first place, little more than claims, unsup-
ported by any substantial body of evidence.”29 Continues Dingman:
To suggest that Mahan the publicist of seapower was a tool of potentially great power
to Japanese naval expansionists . . . is not to argue that he was in any sense the cause
of their actions. . . . While they invoked his ideas and used his language in the wake
of the Sino-Japanese War to justify fleet expansion, it was that conflict—and the
prospect of another with Imperial Russia—that provided the much more basic sense
of threat that yielded affirmative Diet votes for a bigger navy.30
Conclude Dingman and like-minded analysts, Mahan was only part of a
mélange of influences on Japanese naval thinkers. Japanese officials welcomed
his emphasis on command of the sea, which seemed to reaffirm their experi-
ences from wars with China and Russia, but they also used him freely to advance
the IJN’s parochial aims.
If Mahan was only one among many intellectual influences on the IJN,
seapower theory was only one among many political, bureaucratic, economic,
and social factors that shaped the thinking of Japanese naval strategists. Notes
one historian, the navy’s rise resulted in great part from an “interplay between
power, pageantry, politics, propaganda, and nationalism.” Naval leaders “signifi-
cantly altered politics, empire, and society in pursuit of their narrower and more
parochial concerns, namely larger budgets.” “Politics,” he concludes, “was the
lifeblood of the Japanese navy, as it was for the navies of Germany, the United
States, and Britain in the same historical period.”31 Mahan made a useful ally for
IJN leaders, helping them rally public support for an ambitious naval pro-
gram—just as he made a useful ally to Theodore Roosevelt and his cohort of
American navalists or, for that matter, to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in his tilts
with socialists in the Reichstag.
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Since the inception of the IJN, moreover, naval leaders had waged a bitter bu-
reaucratic struggle with the Japanese army for preeminence in the eyes of the
government and the populace. Bureaucratic politics tended to deflect Japanese
naval strategy from the Mahanian trajectory it would have followed had the IJN
abided purely by Mahanian precepts. For the Japanese navy of the mid-1890s,
flush with victory over China, “the problem of grand strategy was more than a
topic of theoretical discussion at the Naval Staff College. . . . [T]he navy . . .
pressed for status beyond interservice parity, toward a position of seniority from
which it could set the nation’s strategic priorities and claim the lion’s share of
national prestige, public acclaim, and most important, the government’s mili-
tary budget.”32
To gain this senior position and the funding and prestige it would bring, IJN
leaders realized they needed “a carefully elaborated statement of the preeminent
importance of seapower, an argument backed by the weight of historical exam-
ple, taken not just from Japan’s own past, but also from the far greater experience
of the traditional maritime powers of the West.” In short, they set out to propa-
gate a “public credo” as much as a rational maritime strategy.33 From the West-
ern maritime tradition, the peculiarities of Japan’s geopolitical situation, and
the IJN’s parochial needs, they fashioned a “blue water” school of strategic
thought about the sea.
IMPERIAL JAPAN’S QUASI-MAHANIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
As it took shape, then, Japanese naval strategy bore only partial resemblance to
the seapower-minded strategy Alfred Thayer Mahan espoused. To be sure, lead-
ing IJN thinkers such as Akiyama, Suzuki Kantar, and Sat—who served to-
gether at the Naval Staff College in 1910–11, imparting their vision of Japanese
seapower to the World War II generation of naval officers—accepted Mahan’s
general advocacy of dominant seapower.34 Sat, note David Evans and Mark
Peattie, “seems to have fallen under the spell of Mahan’s navalism in its most
global sense,” namely “command of the seas as the projection of naval power
abroad and thus the means to national greatness.”35 Like Mahan, he accentuated
the connection among naval strength, maritime trade, and world power, predi-
cating his own seapower advocacy on riko o sake, umi o susumu (avoiding the
continent and advancing on the seas). This beckoned naval leaders’ attention to-
ward Southeast Asia.36 This southerly, seafaring outlook on regional strategy
stood in stark contrast to the prescriptions issuing forth from the Japanese army,
which had cast its gaze westward, on the Asian landmass.
In his treatise On the History of Imperial Defense (1908) and other works, Sat
both confirmed the priorities of the Japanese navy, which had been forged in
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victories over the Chinese and Russian navies, and sculpted these priorities in
line with his own meditations on history and theory. He accepted the Mahanian
notion that assured communications was the sine qua non of great maritime
power and that the way to assure communications was to build a battle fleet ca-
pable of sweeping the enemy’s flag from vital waterways. From the battle of
Tsushima, as well as from his study of Mahan, he concluded that the single, deci-
sive fleet engagement was the arbiter of dominant seapower. Further, he clearly
fell into the “big ship, big gun” camp that represented the mainstream of Japa-
nese naval thought in the decades leading up to the Pacific War.37 Japan did opt
for a Mahanian battle fleet, planning for a climactic fleet engagement with the
“hypothetical enemy” Sat Tetsutar envisioned—the U.S. Navy.38
But, as Dingman and other scholars aver, Sat and like-minded Japanese
navalists adapted Mahanian seapower theory to Japan’s distinctive geography
and political and economic imperatives. How, and why, did they depart from
Mahanian precepts? Several factors were in play. First, Mahan had identified six
“principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations”: geographical position;
physical conformation, including climate and “natural productions”; extent of
territory; number of population; character of the people; and character of the
government and national institutions.39 These indices of powerful seafaring na-
tions guided Japan in a different direction from that of the United States, or even
of Great Britain—to which, by virtue of its insular conformation and its geo-
graphic position on the Asian periphery, Japan bore the greatest resemblance.
IJN thinkers recognized that Japan was a regional power with limited re-
sources, whereas Mahan had derived his theories from the example of Britain,
the world’s leading sea power, which had interests and commitments ringing the
world. They also recognized that their government and people saw the nation
not as a sea power in the British sense but as a land power that had wrested away
territorial holdings on the nearby Asian landmass and thus had certain interests
at sea. Navy leaders were forced to wage a lively debate with their army counter-
parts, lobbying for a maritime-oriented foreign policy and strategy. Army lead-
ers argued that the IJN should content itself with defending the Japanese
homeland against attack. Navy leaders pointed to the importance of the sea lines
of communication connecting Japan to vital foreign resources and markets.
They also questioned how the army planned to support expeditionary forces in
Asia absent secure communications with the home islands. Secure sea communi-
cations, upheld by the IJN, were crucial to even the army’s land-oriented vision.40
Naval leaders thus crafted a modified Mahanian naval strategy that was local
and particularistic. They paid little attention to island bases, one of Mahan’s
“pillars” of global seapower, accepting the reality of large-scale territorial con-
quests in nearby Korea, Manchuria, and coastal China. Akiyama, Suzuki, and
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Sat did turn their attentions toward Southeast Asia as they applied Mahanian
precepts to Japanese conditions. But it was not until the 1930s, when the IJN
converted its warships from coal- to oil-fired propulsion, that their case for “ad-
vancing on the seas” in a southerly direction took on real urgency in terms of the
national interest.41 Japanese thinkers realized that the “southern strategy” they
contemplated would likely bring Japan in conflict with the European imperial
powers, which held most of Southeast Asia, and ultimately with the United
States. In the interwar period, accordingly, the IJN devised a strategy aimed at
luring the U.S. Navy across the broad Pacific to a Mahanian fleet engagement,
where it would reprise the battle of Tsushima.42
Second, Japanese mariners were a product of their bureaucratic environment
and their operational experiences, which primed them to look at seapower dif-
ferently than had Mahan, the seapower historian and prophet. Sat and his fel-
low navalists were practitioners, serving in numerous sea billets, whereas the
academically inclined Mahan had seen only scant sea duty and had possessed lit-
tle taste for more. (“I am the man of thought, not the man of action,” confessed
Mahan on one occasion, venturing an explanation as to why his perspective dif-
fered from that of Theodore Roosevelt, by any definition a man of action.)43
They also understood that their immediate task was to win ascendance over the
army in the services’ perennial turf war. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei
rushed Sat’s On the History of Imperial Defense into print to help the navy make
its case for bigger budgets and more ships.44 These priorities help explain why
Japanese navalists’ ideas diverged from those set forth by Mahan, who, comfort-
ably ensconced in Newport, Rhode Island, was largely spared these everyday tra-
vails of navy life.
Japanese strategists focused primarily on tactics and operations rather than
the more rarefied dimensions of naval warfare, in large part because, in contrast
to their American counterparts, they learned about naval strategy more from
combat experience than from abstract seapower theory. Observes Dingman,
leading Japanese theorists were combat veterans of the Sino-Japanese and
Russo-Japanese wars. Thus “they turned more to their own empire’s recent his-
tory than to the more distant past as Mahan had,” and their “pens were mobi-
lized more to support specific building programs than to elucidate general
principles.”45 Their proposals were geared to big ships and big guns. Says
Spector, “Japanese admirals were too faithful students of Mahan to put their
faith for ultimate victory in any weapon except the battleship.”46
Tactics and even hardware, then, propelled Japanese naval thought at least as
much as did the ideal relationship among strategic theory, naval strategy, and
force structure. In effect the IJN inverted this relationship, fitting seapower the-
ory around its immediate needs for ships, budgets, and bureaucratic supremacy.
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JAPAN’S POSTWAR MARITIME POSTURE
“One searches the pages of recent histories of the Imperial Japanese Navy in vain
for any mention of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” declares Roger Dingman.47 Just so.
Written to commemorate the centennial of the Russo-Japanese War, a recent
Naval War College Review article by Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, a senior JSMDF
officer, is nearly mute on Mahan.48 Interviews with retired officers from the
Maritime Self-Defense Force likewise imply that Mahan is missing from Japa-
nese strategic thought today. Indeed, the MSDF has seemingly allowed strategic
thought to languish entirely, owing primarily to Japan’s close alliance with the
United States. Asked to describe the sources of Japanese seapower thinking,
these officers invariably call for reinforcing the alliance with the United States
and its navy.49 While joining in a composite maritime force with the U.S. Navy
confers undoubted benefits on the MSDF—giving the service the offensive
punch it lacks as a matter of policy and law—Japan’s dependence on its super-
power partner clearly has marked drawbacks.
The demise of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1945 did not end naval planning
for Tokyo, even if it did discredit Alfred Thayer Mahan and other thinkers; it
simply starved Japanese naval planning of intellectual sustenance. Former IJN
officers soon began rebuilding the nation’s maritime forces with full approval
and oversight from the American occupation authorities. Indeed, even before
the formal surrender ceremonies on board the Missouri, the United States or-
dered Japan to clear heavily mined areas along the Japanese coast.50 The ad hoc
flotilla of minesweepers formed for this purpose, using remnants of the imperial
navy, became the nucleus for postwar Japanese naval power.51
It quickly became clear that a functioning institution was required to safe-
guard Japan’s basic maritime interests. In 1948, accordingly, the Japanese gov-
ernment established the Maritime Safety Agency, the precursor to the Maritime
Self-Defense Force. The Korean War induced U.S. defense planners to seek Japa-
nese military assistance. Unbeknownst to the outside world, Japanese mine-
sweepers were deployed to combat zones off the Korean Peninsula under
American operational command, performing a critical support function that
the U.S. Seventh Fleet lacked.52 Postwar Japan, then, devised a navy only in re-
sponse to the demands of its occupiers. Strategic thinking about naval opera-
tions independent of the United States was absent from the start.
Following the full restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952, Tokyo rapidly
expanded its maritime responsibilities. Strikingly, the 1952 U.S.-Japan defense
treaty signed at San Francisco made the security of the Far East—implicitly in-
cluding Japan’s maritime environs—a key area of responsibility for the alliance.
But the broad geographic scope of the alliance had less to do with Japan’s intrin-
sic needs than with America’s emerging containment strategy in Asia.53
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Four years after the MSDF entered service in 1954, the Japan Defense Agency
(JDA) unveiled its first formal defense buildup plan (1958–60), which set forth
three central tasks for Japan’s maritime defense. First, submarines were deemed
the most pressing threat; accordingly, the MSDF’s primary mission was to con-
duct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations in waters adjacent to the Japa-
nese archipelago.54 A second, equally urgent mission was to protect the sea lines
of communication (SLOCs). Third, the MSDF needed to defend against a direct
invasion from the sea. These three pillars informed subsequent four-year plans
and still form the basis for Japan’s maritime defense posture. Renewed attention
to SLOC defense may or may not have reflected thinking inherited from Japan’s
prewar strategic traditions, but there was little sign that Tokyo thought about
seapower in rigorous theoretical terms. Wartime defeat had banished Mahan
from the Japanese lexicon, and no one had taken his place.
An intriguing episode during this period illustrates Japan’s early naval ambi-
tions in the Cold War.55 In 1960, as a part of the regular revision and update of
the first defense plan, the MSDF floated a proposal to acquire a helicopter carrier
for ASW operations. The initial plan for a six-thousand-ton vessel was revised
upward, calling for an eleven-thousand-ton ship capable of carrying up to eigh-
teen helicopters. Such a project, if executed, would have represented a quantum
leap in the tonnage and capability of Japan’s nascent postwar fleet. Notably, the
Japanese cited American requests for sea-based helicopter support during the
Korean War as precedent for a carrier acquisition. (In 1953 the United States had
offered to lease Tokyo a seven-thousand-ton escort carrier to track Soviet sub-
marines, while Tokyo considered converting a transport ship into a carrier.)
Japanese aversion to military matters, amplified by bureaucratic politics, ulti-
mately nullified the MSDF’s bid for a carrier, but its ambitions along these lines
endured. It crafted a fleet centered on helicopter-carrying destroyers, in an effort
to sidestep political objections to aircraft carriers. The service eventually got its
wish three decades later (discussed below). A carrier of that capacity would have
substantially bolstered Japan’s ASW capacity, but in these early days the MSDF
clearly ignored the political climate, budgetary realities, and, most importantly,
the proposed vessel’s place in Japan’s long-term maritime strategy. The MSDF’s
tendency to covet the latest in naval technology without reference to a broader
naval strategy or Japan’s political needs persists to this day.
Geopolitical events and domestic debates reinforced the MSDF’s central role
in securing the nation’s welfare. The 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty added a “Far East clause” that more explicitly codified the need to protect
Japan’s nautical environment while widening allied cooperation to the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines. To ease strategic pressures on a
nation weary from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon promulgated the “Guam
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Doctrine,” calling on U.S. allies to shoulder responsibilities in proportion to
their needs and capabilities. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
declared publicly that Korea and Taiwan were areas of security concern for Ja-
pan. Response to a cross-strait contingency would have required the MSDF to
project forces far beyond the Japanese home islands.56 Again, both the Far East
and Taiwan clauses served America’s strategic interests in Asia rhetorically, but
they supplied no concrete guidance on how to harness Japan’s naval strategy and
capabilities for contingencies beyond defense of the home islands.
As Japan agreed in principle to take on greater responsibilities, this mismatch
in policy and strategy stood in ever sharper relief, until it became impossible to
overlook. As a consequence, genuine debate about the nation’s maritime priori-
ties emerged. Despite politicians’ declarations that Japan had acquired capabili-
ties adequate to defend its maritime interests by the early 1970s, the force
structure continued to exhibit serious deficiencies.57 Recognizing this misalign-
ment between political ends and naval means, Osamu Kaihara, a secretary gen-
eral of the National Defense Council, argued that Japan should dramatically
scale back its maritime posture, setting limited objectives that the MSDF could
realistically achieve. Japan’s SLOCs could be cut at countless points on the map,
he argued; protecting far-flung sea lanes exceeded Japan’s maritime capacity.
Kaihara urged Tokyo to restructure the JMSDF to resemble a coast guard geared
exclusively to defending the home islands from a direct invasion.
In contrast, Hideo Sekino, a respected commentator on defense affairs, con-
sidered a direct Soviet invasion unlikely. Given Japan’s dependence on overseas
resources, the nation was most vulnerable to commerce raiding in a conflict. The
1973 Arab oil embargo lent credence to Sekino’s basic premise and to his recom-
mendation that Tokyo procure the wherewithal to defend sea lanes as far away as
northern Indonesia. Sekino insisted that such a posture would be fully compati-
ble with American regional strategy in Asia, enabling Japan to influence events
within the alliance.58 Interestingly, the most persuasive aspect of Sekino’s argu-
ment was his claim that Japan could best support U.S. strategic interests in Asia
by heeding his recommendations.
Broader geopolitical alignments quickly overtook events. U.S.-Soviet détente
and Nixon’s dramatic opening to China in the early 1970s fed Japanese fears that
Washington was preparing to abandon the alliance. In response, the Japanese
government issued its first comprehensive report on how the force it envi-
sioned—based on a “standard defense force concept”—would meet Tokyo’s na-
tional security objectives. Strikingly, it took Japan nearly a quarter of a century
to address the most basic responsibility of any nation: matching national policy
with a coherent strategy and supporting forces. But little serious thought went
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into the report. If Japanese officials ever revisited their basic assumptions, the
document betrayed little sign of it.
In keeping with the maritime priorities established more than two decades
before, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) provided guide-
lines for the MSDF to defend against a direct invasion of the home islands; pro-
vide warning and defense against threats to Japan’s coastal areas; protect major
ports and straits; and conduct active air reconnaissance and surveillance of the
seas adjacent to Japan’s Pacific coast (out to three hundred miles) and in the
Sea of Japan (perhaps one to two hundred miles from Japan’s west coast).59
The NDPO’s directives envisioned a fleet centering on modern destroyers,
submarines, and fixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft. Two years later, Tokyo
and Washington signed Guidelines for Defense Cooperation that formally com-
mitted Japan to maintaining “peace and stability” across the Asia-Pacific region.
The expansiveness of the outline and the guidelines sealed the ascendance of
Sekino’s vision, emphasizing the complementary role Japan could play in Amer-
ican security strategy.
By the 1980s, the revival of Cold War competition and a convergence of Japa-
nese and U.S. strategic interests had given rise to unprecedented naval coopera-
tion. In 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki sketched a Japanese defense perimeter
extending a thousand miles from Japanese shores.60 Two years later a U.S.-
Japanese study group examined the potential for combined operations to defend
SLOCs against the Soviets. For the rest of the decade, American and Japanese na-
val forces perfected the art of combined ASW, working to bottle up Soviet sub-
marine forces in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. During this period the MSDF
matured into a genuine partner of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater. By the end
of the Cold War, the JMSDF was second only to the United States in Asian waters.
Whatever its benefits, closer allied collaboration held serious risks for Japan.
According to one study, “The SDF’s emphasis on the procurement of interceptor
aircraft and antisubmarine warfare ships designed to complement and defend
U.S. offensive military assets operating from Japan meant that the structure of
its defense force became highly skewed, to the point that it lacked the balanced
range of capabilities necessary to defend Japan independent of the United
States.”61 Any prudent theorist of naval affairs would have frowned upon this ap-
parent shortsightedness—especially in a nation whose destiny lay on the seas.
Several patterns emerge from this brief survey of MSDF history. First, the Jap-
anese took to heart the bitter lessons of World War II, when the IJN’s failure to
defend commercial shipping against U.S. submarines led to disaster for the war-
time Japanese economy. Tokyo’s near-obsessive focus on sea-lane defense during
the Cold War stemmed in part from its desire to avoid a replay of these events.
Second, major historical events, namely the Korean War and the broader Cold
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War, seemed to underscore the importance of defending the sea lanes. From the
start, Japanese planners focused on antisubmarine and antimine warfare, and
subsequent strategy making deviated little from these central missions. Third,
Tokyo’s rigid adherence to the ill-defined mission of SLOC defense left the
MSDF’s capabilities lagging far behind its ambitious maritime vision. The ensu-
ing policy-strategy mismatch would not be repaired until the 1980s.
Fourth, preparations for SLOC defense served the allies’ needs asymmetri-
cally. The MSDF’s primary tasks filled serious gaps in American ASW and
mine-warfare capability while dovetailing fully with the U.S. strategy of contain-
ing Soviet naval power. Tokyo was able to exercise greater influence within the
alliance, as the founders of postwar Japan had hoped, but their grand bargain
entailed serious risks that persist today. Japanese naval strategy was always sub-
ordinate to the U.S. regional posture in Asia. It is no exaggeration to observe that
the MSDF lacked an independent identity, becoming a mere appendage of the
U.S. military. The American imprint on the Japanese navy is unmistakable. In-
deed, Japanese naval officers revere Admiral Arleigh Burke, not one of their own,
as “the father of the JMSDF.”62 But Japan’s heavy reliance on American concepts,
doctrine, and equipment amounted to intellectual buck-passing.
Finally, postwar Japan is a case study in the pitfalls of strategy making with-
out a larger theoretical framework. Policy documents set forth hazily defined
notions of regional peace and stability, while service-level directives focus over-
whelmingly on operations (sea-lane defense), tactics, and equipment. The tissue
that binds strategy to national policy is tenuous, if indeed it exists. Imperial Ja-
pan’s derivative of Mahanian strategic theory clearly did not outlive World War
II. Nor do Japanese planners refer explicitly to Sir Julian Corbett’s theories,
which were predicated almost exclusively on controlling sea communications,
even though the menace of guerre de course transfixed Japanese naval officials.63
THE POST–COLD WAR ERA AND BEYOND: THE MSDF DIVERSIFIES
The security environment grew more and more complex in the post–Cold War
epoch, even as domestic and international constituencies prodded Japan to step
up its efforts to maintain peace and stability, commensurate with its economic
power. The MSDF saw its roles and missions grow accordingly, performing tasks
well beyond homeland and sea-lane defense.64 Whether this diversification will
impel the MSDF to transform itself into a service with all the trappings of a tra-
ditional navy remains to be seen.
Japan got off to a rough start as the superpower rivalry neared its end. During
the 1990–91 Gulf War, Tokyo’s failure to provide meaningful military assistance
provoked accusations, both domestically and abroad, that Tokyo had indulged
in free-riding and “checkbook diplomacy.” Notably, however, the MSDF ended
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up playing a critical, path-breaking role, partly reversing the harsh international
verdict. The minesweeping force Japan deployed to the Persian Gulf after hostili-
ties had ceased boasted state-of-the-art equipment, and the MSDF discharged
its mission. Harking back to the Korean War, Japanese forces again performed
functions that outstripped U.S. Navy capabilities in-theater.
Determined not to suffer another public-relations disaster, the Japanese Diet
passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, easing restrictions on
overseas deployments of Japanese units. The legislation marked the beginning
of unprecedented international activism. Starting in 1992, the MSDF took part
in numerous relief and peacekeeping operations. Its first such effort involved trans-
porting personnel and equipment to Cambodia for a United Nations–mandated
peacekeeping mission. The carrier-like Osumi-class transport vessels (LST, or
landing ship tank) debuted during the 1999 East Timor crisis, arousing suspi-
cions in some quarters that Japan was taking its first step to enhance power pro-
jection. Tokyo’s embrace of international operations was only the beginning of
the MSDF’s expansion in the nautical arena.
Throughout the 1990s, Japan sought to organize regional initiatives to com-
bat piracy in Southeast Asia. As early as 1997, the National Institute for Defense
Studies, the JDA’s in-house think tank, proposed an ambitious security enter-
prise dubbed “Ocean Peace Keeping” (OPK). The OPK concept envisioned a
standing maritime security force composed of naval contingents from nearby
states. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi formally proposed a regional coast guard at
the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit. While Obuchi’s proposal failed to catch on due to
its perceived radical nature, successive prime ministers lobbied for the OPK ini-
tiative in regional forums.65 When OPK faltered, the Japanese government
pressed for bilateral cooperation, including combined exercises and aid. Tokyo
achieved considerable success with this more modest approach, forging agree-
ments with littoral states such as Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Thailand.66
The 11 September terrorist attacks created new incentives for Japan to ex-
pand its maritime missions. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pushed legisla-
tion through the Diet permitting the Self-Defense Forces to provide rear-area
military support to allied forces operating in the Indian Ocean. The MSDF dis-
patched combat logistics ships, transports, and escorts on a rotating basis. No-
tably, the MSDF’s responsibilities and capabilities gradually grew. Its refueling
mission, initially limited to U.S. and British vessels, came to include eight other
coalition partners, with Japan meeting some 30 percent of allied fuel demand.67
As of September 2005, Japanese oilers had dispensed some 410 million liters
of fuel, worth $140 million, free of charge. 68 In December 2002, after some
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prodding from the United States, Japan reluctantly agreed to deploy a frontline
Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean.69
Japan assumed an assertive stance before and after the 2003 Iraq war. While
many Japanese politicians and most citizens questioned the legitimacy of the in-
vasion, Koizumi stood firmly behind the George W. Bush administration’s claim
that Iraq was a central front in the global war on terror. After the Diet enacted
the necessary legislation, Tokyo dispatched six hundred ground troops to
Samawah, a city considered secure, in a noncombat role. The MSDF employed
its Osumi-class ships to support this mission.
Also in 2003, as part of its broad-based support for the U.S.-led war on terror,
Tokyo acceded to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in an effort to halt
the proliferation of weapons technology at sea, aloft, and ashore.70 A “core” par-
ticipant in the PSI, Japan has taken part in a series of highly visible exercises held
across the globe. Because Japanese law forbade the MSDF to board ships in
peacetime, MSDF observers watched the Japanese Coast Guard during the first
round of multinational exercises. To correct this awkward arrangement, one of
the “war contingency bills” approved by the Diet in May 2004 loosened restric-
tions on the MSDF. In October 2004 Japan hosted its first PSI exercise, TEAM
SAMURAI, but the MSDF was still limited to patrol and intelligence operations. It
dispatched a destroyer, two P-3C surveillance aircraft, and two helicopters to the
first PSI drill in Southeast Asia, which Singapore hosted in August 2005.
Humanitarian imperatives also raised the profile of the MSDF. In January
2005, Japan undertook its largest postwar military deployment, sending MSDF
units to Indonesia in response to the devastating December 2004 tsunami.
Numbering approximately one thousand personnel, the relief task force in-
cluded three ships, five helicopters, and two C-130 transport aircraft. The MSDF
dispatched an Osumi-class transport ship, along with a refueling vessel and an
escort destroyer, to support helicopter operations off the coast of Aceh.71 Tokyo
called on a naval flotilla returning from patrols in the Indian Ocean to furnish
additional assistance.72 The mission, in which Japanese forces worked from an
integrated command post in Thailand, represented the first time the three
Self-Defense Force (SDF) services had operated jointly.
Tokyo’s most recent reassessment of its defense policy and military modern-
ization programs conforms to its activism over the past five years. The National
Defense Program Guidelines issued in December 2004 reaffirmed Japan’s varie-
gated security posture, instructing the SDF to prepare for “new threats and di-
verse situations” and for any international operations that might arise.73 The
NDPG mandates the capacity to defend against ballistic-missile attacks, respond
to incursions by enemy special-operations forces, defeat an invasion of Japan’s
offshore islands, patrol and prevent intrusion into Japan’s surrounding seas and
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airspace, and manage the effects of weapons-of-mass-destruction attacks. The
JMSDF has an ambitious slate of missions.
Accordingly, the latest Mid-Term Defense Program, which sets out
force-structure priorities to meet the NDPG’s directives, forecasts sizable pro-
curements of destroyers, submarines, and fixed- and rotary-wing patrol aircraft
during fiscal years 2005–2009. Three of Japan’s four Aegis destroyers will under-
go upgrades to bolster their anti-ballistic-missile capabilities, while two new
Aegis ships will join the fleet over the next decade. These increases will be bal-
anced against efforts to streamline and consolidate the overall fleet, while
growth rates in the annual defense budget will be trimmed. The potential
disjunction between acquisition plans and resources has raised concerns about
feasibility and sustainability.74
The planned construction of a next-generation, 13,500-ton, helicopter-carrying
destroyer signifies a potentially new direction for the MSDF, in which the service
realizes one of its decades-old aspirations. The “16DDH”-class ship has at-
tracted significant media and Diet attention, owing to its resemblance to an air-
craft carrier.75 The vessel’s design features a starboard-side island superstructure
and an uninterrupted flight deck, prompting observers to speculate that Japan
may be eyeing a carrier capable of handling Harrier-like aircraft. Notes one ana-
lyst, “The configuration of the Osumi and the new DDH class indicates that Japan
is rehearsing carrier-building technology to reserve for itself this potential mili-
tary option; and thus, that it is considering discarding the constitutional prohi-
bition on the acquisition of power-projection capabilities.”76
In the meantime, the 16DDH would fulfill many of the peacetime and war-
time missions elaborated in the NDPG.77 As a wartime flagship, the 16DDH
would serve as a command-and-control platform, coordinating the activities of
other units while its organic helicopters conducted ASW operations. During
peacetime operations, or “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), the
16DDH would join the Osumi-class ships for peacekeeping and relief operations,
as well as the “diverse situations” Japan foresees confronting on the high seas.
This array of maritime activities clearly reflects greater confidence on the part
of Japan’s political elite that the MSDF can cope effectively with demanding mis-
sions. The new defense plans also suggest that Japanese power-projection capac-
ity will continue to grow. This convergence of intent and capability could very
well yield a traditional maritime power along the East Asian littoral.
Such a shift would surely have implications for the regional configuration of
power in Northeast Asia and for global security, but several important caveats
are in order. First, Japan’s activism on the high seas today represents the culmi-
nation of gradual, modest steps taken over fifteen years. This long gestation pe-
riod permitted decision makers to ease the prohibitions against overseas
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deployment without unduly alarming government officials or the Japanese elec-
torate. Second, Tokyo’s decisions to employ maritime forces were driven primar-
ily by crisis and, often, by American pressure to act. The Gulf War fiasco
epitomized the highly reactive nature of Japanese decision making. Third, Japan’s
ability to respond to crisis beyond the home islands was largely a by-product of
enhancements to its alliance with the United States. For instance, Japan’s im-
pressive involvement in the war on terror would have been impossible absent the
allied renewal process that began in the mid-1990s. Fourth, at a broader level,
the MSDF largely remains an appendage of American maritime strategy, bereft
of an independent, coherent naval strategy. This situation is acceptable in most
contingencies, when Tokyo can count on support from Washington, but it will
prove problematic if and when Japan needs to act alone.
Finally, Japan’s expansion of the MSDF’s roles and missions does entail strate-
gic risks. The looming consolidation and streamlining of frontline forces suggest
that Japanese political and military leaders believe the MSDF can do more with
less, or at any rate more with the same forces. Such a posture makes eminent sense
if future crises take the form of MOOTW, but this planning parameter assumes
away the potential for higher-intensity confrontations, including traditional
force-on-force engagements on the open seas. This trend is further evidence of
Japan’s break with Mahanian thought since World War II—and it is occurring at a
moment in history when another resurgent military power’s seafaring ambitions
could usher in a new age of Mahan.
CHINA’S RISE: COLLISION COURSE AHEAD?
Sino-Japanese relations have seen better days. Some of the problems that have
ratcheted the two countries’ mutual ambivalence to new highs are perennial fea-
tures of the relationship, while others are new and possibly more difficult to
manage. Among the latter, early signs of maritime competition have appeared in
the past two years. Four nautical issues have dogged bilateral ties: China’s rapid
naval modernization, ongoing cross-strait tensions, boundary and resource dis-
putes in the East China Sea, and incidents at sea. All four problems have followed
patterns that spell trouble for future Sino-Japanese maritime interactions.
In November 2004, for instance, a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine
intruded into Japanese territorial waters, prompting the JMSDF to track the vessel
and Koizumi’s government to issue a rare public demand for an apology. A newly
revised National Defense Program Outline appeared that same month, declaring
that China’s naval operations required greater vigilance on the MSDF’s part. In
February 2005, Tokyo unexpectedly announced that the Japanese Coast Guard
would formally take charge of a lighthouse erected by nationalists in the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, sparking public protests in China. Beijing has also
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placed on the table objections to Tokyo’s claims to exclusive economic zones sur-
rounding Japanese-owned atolls in the Pacific.78 Similarly, a joint U.S.-Japanese
declaration that the two countries shared “common strategic objectives” in the
Taiwan Strait elicited angry recriminations from Beijing.
Ongoing territorial disputes in the East China Sea resurfaced in the summer
and fall of 2005, after the Japanese government announced that it would grant
certain companies the right to drill for gas deposits in and near contested areas.
When China lodged a protest, Japan accused Beijing of starting extraction oper-
ations. In an unprecedented show of force, China dispatched a naval flotilla led
by Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers to the vicinity of the gas field,
even as negotiators on both sides sought to defuse the situation. A Chinese ship
reportedly trained its guns on a Japanese P-3C patrol aircraft.79 In August the
JDA specifically declared, in its annual defense white paper, that China’s growing
naval power in Asia was a matter of concern.80 Following the release of the white
paper, the head of the JDA, Yoshinori Ohno, averred that Chinese maritime ac-
tivities required attention and called on Beijing to divulge more information
about its military expenditures. The Japanese media subsequently leaked a
highly classified scenario-planning document outlining a robust military strat-
egy for repelling any Chinese invasion of the Senkaku Islands.
Given this escalating set of events, it has become increasingly urgent to discern
how Japanese and Chinese seapower might interact in the future. One useful
method for assessing this Sino-Japanese dynamic is to analyze Chinese strategic
thinking about naval power and compare it against Japan’s approach. Such a com-
parative analysis will hint at strengths and weaknesses in the MSDF’s defense pos-
ture, suggesting whether and how Tokyo ought to realign its priorities.
The disparity between Chinese and Japanese strategic thought about mari-
time affairs could scarcely be sharper. In recent years a vocal school of thought in
Beijing has noticed that Alfred Thayer Mahan’s works furnish both the logic and
the vocabulary with which to argue for assertive seapower.81 Proponents of this
school of thought write and speak in avowedly Mahanian terms, and in many
cases they explicitly cite his works to justify an ambitious maritime strategy. In
particular, his portrayal of seapower as “overbearing power” pervades these Chi-
nese thinkers’ discourse on maritime affairs. Should the Mahanians win out
among the cacophony of voices clamoring for the attention of senior policy
makers in Beijing, Chinese strategy will take on distinctly offensive overtones.82
Japanese strategists and their American partners must remain mindful of this
prospect.
Perhaps the most thoughtful—though by no means the only—spokesman
for China’s Mahanian school is Professor Ni Lexiong of the Research Institute of
War and Culture, Eastern China Science and Engineering University. Professor
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Ni uses seapower theory to evaluate the competing claims of advocates of
seapower and advocates of globalization. The latter, he contends, believe
[that] China should not act by following the traditional sea power theory in pursuing
a strong Navy, because today’s world situation is different from the time of Mahan . . .
that the globalization of the world’s economy has made various countries’ interests
interconnected, mutually dependent on each other to a greater degree, and that if a
country wants to preserve its life line at sea, the only way to do so is to go through
“cooperation” rather than the traditional “solo fight.”83
Globalization theorists, notes Ni, typically urge Beijing to refrain from a na-
val arms buildup. To do so would alert “today’s naval hegemon,” the United
States, “making China’s naval development a self-destructive play with fire,”
reminiscent of imperial Germany’s quixotic bid for seapower at the turn of the
nineteenth century.84
Ni hedges by allowing for the possibility that the world is entering a Kantian
era of perpetual peace, as many globalization enthusiasts maintain, but he pos-
tulates that even a pacific international system will ultimately depend on force.
In either case, then, China should build up its naval forces. If the globalization
theorists have it right, China will need a muscular navy to play its part in the
“world navy,” when one emerges, and to help along the transition to a peaceful
international order. Ni clearly believes, however, that the world has not yet
evolved beyond its Hobbesian state, in which nations must maintain powerful
military forces as a means of self-help. Thus “it is China’s necessary choice to
build up a strong sea power” to guard against “the threats to our ‘outward-leaning
economy’ by some strong nations”—again, code for the United States—in the
lingering “Hobbesian era” he perceives.85
Professor Ni reminds his readers of China’s humiliation at Japanese hands in
1894–95, when a powerful Japanese battle fleet crushed that of the Qing dynasty.
“The key to winning that war was to gain the command of the sea,” he proclaims.
Today’s China should emulate imperial Japan’s example, keeping in mind that
Mahan “believed that whoever could control the sea would win the war and change
history; that command of the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the
seas; that the outcome of decisive naval battles is determined by the strength of fire
power on each side of the engagement.”86 This is scarcely the language of someone
predisposed to “protracted defensive resistance,”the term used by some Western an-
alysts to describe China’s naval strategy.87 If indeed this sort of thinking comes to
dominate policy discourse in Beijing, Washington and its Asian partners will be
compelled to come to terms with a newly assertive naval strategy on Beijing’s part. It
behooves Tokyo to relearn its Mahan and to revisit the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
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history, if for no other reason than to get a glimpse into what a prospective competi-
tor may do in maritime East Asia.
What kinds of problems might these trends in Chinese maritime strategy
pose for Japan? Observers in certain quarters of Japan’s strategic community
have begun to grasp the potential Mahanian challenge that Chinese seapower
could present. Studies assessing Chinese maritime intentions and the Sino-Japanese
military balance on the high seas have become more and more common.88 The
Japanese worry that China may be eyeing Japan’s offshore islands as it extends its
naval power eastward. One author cites the creeping expansion of China’s naval
presence in the South China Sea as a worrisome precedent.89 Indeed, some ana-
lysts and authorities in China have hinted subtly at challenging Japan’s legal inter-
pretation of its administrative and sovereign prerogatives in the East China Sea,
including those pertaining to Okinawa. A Japanese commentator alleges that
Beijing harbors hegemonic ambitions to reestablish control over all territories
governed by the Qing dynasty.90
Hideaki Kaneda, a retired JMSDF vice admiral, explicitly links China’s
emerging maritime strategy to Mahan. Kaneda argues that China meets Mahan’s
six tests of seapower, three of which are favorable geography, a large population,
and the national will to compete on the high seas. He observes that the Chinese
are constructing strategic relationships and military bases along the sea lanes
stretching from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf, sea lanes that convey
the energy resources and other commodities that sustain China’s economic
well-being. Under Mahanian logic, this emerging diplomatic and defense infra-
structure (also known as a “string of pearls” ) would permit larger-scale military
deployments in the future to protect Chinese commerce.91 He concludes, “All of
Asia must wake up to the arrival of Chinese-style aggressive ‘sea power.’ Japan, in
particular, must reformulate its national maritime strategy with this in mind.”92
A highly influential journalist, Yoichi Funabashi, implicitly endorses Mahan’s
view that national will is a key determinant of seapower. Despite the nautical
character of Japan’s geography, Funabashi bemoans the Japanese people’s indif-
ference to maritime matters, imploring Japan “to once again devise a maritime
strategy aimed at opening up the four seas that surround it and taking advantage
of the blessings of the oceans.” As for China, he observes, “China is a major con-
tinental power on the rise. By contrast, Japan is expected to show its ‘difference’
and ‘strengths’ as a major maritime power more than ever. It should maintain
‘free navigation’ to build peace and stability in Asia seas and incorporate China
in the framework.”93 Despite his somewhat conciliatory tone, Funabashi insists
that Japan must nurture a national character that embraces maritime power if it
hopes to compete with China on the world stage.
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Jun Kitamura, a Japanese consultant to the U.S. Pacific Command, advocates
a far more bellicose stance vis-à-vis China. He too complains that “Japan lacks a
sense of caution in regard to China’s rapid military expansion.” Pointing to
China’s maturing submarine force, he criticizes the Japanese government for
failing to “fathom the geopolitical significance of the fighting power of sub-
marines in today’s international community.” To remedy the apparent shortfall
in national maritime consciousness, Kitamura urges the Japanese people to “estab-
lish clear national strategies for Japan on their own, and rebuild their military
power as effective means to guarantee the strategies as soon as possible.” Spe-
cifically, he recommends shifting Japan’s line of defense seaward, arguing that
repulsing a direct invasion would be too late and too costly. To support a forward
defense, he says, the JMSDF needs to double in size, acquire a panoply of offen-
sive weaponry, build massive naval bases, and develop its own intelligence infra-
structure. Most controversially, he presses for an alliance with Taiwan that keeps
the island from falling into Chinese hands, thereby safeguarding Japanese sea
lanes adjoining the island.94
Whatever the merits of and differences among these analyses, they all concur
on one important priority: a fundamental reassessment of Japan’s maritime
strategy that helps the JMSDF maintain its edge as China’s naval power grows.
The apparent shift in tone and urgency among these well-respected observers
suggests that a spirited debate about Japan’s maritime posture, harking back to
the Sekino-Kaihara debate, may be in the making. Whether or not Japan’s na-
tional policy and maritime strategy will veer in the direction these commenta-
tors espouse remains to be seen.
In policy terms, the Japanese government has responded concretely to the po-
tential Chinese challenge. Reflecting worries about Beijing’s intentions toward
the offshore islands, the latest defense white paper sets the capacity to stage an
effective response to island invasion as a major priority. Significantly, the report
states, “If there is an indication noticed in advance, an operation shall be con-
ducted to prevent invasion by the enemy’s unit. If there is no indication in ad-
vance and the islands in question were occupied, an operation shall be
conducted to defeat the enemy.”95 For the first time, the Ground SDF forces re-
cently joined the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined exercises to defend
offshore islands.96 The Maritime Self-Defense Force would play a central role in
carrying ground troops in such a defensive operation. The JMSDF has also en-
gaged in antisubmarine drills with the U.S. Navy near Okinawan waters.97
A recent study considers how the SDF’s capabilities would measure up against
China’s military in combat over Japan’s offshore islands. The study postulates that
if the Chinese side were able to surprise Japan and rapidly occupy the Sakishima
Islands, the SDF would find it difficult if not impossible to dislodge enemy forces
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on its own. Given the short distances involved, land-based Chinese fighter aircraft
could easily provide protective cover against Japanese forces, while Japanese air-
craft would have much shorter loiter times in the area. The author of the study
concludes that a light aircraft carrier capable of handling vertical/short-takeoff-
and-landing aircraft would be required to counter such an invasion.98 Regardless
of whether this analysis carries any policy weight, the bluntness with which it dis-
cusses a Sino-Japanese confrontation hints at changes in the public mood in Japan
with regard to a Chinese maritime challenge.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JMSDF
From the foregoing analysis of Japanese strategic thought, it is possible to ven-
ture a few observations and findings.
Applying Strategic Theory Is Tough. Dogmatic adherence to seapower theory
can be harmful if not fatal to maritime nations. So can an indifference to funda-
mental principles of seapower that unmoors strategy and force planning from
any larger sense of national policy and grand strategy. Over the past century, Ja-
pan has exhibited extreme tendencies in both directions. In the case of prewar
Japan, a variant of Mahanian dogma seeped into the Japanese consciousness
about naval power, prodding the IJN leadership into fateful decisions about
force structure and operational doctrine. Today, Japan’s niche—and therefore
highly unbalanced—capabilities and strategy derive from unquestioned as-
sumptions about American security commitments. This could serve Japanese
maritime interests ill over the long run.
China’s Rise Could Portend Trouble. An area that requires further research is
how two differing national approaches to seapower might intersect in practice.
Substantial evidence indicates that Beijing is succumbing to Mahan’s beguiling
logic. If this is so, how will a post-Mahanian JMSDF, unaccustomed to strategic
thought in any of its guises, interact with a Chinese navy that is fascinated with
Mahan? This question has gained substantial policy urgency over the past few
years, as naval rivalry between the two powers has taken hold. Is Japan endanger-
ing itself by directing the MSDF to keep performing its full array of Cold War–
era missions while piling on new international operations, all without boosting
defense spending? How might future acquisitions affect Japan’s maritime secu-
rity? Specifically, would ASW and minesweeping prove adequate in a tilt with
the People’s Liberation Army Navy?
America Needs a More Coherent Naval Strategy. Assuming the United States
wishes to maintain its naval preeminence in Asia indefinitely, it must carefully
reexamine its maritime strategy in the region. Tokyo should urge Washington to
do so, and it should take an active hand in formulating combined strategy. Key
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U.S. policy documents such as “Seapower 21” and the latest Quadrennial De-
fense Review represent sorry excuses for strategy, framed in terms too general
and abstract to provide meaningful guidance. Many Japanese strategic thinkers,
accordingly, have begun reassessing the benefits and costs of a far more inde-
pendent posture in the maritime realm. How would such an outcome benefit or
harm the United States? If American policy makers have thought about this
prospect, they give no sign of it. Washington’s assumption that Tokyo will auto-
matically follow its lead—or, for that matter, Tokyo’s assumption that Washing-
ton will furnish military support even in situations that do not engage U.S.
interests—could engender mutually unrealistic assumptions about the two
partners’ wills and capabilities, especially in times of crisis or war. Suppose the
United States decided that a Chinese invasion of Japan’s offshore islands fell out-
side of the purview of the defense treaty. What then for the JMSDF?
Japan Needs a Theorist. It behooves the policy community in Tokyo to start
thinking ahead now about how Japan should handle contingencies that threaten
to strain the security alliance or leave the United States standing on the sidelines.
If Alfred Thayer Mahan is no longer a useful guide to Japanese maritime strat-
egy, who is? Julian Corbett’s writings offer a good starting point for this sorely
needed debate and for a broader renaissance of strategic thought in Japan.
Corbett fits better with contemporary Japanese political and strategic culture
than does Mahan. He favored big ideas, not technical details or specific weapons
systems; he was not a blue-water theorist to the same degree as Mahan; his vision
was not universalist like that of Mahan but admitted of regional strategies such
as Japan’s; and he was not fixated on absolute victory at sea. Rather, Corbett held
out the possibility of limited naval operations aimed at limited political and
strategic objectives—a trait that could endear him to a Japanese populace and
government still averse to the use of force. And, like today’s MSDF leadership, he
depicted controlling maritime communications as the foremost challenge fac-
ing practitioners of naval operations.99
In short, Corbett’s works offer a promising platform for strategic discussions.
Japan needs to resurrect its tradition of strategic thinking about the sea. Let the
debate begin.
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MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
IN SEA-BASED OPERATIONS
Captain Arthur M. Smith, MC, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired), and
Captain Harold R. Bohman, MC, U.S. Navy
Medical support of the sick and wounded is a complicated, resource in-
tensive, and vital aspect of any over-the-horizon operation. It needs to
be considered as a major subordinate command element just as the
Ground Combat Element, the Air Combat Element and the Combat
Service Support Element are.
A NAVY COMBAT SURGEON
During World War II it took the Navy and Marine Corps years to confirmand refine their prewar doctrine for amphibious attack. The labor began
with the first U.S. landings at Guadalcanal in August 1942; the resulting doc-
trine, organization, tactics, and techniques were subsequently used by the Army
in Europe. Early operations in both theaters highlighted the enormous difficul-
ties associated with essential medical elements, and it was not until late 1944,
perhaps 1945, that these problems were adequately solved. During future major
expeditionary operations, will it take that long for a latent functionally effective
medical support system to evolve? Will medical support of the anticipated “sea
base” concept of operations, for example, be obligated to recapitulate the same
sad evolution of repetitive mistakes committed during prior conflicts over the
past century? It is imperative that those who bear responsibility for ensuring
that prompt and competent care is provided to the combat injured examine the
lessons emerging from historical precedent. Likewise, it would be reasonable to
consider the “revolutionary” concept of establishing a “medical command and
control element” in joint expeditionary operations, to obviate the often-validated
reality that those who choose to ignore the lessons of history are destined to re-
peat them.
In late 1992, the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning from a Cold
War scenario for opposing Soviet naval forces in midocean toward a concept of
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countering land- and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors in heavily
defended littorals. It moved the focus of Navy planning from a geographical en-
vironment where the force would operate primarily by itself to one of joint or
combined expeditionary/amphibious warfare from a sea base independent of
any land-based logistic lodgment. Today, in attempting to transform itself to
meet twenty-first-century needs, the Navy is emphasizing not only increased
readiness but also the ability to deploy naval forces quickly in response to crises
and conflicts around the world, notwithstanding homeland defense needs.
Since every option for transformation involves human assets, the potential
for sickness and injury must be factored into any operational equation. From a
medical perspective, a series of questions need to be answered, such as what spe-
cific forms of threat conjoined joint medical forces will likely face, and what role
Navy medical resources will play in enabling the rest of the joint/combined
force. What are the specific medical readiness goals for Navy medical assets
functioning in a joint environment, and what resources will be necessary to
reach them? Concurrently, what form of information architecture will be re-
quired? Who, in the final analysis, will be responsible for ensuring compliance
with goal expectations? Historical evidence of dysfunctional medical support
during the last century of conflict is profoundly discouraging; some medical
command and control mechanism in such joint/combined operations will be
necessary to ensure functional compliance with readiness and operational ob-
jectives. Let us look first at the operational future.
SEA BASING AND ITS PROPOSED MEDICAL SUPPORT
A series of innovative proposals followed the adoption of the sea-base concept.
New naval formations, such as the expeditionary strike group (amphibious ships
combined with surface combatants, attack submarines, and land-based P-3 mari-
time patrol aircraft), were implemented. It has also been proposed to launch ex-
peditionary operations, complete with command, control, and support
infrastructures, directly from sea bases, to be formed, without necessarily estab-
lishing an intermediate land base, by a combination of amphibious and
sealift-type ships. (The sea-basing concept responds to a concern that fixed
overseas land bases in the future will become increasingly vulnerable to enemy
anti-access/area-denial weapons such as cruise missiles and theater range ballis-
tic missiles.)1 Computer technology will potentially tie together the personnel,
ships, aircraft, and installations of the sea base in a series of highly integrated lo-
cal and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information,
under the rubric of “network-centric warfare.” An additional key program relat-
ing to sea basing is the notional Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), ship, which would replace the Marine Corps’s current “black bottom”
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maritime prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command utiliz-
ing civilian mariner crews. The MPF(F) ships are to be specifically designed to
support the sea base while under way. Implementation of the sea-basing concept
will also possibly affect integration with future ships of the San Antonio (LPD
17) class of amphibious dock landing ships (which is replacing the old LPD
types and five older LSD-36 dock landing ships) as well as the LHA Replacement
(LHAR) program meant to retire the older Tarawa-class amphibious assault
ships. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the legacy T-AH hospital ships will be
replaced by a medical support system incorporating advanced-level medical fa-
cilities within the MPF(F)s and the expeditionary strike group.
Under current consideration is the operational expectation that the compo-
nent parts of a sea base could “close”—arrive and begin operation—anywhere
in the world’s oceans within ten days of the executive order, by strategic air and
sea lift, to be followed overnight by the insertion of two battalions of an expedi-
tionary brigade into an operational objective, one by air and another by sea, all
without any formal logistical support lodgment ashore. The goal is to complete
the entire “ship-to-objective maneuver” within thirty days. The return of the
force to the sea base (“retrograde reconstitution”) would take an additional
thirty days. The seagoing platforms of the sea base would comprise the ships of
an expeditionary strike group and a carrier-based strike group, united with
ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. The assemblage would sustain
ground, sea, and air operations with logistic support, command, control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It is en-
visioned that MPF(F)s themselves will meet all logistic requirements, including
berthing for over sixteen thousand personnel, as well as extensive medical mod-
ules with surgical-specialty capabilities (known as “echelon level three” care).
The medical modules would operate under “established hospital standards of
care,” utilizing appropriate nursing operating procedures. They would require
specialized and trained personnel, equipment, and quantities of supplies as nec-
essary to match the operational exposure of combat personnel.
Under the sea-basing blueprint, a ground combat component inserted ashore
would have a minimal “footprint,” including a minimal medical support struc-
ture. It might be augmented by forward resuscitation and surgical (FRSS) units
or some functional equivalent, providing limited surgical capability beyond that
intrinsic to operational battalions. Even so, the limited depth of medical re-
sources ashore will mandate prompt evacuation for the bulk of casualties—
generally by air, or when required by high-speed seagoing “connector” vessels—to
the ships of the sea base, primarily the ships of the expeditionary strike group
and MPF(F)s. If afloat resources are to be continuously available for new casual-
ties, there will have to be an additional mechanism for evacuating initially
S M I T H & B O H M A N 5 5
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:19 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
61
War College: Summer 2006 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
treated casualties from the sea base to higher-level medical facilities, perhaps
thousands of miles away.
An important question is: Will it work?
HISTORICAL MEDICAL LESSONS FOR SEA BASING
Gallipoli
History has adjudged the British attempt to take the Dardanelles at Gallipoli to
be an amphibious fiasco, a failure owing in large degree to a lack of coordination
between attack and supporting elements, including the medical services. Among
the many medically related issues was the paucity of medical communications
and a poorly coordinated mechanism for transfer of casualties out to ships,
many of which were scarcely able to care for them, if at all. Many deaths ensued,
as did profound morbidities. The implication today for the likely result of poor
coordination of medical assets under the sea-base concept is obvious.
On 26 April 1915 Surgeon General Birrell, director of medical services for the
combined attack of the British and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
(ANZAC), requested that he and his deputy be allowed to join the general head-
quarters on board the battleship Queen Elizabeth, where the operational com-
mander was, to supervise casualty evacuation. His request was refused, and he
was embarked instead on board Arcadian, a ship that possessed neither wireless
communications with the shore nor medical assets.
On 28 April Birrell was sent the message, “Lutzow [a transport being used as a
hospital transport ship] filling up rapidly. Request name of next hospital ship.
Where is the advanced depot of medical stores? Running short of supplies.” An-
other message read, “Wounded arriving rapidly—about 500. Probably require
another hospital ship.” To these messages there was no reply. The director of
medical services never received them. He was isolated—all signals from shore
were conveyed by wireless to Queen Elizabeth, where the general’s staff, which
was supposed to be coordinating the wounded evacuation, remained silent.2
Casualties were transported to the beach on the backs of pack animals, as im-
mortalized in ANZAC legend by the donkey “Murphy,” led by members of vari-
ous irregular groups, such as expatriate European Jews (many driven by the
Ottomans out of Palestine to Egypt) organized by the British into transporta-
tion units known collectively as the “Zion Mule Corps” (see photo). The great
numbers of Commonwealth casualties practically stopped operational activity
on the beaches, and the devastation these drovers found at the water’s edge was
graphically described by Colonel John L. Beeston of the Royal Australian Medi-
cal Corps: “The whole beach is filled with wounded of all kinds and descrip-
tions. It has quite unnerved me for a time. Some of the wounds are so ghastly,
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whole abdomens blown away and the
men still living. They are in such numbers
that it is difficult to get along, and there
is only one hospital ship in the bay.”3
At least twenty-two converted “hos-
pital ships,” twenty troop ships, and
other transports and merchant ships
had been set aside for the reception of
sick and wounded, but fear of Turkish
coastal artillery and German subma-
rines prompted many of these vessels to
lie well offshore or in island ports some
distance away. From the beaches, casual-
ties were towed seaward in small craft,
each carrying thirty patients, often in a
frantic search at night for a ship to ac-
cept them. Concurrently, as troopships
landed their complements on the
beaches or transports unloaded their
cargoes, they were rapidly filled with ca-
sualties. These “carriers” then moved to
the hospital ships or other vessels lying
offshore and likewise transferred the
casualties at sea, under occasionally
difficult, even dangerous, conditions.
As described by one historian, “the
wounded were evacuated in large horse
barges with sterns that could be let down for easy access; stretcher cases were
placed in big boxes and hoisted into ships with the aid of derricks.”4 Some were
swung on board by means of cargo nets dropped over the side.5 At a later stage,
minesweepers partially fitted for medical purposes were brought into use for
evacuating casualties, and the British Red Cross provided six motor launches
specially equipped to tow barges from the Gallipoli beaches (see photo). Ulti-
mately, the large number of casualties at Gallipoli led to overcrowding, render-
ing many ships unsuitable as base hospitals. They became, in essence,
casualty-clearing stations, providing interim and often merely token treatment
of patients. The more serious cases were transferred to distant shore bases in
Egypt, Malta, and in some cases England itself.
Could the casualty-management breakdown witnessed at Gallipoli occur
again under the modern banner of sea basing? Will a proposed diminution of
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medical assets (a “reduced medical footprint”) accompanying expeditionary
forces inserted from sea bases allow critical, life-threatening wounds to be at-
tended to adequately? If all that is available ashore is a meager casualty-sorting
capability, and no efficient medical regulating network is established, will the re-
sults be any different from those experienced at Gallipoli?
The U.S. Invasion of Grenada
On 21 October 1983, with the designation of Commander Joint Task Force 120,
intensive operational planning was begun for Operation URGENT FURY. How-
ever, no combat support planners, including medical representatives, were in-
vited to participate. Consequently, no estimate of logistical supportability was
completed prior to execution, and the required medical support system did not
develop. The short lead time and the absence of a designated task force surgeon
to coordinate medical services at the joint level left each service to plan medical
support within the scope of its own organic assets, with little or no joint coordi-
nation of such activities as casualty care management, whole blood procure-
ment, and aeromedical evacuation. Erroneous assumptions may have been
made as well. For example, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division was
informed that two amphibious ships, USS Guam (LPH 9) and Trenton (LPD 14),
which were in the vicinity of Grenada, could provide significant medical and
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surgical support. The record is unclear, but this inaccurate information may
have been responsible for his ultimate decision to keep Army medical support to
a minimum.6
The hostilities lasted ninety-six hours—123 casualties and eighteen deaths
were recorded—and brought combat wounded to both Guam and Trenton. No
significant or sustainable tactical medical asset was established within the com-
bat zone during the hostilities, nor were there triage facilities ashore. Without
trained and experienced triage corpsmen or officers, casualties were not sent in
an orderly and logical flow to the proper receiving facilities. There were no es-
tablished medical communication nets between the Army and Navy, let alone
with Trenton and Guam; Army helicopter pilots, unfamiliar with the Navy ships
and their silhouettes, brought casualties to whichever flight deck was most con-
venient. On several occasions the better-equipped Guam was overwhelmed with
both minor and lower-priority delayed casualties, while Trenton, which had no
surgical capability, laboratory, or blood bank, was sent critical casualties. In es-
sence, medical assets were squandered and overutilized simultaneously.7
Beirut 1983
The U.S. Marine compound at the Beirut International Airport was bombed on
23 October 1983. The tragedy presented an opportunity to evaluate in detail the
American military medical system’s ability to react to such incidents or, by ex-
tension, to a larger conflict. Among the principal components tested that day
were medical command and control, casualty evacuation, medical regulating
procedures, capabilities of facilities, joint medical readiness mechanisms, and
the transition from routine peacetime to contingency operations.
A medical review group chaired by Rear Admiral James Zimble later evalu-
ated the medical response to the bombing. Its 1984 report detailed serious defi-
ciencies in medical readiness, attributing them in large part to a lack of medical
evacuation resources, shortages of equipment and personnel, and inadequate
joint  planning  for  wartime  or  contingency  requirements. The  problems, it
found, were also the result of the low priority habitually assigned to medical
readiness in the planning, programming, and budgeting processes. As the report
declared, “Had the ratio of killed-outright-to-wounded been reversed, so that
over 200 casualties had required treatment, rather than fewer than 100, the med-
ical system might well have failed.” The report recommended greater investment
in essential medical readiness resources and refinement in the command and
control over wartime support and operation of these resources.8
During contingencies, smoothly running casualty support operations are
critical; a lack of joint planning obviously hampers the sharing of limited re-
sources and creates confusion over responsibilities. As the Zimble Report noted
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in 1984—in a finding that raises problems that might be associated with future
sea basing—there was no comprehensive joint plan for the use of the medical as-
sets that were already in place. The services’ contingency medical plans were
“stovepipe documents”—that is, their orientations were purely “vertical,” or
intraservice—and bore little relationship to each other. This was a direct result
of the tendency of the services’ medical components to support their respective
line units as if they were the only ones, and likewise a consequence of the lack of a
joint medical staff structure to arbitrate differences. There was no mechanism for
achieving efficiency through interservice sharing in peacetime, coordinating op-
erations in wartime, or resolving inconsistencies among the components’ plans.9
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
An important element of the medical evacuation process, familiar in both mili-
tary conflict and civilian mass-casualty disasters, is medical regulation, to which
we have already referred. “Medical regulators” manage the process by selecting
sources of care, matching patients’ medical requirements with the reported ca-
pabilities of treatment facilities. They must also ensure that the receiving medi-
cal facilities are not over- or underutilized—an essential matter when numerous
and dispersed facilities are involved. During the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91,
medical communications problems represented the greatest limitation in medi-
cal regulation, followed by failures of regulating systems to exercise effective
oversight of casualty movement. The result was that casualty evacuation was ef-
fectively compromised on many occasions.
Communications Problems
Troops on the battlefield could not communicate with ambulances. The radios
used by medical regulators had an operating range of only fifteen miles, whereas,
for example, the XVIII Corps area was 250 miles deep and a hundred wide. The
ambulance units operated with similar equipment and therefore experienced
great difficulty in working efficiently with regulators or hospitals. As a result,
they often took patients only to hospitals whose locations they knew, and those
hospitals were not always the ones best able to assist the wounded. Air ambu-
lances also had difficulty learning where casualties awaited. One helicopter com-
pany, in the words of the General Accounting Office (as the Government
Accountability Office was then known), “listened to the international disaster
channel to find out where casualties were. . . . After patients were loaded, pilots
flew directly to known hospital locations over Iraqi tanks and infantry. One pilot
stated that if it had been a ‘shooting war,’ the company would have lost every
Huey [helicopter] and its crew.”10
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To overcome these shortcomings of communications equipment, VII and
XVIII Corps restricted air ambulances to shuttle runs between designated col-
lection points near the battlefield and drop-off points adjacent to hospitals. As a
Navy medical officer with a Marine Corps tank battalion described his situation,
“The locations of higher echelon medical facilities were not even available at the
battalion or division level.”11
Communications between medical units and between the different levels of
care (such as between aeromedical evacuation units and field hospitals) were
made even more difficult by the prevailing variety of radio equipment and the
use of commercial along with tactical telephone systems. Without adequate
communications capability, some Army and Air Force facilities frequently had
no warning of the quantity or type of casualties that they were to receive. Some
field hospitals did not know that casualties were on the way until the
aeromedical evacuation helicopter arrived. Obviously, for them, planning for
patient-care needs was out of the question.12
During the movement into Iraq, some Army hospitals were left for several
days with no method of communicating with either combat or evacuation units.
The chief nurse of the Army 12th Evacuation Hospital found its communica-
tions in Saudi Arabia nonexistent; the equipment was too diverse and too lim-
ited in capability. Helicopters had FM radios with a range of only twenty miles;
the field hospitals had AM radios, which in any case could not be used near a
battlefield, since their transmissions were traceable by the enemy. Furthermore,
while combat and command units had satellite equipment, that did not put
them in direct communication with the medical units that lacked such capabili-
ties. Also, due to either traffic saturation or inherent equipment limitations,
none of the systems at aeromedical evacuation locations proved consistently
reliable.13
Communications problems for combat and support units, of course, are not
new. They were identified during the URGENT FURY invasion of Grenada in
1983, during the 1990 JUST CAUSE contingency in Panama, and during such
Joint Staff exercises as PROUD EAGLE (worldwide), REFORGER (Europe), and TEAM
SPIRIT (Korea).14
Casualty Regulation Breakdown
Communications problems among all services during DESERT SHIELD and STORM
degraded the casualty-regulating mission. These were primarily related to limi-
tations and mismatched capabilities on both the intra- and inter-service levels.
Some medical facilities could not communicate with their control elements, with
one another, with supported combat units, or with supporting logistical units.
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The inability of medical regulators to manage the evacuation of patients
could have led, had the projected numbers of casualties actually occurred, to the
underuse of some hospitals and the overwhelming of others—a potentially
tragic situation. A “lessons learned” report by the Air Force’s Air Mobility Com-
mand stated that as a result of communications problems, 43 percent of patients
arrived at the wrong airfield and had to be rerouted to the appropriate medical
facility.
While automated medical regulating systems existed, they were unfortu-
nately not standardized, interoperable, or available in all theaters, and they
could not track the location and status of individual patients. Each service had
its own computer systems, and the incompatibility of those systems severely
limited the ability of medical organizations to interoperate during the war.15
Casualty Evacuation Problems
The process of medical evacuation entails moving patients under medical su-
pervision both to and between medical treatment facilities. The Army and Ma-
rine Corps provide most of the ground and helicopter lift for tactical medical
evacuation. (The primary Air Force medical mission is to provide fixed-wing
aeromedical evacuation within and between theaters.)
In the Persian Gulf conflict, problems arose in the effective use of both
ground ambulances and helicopters in tactical evacuation of patients. Ground
ambulances could not be used as often as had been planned because of the rug-
ged terrain, a lack of navigational equipment, and the long distances. Even air
evacuation was taxed by the distances from pickup points to the hospitals; re-
fueling was frequently required, and crews had trouble locating fuel sites. Some
air ambulances landed near tanker trucks, tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles to
ask for fuel and for directions to the nearest proper supply.16
Lacking its own tactical medical evacuation assets, the Navy ordinarily relies
upon returning (“retrograde”) combat support aircraft with primary missions
other than medical. They serve as “transportation of opportunity” for moving
casualties to medical facilities afloat and to land-based advanced-echelon medi-
cal facilities. Obviously, because of other priority commitments, such aircraft
are not always available in sufficient numbers when urgent medical evacuation
requirements arise. In the Gulf in 1990–91, short-range Army and Marine heli-
copters were available for medical evacuation, but, as Army and Marine Corps
officers acknowledged, too few of them—at least in part, as asserted by the De-
fense Department’s inspector general, because Navy aeromedical requirements
had not been previously made known and the Army and Marine Corps had ac-
cordingly not arranged to support them. As noted by the Navy’s surgeon general,
“lack of dedicated tactical aeromedical evacuation capability in naval services
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would have created difficulties had the theater (Southwest Asia) matured as ex-
pected.”17
To have had any fewer or less capable Air Force aeromedical evacuation assets
would have affected patient care as well. The commanding officer of the Air
Force’s theater aeromedical evacuation squadron later stated that insufficient
aircraft were allocated to evacuating patients and that the predicted flow of ca-
sualties would have overwhelmed them. Further, even given sufficient aircraft,
there were shortages of crews and in-flight evacuation equipment; the Air Force
surgeon general was convinced that “we were fortunate that the medical evacua-
tion system was not taxed.” If it had been, substantial shortfalls in strategic and
tactical aeromedical evacuation would have materialized.18
Nobody should have been surprised. Like communications problems, defi-
ciencies in aeromedical evacuation assets are nothing new. They were noted in
several Joint Staff–sponsored exercises, including REFORGER in 1987 and WINTEX
in 1988 and 1989. During the latter, in Europe, a lack of dedicated aeromedical
evacuation assets paralyzed the entire combat zone until three thousand exercise
casualties could be removed.19
The Air Force, particularly aware before the 1990 Iraqi invasion that it did not
possess sufficient personnel or equipment to manage patients needing individu-
alized care during evacuation flights out of Southwest Asia, required that any
hospital unit evacuating a patient needing constant attention was to provide an
in-flight medical attendant and enough specialized equipment, such as respira-
tors or cardiac monitors, to last five days. Two Navy fleet hospitals were required
to provide for additional care at staging sites. These requirements, however, were
not taken into account in fleet hospital and hospital ship manpower and equip-
ment authorizations. Had casualty rates approached predicted levels, the inven-
tory of ventilators, intravenous fluids, medications, litters, and a host of other
items would have been rapidly exhausted by these evacuation needs.20
In a 1993 report the Defense Department inspector general indicated that op-
eration plans of the commanders in chief still, two years after DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, did not promote the efficient use or sharing of medical as-
sets. It indicated that the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific commands did not
propose to integrate medical support at all, instead assigning each service com-
ponent to provide for its own forces only. The report found further that such in-
consistencies persisted because of poor testing of medical systems during joint
exercises—exercises that included only token medical participation and could
not validate readiness.21
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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Anecdotal reports from surgical staffs, as well as from tactical aeromedical nurs-
ing staffs, do not, unfortunately, offer much hope for the future.22 Once again,
they related discouraging examples of the state of medical regulation: inade-
quate coordination/communications between the extraction site and the flight
controllers at the Direct Air Support Center–Patient Evacuation Team, as well as
between the inbound casualty evacuation aircraft and casualty delivery sites.
Invasion Maneuver Phase
The surgical teams related not only difficulty in communicating with evacua-
tion controllers but also that they received no warning of incoming casualties.
Likewise, occasional long waits at casualty evacuation pickup points were ob-
served, as well as insufficiencies of personnel or equipment at casualty-drop-off
landing zones. The limited communications and limited available airlift likewise
made reinforcement or replacement of medical personnel difficult.
Concurrently, training deficiencies of medical personnel were reflected in the
relaying of incorrect landing zone coordinates and erroneous patient priority
status, as well as in frequent failure to report to controllers updates in the physi-
cal status of casualties prior to pickup. In addition, during the invasion of Bagh-
dad, inexperience and lack of training led to “over-triage” of casualties by
frontline medical responders. On the medical evacuation messages, all casual-
ties had been designated as “urgent surgical,” some inappropriately, leading the
flight controllers to direct all casualties to the forward colocated surgical teams,
nearly overwhelming their capability. One forward-located surgical team was
obligated to care for seventy-eight significantly injured casualties in a
forty-hour period, performing surgery upon fourteen in twenty-four hours. In-
deed, the combination of communications deficits, lack of available resupply,
insufficient return of nurses who had accompanied evacuation flights of casual-
ties, and physical exhaustion all significantly degraded their capability. As noted
at the time by one of the authors, “Only because of an unplanned fifteen hour
break, return of the en route care nurses, and serendipitous arrival of supply
blocks with commonly used medical consumables, were the teams able to meet
another 30 hour period of sustained casualty flow.”23
Transfer of clinical data, including health and treatment status of casualties,
from one treatment point to another was not easily accomplished either; charts
were sometimes lost or illegible when received at higher levels of care. Attempts
were made to convey information by writing on the skin or dressings, but in
vain; the notes were often smudged, soaked, or illegible. Nurses assigned to pro-
vide en route care attempted to pass on information vital to ongoing care, but
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time was often limited. (Incomplete information transfer can lead to repeated,
and possibly unnecessary, operations. For example, one combat support hospi-
tal backing up the surgical teams re-operated upon every casualty as a matter of
policy, mistrusting even the information it had. Another such hospital used a
policy of selective re-operation, depending on the information available, the sta-
tus of the patient, and the perceived experience level of the forward surgeons
who had first treated the casualties.) In addition, the forward surgical treatment
units, lacking feedback on the outcomes of their interventions, could not know
if their practices needed to be changed.
An additional issue consistently seen at this time was that of conflicting per-
spectives between tactical commanders and medical commanders on the geo-
graphic placement of forward medical assets.
Security and Stabilization Phase
During redeployment of Navy medical assets in IRAQI FREEDOM II,* the location
of surgical assets was again often determined by ground combat commanders,
who based their decisions upon evacuation times, attempting to ensure that every
Marine was within one hour of an operating table, if needed. This once resulted
in placement of a Navy FRSS team within twelve minutes’ evacuation time of an
established advanced Army combat support hospital, thereby creating redun-
dancy and wasting limited valuable resources that were needed elsewhere, such
as during the initial operations in Fallujah.
In May 2004, the Army surgeon general received from his trauma consultant
a report regarding theater trauma care that confirmed many of the above obser-
vations.24 The consultant noted, first, disorganized delivery of trauma care on
the battlefield, resulting in nonoptimal staffing and placement of surgical assets,
and casualties occasionally being sent to the wrong location. Second, he found,
medical records were not reliably reaching the next level with casualties, with a
resultant impact upon clinical care and ability to capture aggregate experience.
Finally, he recommended the establishment of a “Joint Theater Trauma Sys-
tem.” A fully functional joint combat trauma system would embrace all aspects
of trauma management, from prevention, training, and evaluation through all
phases of care with command and control, as well as data collection, evaluation,
research, and process improvement. It would also involve dedicated communi-
cations and ensure adequate standards and oversight of first-responder care at
the point of injury, initial resuscitative care at the battalion aid station, forward
surgery, en route care, definitive care either in the theater or aboard MPF(F)s or
ships of the expeditionary strike group, and finally strategic transport care
S M I T H & B O H M A N 6 5
* Corresponding in U.S. Marine Corps usage to the service in Iraq of I Marine Expeditionary Force
from March 2004 to March 2005, conducting “Phase 4” (security and stabilization) operations.
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beyond the combat zone. The system would be under the oversight of a “corps
trauma surgeon,” an experienced trauma physician who would:
• Negotiate with ground commanders regarding the optimal locations of
facilities with surgical capability
• Minimize delays at forward locations and analyze time intervals between
different levels of care
• Ensure continuous improvement of casualty care at forward levels, on the
basis of data accounting for the great variability of care, outcomes, skills,
and circumstances
• Optimize evacuation routes
• Ensure consistent policy regarding en-route interventions by aeromedical
nursing staffs
• Ensure reliable communications
• Reduce geographic redundancy between medical units of various services
with similar capabilities
• Ensure effective communications and logistical support.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS FOR SEA-BASE COMMANDERS
Recent advances in development of body armor and changing tactical utiliza-
tion of improvised explosive devices by opposing forces may well have shifted
the spectrum of wound survivability. The incidence of mortal wounds of the
chest and abdomen may have diminished, thereby allowing greater numbers of
casualties with severe injuries to the head, brain, and neck, as well as major
blood vessel injuries of the extremities, to survive long enough to reach forward
combat unit medical staffs, such as those of battalion aid stations. Granted, the
resuscitation capabilities of battalion medical personnel on the ground, both
corpsmen and physicians, are projected to grow. Nonetheless, will the treatment
system envisioned under sea basing’s concept of a minimal medical footprint
ashore allow timely and competent treatment of these severe injuries?
In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, a surgical hospital erected by the Israeli
Defense Force in the Sinai Desert received casualties in groups of from thirty-six
to 140 (on one day 440 casualties), stabilizing them and transferring most to
hospitals in central Israel.25 Would not such a volume in a future major conflict
quickly overwhelm a limited number of Navy/Marine forward resuscitation and
surgical units or equivalent if they were available in combat service support areas?
FRSS units each have only two surgeons, one surgical theater, a small number of
nursing personnel, and no appreciable patient-holding capacity. In a sea-base
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scenario accompanied by a large number of ground combat casualties, would
not their inability to sort out types and levels of injuries rapidly, directing per-
sonnel needing advanced care to appropriate facilities and returning those with
minimal injuries to their units, result in a mass, hurried, and necessarily indis-
criminate transfer of casualties to an offshore medical facility, the sea base itself?
Failure to identify the most needy casualties for evacuation imposes enor-
mous burdens upon transportation assets and afloat facilities. Military planners
unfamiliar with the realities of combat wound management often consider
medical evacuation but an exercise in logistics, in which numbers of anticipated
casualties, quantifiable capacities of transport facilities, availability times of
transport shuttles, and numbers of available beds are the primary consider-
ations. That view ignores the realities of wound care and implies an acceptance
of an overall increase in deaths, or at least disability, and a decrease in the return
of men to duty (see photo).
How can patients evacuated
from a battlefield to a sea-based
medical entity be properly routed
to the facility best suited to their
specific needs? Absent a well prac-
ticed and smoothly functioning
casualty-distribution system, sup-
ported by advanced and net-
worked communications, the
growing proportion of surviving
casualties with severe wounds are
likely to find themselves not in
the seaborne medical facility best
prepared to treat their specific in-
juries but in the less capable facili-
ties of amphibious assault ships.
Ideally, a sea base would include
MPF(F) ships with modules capa-
ble of advanced neurosurgery to manage brain and spinal cord damage and of
vascular surgery to treat complicated blood-vessel injuries. Clearly, time ex-
pended transferring patients with such devastating injuries, without knowledge
of their specific needs, from a battalion aid station to a marginally staffed facility
aboard an LHD could be fatal, or at least sharply lessen prospects for recovery, and
consume limited resources unnecessarily (see figure).
Are the necessary medical-regulation capabilities regularly practiced during
exercises? In 1994 one of the coauthors was the deputy amphibious task force
S M I T H & B O H M A N 6 7
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surgeon in a major Pacific exercise, TANDEM THRUST, and in 1997 served as the
deputy naval forces surgeon in a combined U.S./Australian TANDEM THRUST off
the Australian coast. In neither exercise was medical regulation practiced. In
fact, actual injured personnel from the afloat task force were flown ashore to a ci-
vilian hospital. A report generated by international colleagues who had held
medical leadership positions in a later exercise, RIMPAC 2000, noted a similar
lack of medical regulation “play.” Ironically, the report held that the most useful
medical communications method in RIMPAC 2000 was unclassified e-mail,
which worked throughout the exercise.26
A COMMAND MEDICAL ELEMENT
The historical record of dysfunctional medical support during armed conflict
reflects persistent neglect of the fundamentals of managing the needs of the sick
and wounded. In the setting of joint/combined sea-based operations, dissoci-
ated from a land base, therefore, serious consideration should be given to a com-
mand entity specifically responsible for operational control over joint medical
functions. Such responsibility must be vested in a single entity or individual who
is appropriately placed within the command structure, is assigned adequate staff
to discharge these responsibilities, and has clearly delineated authority and ac-
countability. Likewise, there must be a clear and functional chain of command
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
SEABASING VIEW
Key:
APOD air point of debarkation ESG expeditionary strike group
APS Army Prepositioned Stock MPF(F) Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
ARF Army Regional Flotilla MPS maritime prepositioning ship
CONUS continental United States SPOD sea point of debarkation
CSG carrier strike group TBD to be determined
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within this entity that can develop as well as execute joint medical plans involv-
ing the sea base.
This “medical command element” would promulgate local doctrine suffi-
cient to guide not only joint medical planning but also that of each service in the
joint task force. Consequently, authority must be delegated by the chain of com-
mand to the command medical element to ensure that these principles are in-
corporated into operational medical planning at every echelon and that the
plans developed by service components are both coherent and compatible.
The medical command element would also:
• Ensure that the sea-base medical system can integrate with the joint
strategic patient evacuation system in wartime as well as during
contingencies.
• Ensure that responsibility for control of the tactical and strategic
components of the medical evacuation system lies within the same chain of
command and that clear guidelines regarding aircraft destinations and
patient distributions, as well as priorities for medical evacuation, are
promulgated.
• Ensure that the system of medical communications at the joint level, as well
as within the various components of the sea base, are sufficient to support
wartime medical operations, are simple and direct, and will work reliably
during times of crisis.
• Determine whether the sea base can accept biological, chemical, or
radiological warfare casualties.
• Ensure that adequate mechanisms exist in the medical planning system for
assessing the capabilities of friendly nations to provide hospitalization and
evacuation support in the event of mass casualties, and also for arranging
that support via adequate means of swift communication channels.
Without a well developed medical support plan and methodical testing of its
worthiness, the Navy and allied services may not be aware of all the possible im-
pediments to the rapid surge and timely engagement of their forces in response
to crises within a sea-base context. A comprehensive set of goals, performance
measures, time lines, milestones, benchmarks, and guidance documents are nec-
essary to manage any joint medical response plan effectively and to determine if
the plan is capable of achieving its goals. In any case, systematic testing and eval-
uation in the field of new concepts is an established practice for gaining insight
as to how systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. Commit-
ment to the implementation of these most basic fundamentals of medical sup-
port in the field must be firmly established. It is to answer this call that a medical
S M I T H & B O H M A N 6 9
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command-and-control entity is proposed. The medical people who are now
practicing “good medicine in bad places” are far better prepared than ever be-
fore. Now, they need to be given a command structure and proper resources to
do their job even better.
Will it work? We must not forget that military innovation and improvements
are fostered by developing new concepts and organizational ideas, transferring
them into operational reality, and employing them. Table-top and command-
post exercises, war games, and experiments have traditionally been applied to
these purposes, exploring military doctrine, operational concepts, and organi-
zational arrangements. The concept of a deployable medical command element
is surely worthy of similar consideration.
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U.S. COAST GUARD HEALTH SERVICES RESPONDERS
IN MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
Captain Arthur J. French, MD, USPHS, Joe DiRenzo III, and Chris Doane
Superior operational service is our core purpose, and we have long been
recognized as the world’s best Coast Guard. America expects that we
will bring the same level of professionalism and maritime leadership to
the war on terrorism that we have traditionally brought to all our other
missions.
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, USCG
Unlike most other federal agencies, the Coast Guard is a true first-responseorganization, with statutory authority and responsibilities that allow re-
sponses following a disaster without waiting for a
Stafford Act declaration of state request for assistance.
This ability and expectation have been lauded in the
public press critiques of the government’s response to
Hurricane Katrina. As an agency within the Department
of Homeland Security, the lead federal department for
responses to terrorism and natural disasters, the Coast
Guard must maintain capabilities to respond to terror-
ism and all-hazard incidents in the maritime and
coastal regions. Katrina demonstrated that medical
first responders are integral players during cata-
strophic incidents in addition to search and rescue
(SAR) responders. In terms of response planning and
execution, Coast Guard health service personnel are
an untapped resource.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has been leading an effort incorporating all levels of
government and the private sector to build a com-
prehensive and coordinated campaign to minimize
the risk of terrorism to the United States. Much of the
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department’s and Coast Guard’s efforts have focused on threat and vulnerability—
that is, preventing terrorist attacks. We must also ensure that an appropriate in-
vestment in mass casualty response capabilities is made to minimize the conse-
quences of a terrorist attack, transportation security incident, or natural
disaster. This article will examine maritime consequence management and a
proposal for using the Coast Guard’s health services personnel as an integral re-
source for its responsibilities under the National Response Plan.
The Coast Guard has also focused on prevention in its efforts to secure the
U.S. maritime domain. For over fifty years the Coast Guard has been charged
with overarching responsibility for the safety and security of American ports
and waterways. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 underlined
the service’s role as the lead federal agency for maritime security. Since 9/11 it
has produced outstanding results. The nation’s maritime transportation system
is far more secure than it was on 11 September 2001, and the improvement
continues.
For over two centuries, the Coast Guard has been charged with lead responsi-
bilities for maritime consequence management; in fact, most people think of the
Coast Guard in connection with maritime searches and daring, dramatic res-
cues. Today this role in maritime SAR has been codified in a National Search and
Rescue Plan. Similarly, the Coast Guard has long been responsible for marine
environmental protection and response; that role too has been formalized, in
the National Contingency Plan developed in accordance with the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990. This plan makes the Coast Guard the lead federal agency for re-
sponding to oil spills and hazardous material releases, including intentional
chemical or biological releases, in the coastal zone—that is, all tidally influenced
waters and adjacent waterfronts.
The service’s responsibilities as a lead agency involve not just federal agencies
but state and local governments as well. This fact has given the Coast Guard a col-
lective “persona” unique among federal agencies—that of a true first-response
organization, whose assets arrive on scene alongside, if not ahead of, those of lo-
cal agencies and operate in full partnership with the local response community.
For many states and municipalities, the Coast Guard is the primary resource for
security, search, and rescue response on the water. The Katrina response demon-
strated that the Coast Guard may also be the primary or, in some cases, the only
first responder in coastal communities devastated by a disaster.
While the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for coordinating responses
in the maritime domain, the service lacks the capacity to meet all of these de-
mands; further, its jurisdiction and responsibilities in various aspects of the
maritime domain are shared with other government agencies. Therefore, it has
built cooperative partnerships, at all levels and in both the public and private
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sectors, designed to pool resources. The keys to success in this respect have been
the Incident Command System (ICS) and the concept of “unified command.” The
latter is quickly described—under its rubric, entities having significant jurisdic-
tions over, or stakes in, an incident or operation provide representatives with au-
thority to act in a decision-making council that, in turn, ensures unity of effort.
This process has proven effective over the last decade and has been mandated for
all federal agencies by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, as set forth in
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System.
For the Coast Guard, the Incident Command System goes back to the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as a result of which the
Coast Guard adopted the ICS from the National Fire Service as a fairly robust in-
frastructure for responding to maritime spills and releases. Until the 11 Septem-
ber 2001 attacks, the system was primarily limited to environmental hazards.
Because few casualties were involved, there was no operational requirement for
medical first responders; concern was focused on environmental issues and re-
sponder safety. As oil-spill-prevention programs took effect the number of spills
decreased, and the Coast Guard, as a good steward of the taxpayer’s dollar, al-
lowed the response infrastructure to shrink—reducing funding for equipment,
reassigning personnel, etc.
With the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Coast Guard’s senior leadership, start-
ing with the Commandant, then Admiral James M. Loy, understood the trans-
formation needed and established maritime homeland security as the service’s
number-one mission priority alongside SAR and rebalanced mission emphases
in terms of this national mandate. Since then all Coast Guard programs have
been required to improve current and future readiness for the “new normalcy,”
as described in the Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.1
The Maritime Strategy, which prescribes principles, strategies, and program
elements, establishes prevention, detection, and deterrence as the primary foci
of the Coast Guard’s security efforts. Such critical issues as maritime domain
awareness and implementation of the omnibus Maritime Transportation Safety
Act have dominated the allocation of the service’s financial and human re-
sources. With respect to the latter, the service has called upon its personnel to
perform at levels well above normal in preventing maritime terrorist attacks,
and indeed they do, but as a result they have little time left for consequence-
management preparedness. While everyone accepts the old adage that “an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” prevention against terrorism cannot be
100 percent effective, the Maritime Strategy acknowledges: “The maritime terror-
ist threat presents a daunting challenge, and adequate measures against it can
never be completely guaranteed.” As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, we will
also always be faced with responses to major natural disasters.
F R E N C H , D I R E N Z O , & D O A N E 7 5
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The service’s lack of emphasis on consequence management does not align
with the Maritime Strategy, which states, “The Coast Guard equally values emer-
gency preparedness and the response needed to minimize damage and recover
from any future terrorist attacks that may occur, despite its best efforts at pre-
vention and deterrence. . . . To meet this new threat increased levels of prepared-
ness and response capabilities are required, including additional personnel
specially trained and equipped to mitigate the impacts of a terrorist incident.”
Nonetheless, and despite the increased risk of a terrorist chemical, biological, radio-
logical, nuclear, or high-yield-explosive (CBRNE) attack, other than strengthen-
ing the CBR response capabilities of its National Strike Force, the Coast Guard
has done little to rebuild its former oil and hazardous-material response infra-
structure. Nor has it adequately addressed the unique first-responder require-
ments of mass casualties in an intentional or unintentional incident,
particularly as might result from an attack on a cruise ship, high-capacity pas-
senger vessel, or crowded waterfront venue.
This shortfall is further exacerbated by the declaration in the Maritime Strat-
egy that “the Coast Guard will particularly ensure the readiness of its forces to
work safely in areas where CBRNE weapons have been used, as well as its ability
to communicate with first responders from other military, civil, and law-
enforcement agencies in applying common disaster-relief and terrorist incident
protocols.” In addition, the president has directed that we will build “an emer-
gency management system that is better able to manage not just terrorism but all
hazards; a medical system that is not just better able to cope with bioterrorism
but with all diseases and all manner of mass-casualty incidents.”2 An attack on a
chemical tank ship or a terrorist craft loaded with a chemical, biological, radio-
logical, or high-explosive weapon to be exploded in a populated seaport would
severely test our maritime response capabilities.
The challenge requires that the Coast Guard adapt its internal response infra-
structure and its medical expertise to the prospect of maritime mass casualties.
Medical backgrounds will be needed if response teams are to bring comprehen-
sive perspectives to planning, coordinating with other entities, and offering nec-
essary staff expertise. The service has taken the positive step of establishing two
Incident Management Assist Teams, deployable groups of specially trained and
highly experienced personnel in the Incident Command System and major inci-
dent management. They have assisted Coast Guard incident commanders on
multiple occasions, including the response to Katrina, providing a nucleus of in-
cident management expertise with outstanding success. Unfortunately, the duty
is a collateral one; the teams’ members are permanently assigned to a variety of
Coast Guard commands. These units are already hard pressed to meet their day-
to-day mission load, and their commanders are increasingly reluctant to allow
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their qualified personnel to join the teams. Attempts to create permanent billets
to staff the assist teams have fallen short in budgetary competition. While effec-
tive in incident management, these teams do not have health services personnel
assigned to provide a bridge to the medical community and a medical perspec-
tive to the incident management planning.
MARITIME POPULATIONS AT RISK
History shows that some terrorist groups seek to achieve their goals by maxi-
mizing human casualties so as to gain the most publicity possible. The growth in
the passenger capacity and numbers of cruise ships and ferries operating in or
adjacent to U.S. waters has thus increased the probability of an intentional or
unintentional maritime mass-casualty incident. Cruise ships alone carry more than
6.5 million American citizens annually. Cruise ships and ferries are “soft” targets
for terrorist attacks; clearly passengers of these vessels are a population at risk.3
An attack on such a ship could generate hundreds of critical casualties requir-
ing airway, oxygenation, ventilation, and intravenous support. Previous inci-
dents show that the sinking of a vessel would result in a large number of
hypothermic casualties.4 In the case of a chemical or biological attack, psycho-
logical casualties—symptomatic but stable—would outnumber actual physical
casualties by ten or fifteen to one.5 The response would be little less for an attack
that did not produce large numbers of injured; all of the hundreds of passengers
(some cruise ships and ferries carry in well excess of a thousand passengers)
would have to be screened and prioritized for evacuation.
The likely consequences of a maritime mass-casualty incident, then, will re-
quire a deliberate multidiscipline, multistakeholder, multiresponder approach
from emergency-response planners in the homeland security and search-
and-rescue communities. This includes planning an adequate health services
support (HSS) architecture. The core priorities include saving lives, reducing
suffering, and mitigating the impact on an affected population; in all of these the
medical community will bear a heavy burden. How well we prepare for maritime
mass-casualty incidents will determine whether it can carry them.6
While the response to Hurricane Katrina was not a true maritime incident,
and other agencies had lead responsibility for casualty care, the lack of involve-
ment by Coast Guard health services personnel in planning for and executing a
hurricane response was reflected in initial weak coordination between Coast
Guard rescuers and medical response personnel. The Coast Guard’s search and
rescue personnel did an incredible job responding to pluck Katrina’s victims
from peril and transport them to safer locations. This response represented per-
haps the largest mass rescue operation in the service’s history. However, while
victims were transported to locations of relative safety, these movements were
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not effectively coordinated during the early days of the response with emergency
medical support personnel to optimize post rescue care. This less than optimum
coordination reflects the lack of a medical perspective in the service’s command
response planning.
MARITIME FIRST RESPONDERS
The term “first responder” has several definitions, depending upon context.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) first-responder grants go to
law enforcement, fire/rescue, and emergency medical services agencies. The
medical and public health grant programs of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services consider emergency medical agencies and hospitals as first re-
sponders as well, to the extent that they are “first receivers” of victims. The rele-
vant joint capstone document discussing the five phases of casualty care
management defines the role of first responders:
The first response may include self-aid and buddy aid, combat lifesavers, medics,
hospital corpsmen, physician assistants (PAs), physicians, or other medical person-
nel. The first responder should have a working knowledge of the next level of care
available and the patient movement system. Within this phase, the focus of health
care providers is to save life and limb and stabilize the patient sufficiently to evacuate
to the next level of care. A stabilized patient is one whose airway is secured, hemor-
rhage is controlled, shock is treated and fractures are immobilized.7
The 2005 federal budget included $3.6 billion to fund first responders—a 780
percent increase since 9/11. The Bush administration has proposed doubling
first-responder-preparedness grants to high-threat urban areas. In fiscal 2004,
DHS awarded more than forty-six million dollars to metropolitan medical re-
sponse teams, established for domestic WMD incidents. However, federal grants
for civilian first responders do not necessarily translate into improved maritime
first-response capabilities unless gaps in maritime capabilities are deliberately
identified and dollars are spent to address these gaps specifically. Though the
Coast Guard remains, in the maritime realm, the primary first responder among
federal, state, and local agencies, it does not receive federal first-responder
grants and has realized minimal growth in its budget in this area. Until person-
nel are assigned to careful planning for maritime contingencies, gaps and short-
falls will remain undocumented and therefore continue to be ignored.
In accordance with the National SAR Plan, National Contingency Plan, and
National Response Plan, which apply respectively to various circumstances,
Coast Guard geographical commanders (that is, commanders of sectors and dis-
tricts) will be the federal incident commanders for mass-casualty responses off-
shore, near the shore, or on the waterfront. For incidents occurring beyond three
nautical miles (i.e., beyond state waters), the Coast Guard has sole jurisdiction
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and responsibility for consequence management. But command staffs, while
skilled and experienced in coordinating large-scale, unified incident responses,
do not have the health and medical expertise required to recognize, plan for, or
comprehensively address the medical issues that would result from a maritime
mass-casualty incident. The U.S. maritime search-and-rescue system is de-
signed primarily for incidents of limited size with relatively few victims, which
constitute the vast majority of cases. For them the Coast Guard relies upon
small-boat and air stations strategically located along the coast and in estuar-
ies. Generally, each Coast Guard boat or air station has one ready crew on
board; these crews, supported by personnel in dispersed district and sector
command centers, are expert in locating and rescuing victims in small num-
bers. Most crew members have basic first aid training; some have qualifications
as emergency medical technicians. These Coast Guard capabilities are aug-
mented by local community squads and state-owned assets. These state and local
responders have training and qualifications like those of Coast Guard respond-
ers; these units are few in number and capacity, and they are limited to inshore/
near-shore operations.
Mass-rescue/casualty situations, which are not routinely practiced, could
quickly overwhelm such resources. Exercises are being scheduled, but mean-
while, planning for comprehensive, multiagency responses lags. This shortfall is
due in part to a lack of planning capacity within the Coast Guard; there are sim-
ply not enough people to conduct daily operations and plan for future contin-
gencies as well. In addition, the perspectives of personnel and commands
developing plans are limited by their individual experience. For example, “boat
drivers” and other operators tend to focus on locating, rescuing, and transport-
ing victims, tending to overlook the medical details involved with treating the
victims. Planning teams must incorporate personnel from a wide variety of
backgrounds, including medical, to ensure the synergy required to develop a
comprehensive plan that addresses all aspects of a mass-rescue/casualty re-
sponse and leverages all necessary government/private-sector capabilities.
Studies of conventional mass-casualty incidents have shown that 10 to 15
percent of casualties will die should they not receive timely prehospital inter-
vention. Many maritime incidents will involve prolonged evacuation and trans-
port times, meaning that advanced life support will have to be deployed to the
scene. Secondary triage by advanced-level medical responders at offshore casualty-
collection points will be critical; these responders require a higher level of clini-
cal expertise than that of emergency medical technicians. The Coast Guard cutters,
Navy ships, and merchant vessels that would act as offshore casualty-collection
points lack such medical teams. Perhaps municipal medical responders or fed-
eral and Defense Department disaster augmentation teams could rapidly deploy
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to and operate on the scene at a maritime incident; their availability and capabil-
ity to do so have not been adequately explored.
All this does not align well with the expectations of local or state government,
or of the public. The general presumption is that the Coast Guard is as prepared
to respond to a maritime mass-casualty incident as the local community is to re-
spond on land. Communities within fifty miles of the country’s largest 120 cities
are covered by federally funded Metropolitan Medical Response Teams capable
of treating a thousand casualties; no such support is currently in place for the
maritime region. Coast Guard area commanders have identified this gap as a
priority strategic issue.8
The Coast Guard’s internal health services support personnel need to be ac-
tively involved in the process of understanding and addressing these substantial
gaps in preparedness. The Katrina response demonstrated the lack of active
health services responders’ engagement with operational responders. With the
exception of Safety and Environmental Health Officers and forensic dentists, the
medical response was limited to augmenting aviation medicine support to
Coast Guard aircrews at fixed operating bases. No physicians were deployed to
augment rescue and operational units and assist with coordination with medical
response organizations or the numerous medical triage and transportation is-
sues. Nor were Coast Guard health services personnel deployed to assist DoD or
DHS medical teams in caring for the displaced evacuees. While the Air Force
provided its own medical evacuation crews during the evacuation of patients
staged at the New Orleans Airport, Coast Guard C-130s required augmentation
from other services for MEDEVAC crews. The Defense Department has learned
through painful experience to include health services in mission planning, but
no such culture change has occurred in the Coast Guard. In addition, Coast
Guard staffs have hesitated to “lean forward” and ensure that operational
commanders fully appreciate the medical and health demands they will face
in a mass-casualty incident and to promote their service’s health support
capabilities.
The HSS program has traditionally not had an operational response role, in-
stead supporting health protection and health fitness for Coast Guard forces.
The Director of Health and Safety manages the service’s program at the head-
quarters level. The chain of command for local Coast Guard clinics and sickbays
runs through Integrated Support commands via regional Maintenance and Lo-
gistics commands. The result is an administrative and operational separation
between Coast Guard operational commanders and health services support ac-
tivities that impedes coordination of medical operational-response planning.
While Coast Guard health services safety and environmental health officers
have bridged this operational-support gap and are well integrated into marine
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safety and operations response plans, the inclusion of local health services in di-
rect planning for and support to mass-casualty responses has been inconsistent
and ill defined. With the exception of a 1990s medical response “away team”
concept in the Coast Guard’s Seventeenth District in Alaska and a partnering at-
tempt in the Thirteenth District (in Marine Safety Office Puget Sound, between
Coast Guard health services representatives, the Defense Department, and the
Department of Homeland Security’s Regional National Disaster Medical System
Coordinator), the discrepancy between Coast Guard health and medical maritime
homeland-security requirements and operational readiness has not been ad-
dressed. This “delta” must be closed now, before an attack or accident forces medi-
cal and health shortcomings to be solved in the midst of a mass-casualty crisis.
The Coast Guard must proactively engage its HSS component in maritime
homeland security mission planning, preparedness, and operations. Opera-
tional commanders need to “mine” their health services support personnel for
information on the medical threats to the populations at risk, the response capa-
bilities required to mitigate these threats, and the availability of medical re-
sources to meet these needs. They also need to cause their personnel to interact
and develop cooperative relationships with their health services peers at other
medical facilities. The Coast Guard Medical Manual already assigns senior medi-
cal officers responsibilities for disaster planning and coordination with local au-
thorities, but it needs to be defined further by doctrine and supplemented with
policy guidance, particularly with respect to maritime disasters.9 Planning
should adapt a “network-centric” concept, one that relies on regional medical
capabilities and mutual aid to support maritime incident management.10 Re-
gional medical mutual-assistance maritime-response plans that associate Coast
Guard health services with specific geographical areas have not been established
in most places. Creating these networks will require close coordination and ded-
icated communication.
Coast Guard responsibilities for direct support of maritime homeland secu-
rity preparedness and response need to go beyond planning and coordination
support to include operational support. While medical personnel from other
agencies may become available for rapid deployment to a maritime incident,
Coast Guard health services support personnel represent a valuable resource.
Coast Guard Auxiliary healthcare providers also serve as “force multipliers” and
backfill for deployed active-duty healthcare providers during surge operations.
Doctrine needs to create, and align the service’s first responders with, the health
and medical roles for terrorism and mass-casualty operations prescribed by the
Department of Homeland Security.11 The Coast Guard Incident Management
Handbook defines numerous medical, health, and safety roles for responses to
maritime mass-casualty scenarios (hazardous-materials accidents, collisions of
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vessels, terrorist acts, use of weapons of mass destruction, etc.);12 it does not
identify the assets that would fill these roles.
Health services support doctrine must be congruent with the Incident Com-
mand System.13 It must ensure that Coast Guard first responders—emergency
medical technicians, physicians, dentists, and pharmacists—are available to de-
ploy and integrate into the service’s response structure on little or no notice.
Coast Guard operations, logistics, and marine safety programs have established
training and exercise requirements for their respective communities, and the
health services support community must do the same. Medical response coordi-
nation, including on-scene treatment and triage, patient evacuation coordina-
tion, and mutual aid coordination, for major contingency responses is incredibly
complex. It requires the expertise of HSS personnel in the planning process as
well as in the actual event.
Health Services Support Response Functions
Several planning scenarios involve mass casualties from natural or technological
disasters and terrorism, for which on-scene emergency medical care, triage, and
en route medical care will be essential. Incident Command System positions will
have to be staffed for medical command, medical communications, triage, treat-
ment, transportation coordination, and medical supplies.14 These functions will
be under the control of the ICS operations section, alongside or in place of the
medical unit within the logistics section established to care for responders
themselves.
Coast Guard operational commanders who have anticipated the need for de-
ployable medical incident-response teams depend upon local civilian health and
medical organizations for such leadership positions. While such community
emergency services may have valuable experience, there are disadvantages in us-
ing non–Coast Guard personnel, who would not be closely familiar with the ser-
vice’s command and control information systems. Civilian responders, who
have other primary obligations, are not likely to be readily available to partici-
pate in deliberate planning or in training and exercises. In addition, many
coastal regions do not have sufficient public safety infrastructure to support a
maritime mass-casualty incident to begin with, let alone detach personnel to the
Coast Guard.
Establish Health and Safety Maritime Response Teams
In addition to participating in the contingency planning process, the Coast
Guard needs to organize and train its health services support personnel to be
medical first responders and surge assets. Forming regional medical and dental
providers into Health Services Maritime Response Teams (HSMRTs) analogous
to the Metropolitan Medical Response System, thus consolidating the collective
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regional resources from maintenance and logistics, district, and integrated sup-
port commands, would make trained and qualified Coast Guard personnel
available for deployment for major contingencies on a sustained basis.
The teams would be composed of Coast Guard medical officers, dental offi-
cers, pharmacists, safety and environmental health officers, and enlisted health
services technicians. A concept-of-operations document would lay out types,
structure, and missions; required qualifications for members; and sources of
material support. HSMRTs would be flexible, expandable or collapsible in size as
required for specific missions. Staffing would be notional, without prior assign-
ments to a specific team, with the exception of mass-casualty-incident teams,
discussed below. Teams would train with existing Incident Management Assist
Teams and National Strike Force Strike Teams to enhance interoperability.
The concept document would set up an optimal structure and standard oper-
ating procedures for preparing and organizing mission-specific teams for vari-
ous missions, in contrast to the current de novo “select and direct” approach,
predicated primarily upon personal interest and availability. Nonetheless, as ex-
perience as shown, reluctance by commands to supply members can be over-
come only by strong commitment to the health services support program, a true
cultural shift.
Teams would be designated by type according to missions, along the lines of
U.S. Army Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams (SMARTs) and Air
Force Small Portable Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response (SPEARR)
teams. Teams would be deployed individually or in combinations as required for
a mission-specific assignment. Several types have been proposed.
• Mass-Casualty Incident Medical Team—supplying personnel to establish
the medical branch within the operations section of the ICS organization
during mass-casualty/mass rescue incidents. (These functions include
on-scene triage, treatment, and medical evacuation coordination. These
teams need to be preassigned to each sector, because of the likely need for a
rapid on-scene, no-notice response.)
• Contingency Operations Medical Unit—within the Logistics Section of the
Incident Command System organization, providing medical support, in-
cluding rehabilitation and mental health services, to responders. (Such op-
erations occur every three years or so in the Coast Guard; medical support
needs to be part of a complete package.)
• Incident Management Team—providing a robust health and safety staff to
incident commanders at the district/sector headquarters levels. These
teams would advise incident commanders and unified commands on medi-
cal and health aspects of major contingencies, representing an organized,
F R E N C H , D I R E N Z O , & D O A N E 8 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:43 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
89
War College: Summer 2006 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
comprehensive approach to mass-casualty/health emergency incidents that
was lacking in the 2001 anthrax attack response.15
• Preventive Medicine Unit—offering preventive medicine and environmen-
tal health capabilities, task organized and deployed to assess, prevent, and
control potential health threats, including bioterrorism and mass vaccina-
tion centers.
• Humanitarian Disaster Support Team—assisting in migrant/refugee pro-
cessing and support, natural disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation.
(These teams would also be available for augmentation of fixed capabilities
during disasters.)
• Tactical Support Team—supporting law enforcement and tactical opera-
tions, such as Marine Safety and Security Teams, Tactical Law Enforcement
Teams, and Port Security Units. Health services personnel assigned would
have specialized training and qualification in tactical medicine.
• Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear Support Team—providing tech-
nical expertise to the incident commander and operating forces in support
of potential or actual hazardous-material incidents, including supervision
of decontamination procedures. (The team, equipped to operate in the
“warm zone,” would support National Strike Force Marine Safety and Secu-
rity Teams.)
Standing up Health Services Maritime Response Teams requires adequate logis-
tical support, funding for equipment and training, and triage and treatment sets
staged in each sector, ready for immediate deployment. There has been reluc-
tance to divert Coast Guard funds from direct patient care to prepare for contin-
gency responses; without a servicewide mandate, financial disincentives will
persist. Such contingency sets as exist have been established from local funds
and inventories based on local medical officer preferences, creating nonstandard
triage procedures and equipment. A Coast Guard–wide standardized HSMRT
medical set, including decontamination equipment, would optimize procure-
ment and inventory maintenance. Standardizing medical sets and protocols also
facilitates logistical support and proficiency training between units. Every effort
should be made to ensure interoperability and compatibility with systems used
by other federal, state, and local agencies.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INTEROPERABILITY
Comprehensive preparedness will require integrating electronic information
systems, including performance support, geographical information, and
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communications interoperability. Off-the-shelf technology is available and
should be exploited.
“Situational awareness” within any battle space means, in a health services
context, knowing where casualties and medical resources (triage/casualty col-
lection points, hospitals, and air medical and ground transport staging sites) are.
Health services response elements need to be in the incident commander’s
“common operational picture.” Health services leadership elements need geo-
graphical information software and hardware that can collect, analyze, and
share spatial data, and the health services–specific requirements need to be inte-
grated into the Hawkeye Core C2 Suite and Common Situation Display System
now being deployed to sector command centers.
Handheld digital assistants that incorporate wristband barcode or radio-
frequency identification-device readers to track victims and facilitate triage are
now commercially available.16 Innovative performance support system software
also exists, such as the Automated Decision Aid System for Hazardous Incidents
(ADASHI), a Defense Department–funded, portable, computer-based, inte-
grated decision-support system for hazardous material for civilian or military
first responders to CBRNE incidents. It integrates the specific technical func-
tions required to manage such an incident—initial hazard assessment, hazard
source analysis, mitigation alternatives, physical protection requirements, de-
contamination methods, medical treatment, and triage criteria.17 Programs like
ADASHI can also augment traditional “tabletop” training, by tracking decisions
automatically and projecting consequences of those decisions.
Interagency communications have been problematic in almost every major
disaster.18 This lack of communications interoperability was blamed for pre-
ventable deaths of New York City firefighters in the World Trade Center collapse.19
During a mass-casualty incident, reliable communications among on-scene
units, triage and transport officers at casualty collection points, responding
emergency medical services, and receiving hospitals will be critical. The Coast
Guard’s new emergency communication system (Rescue 21) will improve
interoperability but will not meet multiagency health system communications
requirements during a major incident. Deployable medical and health commu-
nications systems are needed that meet interoperability standards being estab-
lished by the Department of Homeland Security’s Project SafeCom.20
HEALTH SERVICES RESPONSE TEAM PREPAREDNESS
AND EXERCISES
DHS agencies, including the Coast Guard, routinely lead or participate in na-
tional intermodal terrorism exercises designed to enhance their ability to re-
spond to transportation security incidents. Health Services Maritime Response
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Teams members should regularly participate in exercises at the local and re-
gional levels to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid, and assess
operational improvements and deficiencies.21
The Coast Guard’s existing lessons-learned processes will help it evaluate
progress, validate the effort, and direct future resources.22 HSMRTs should at-
tend formal team training, such as that provided by the DHS-FEMA Emergency
Management Institute’s Hospital Emergency Response Training for Mass Casu-
alty Incidents in Anniston, Alabama, conducted at its Noble Training Center.
HSMRTs should exercise with their sector operational units and command and
control cadre, utilizing patient care scenarios developed by federally funded
centers.23 In addition, to enhance interoperability, team members should seek
out every opportunity to train with members of other federal, state, and local
medical response teams. This would have the added benefit of developing the
personal trust that is so critical during an incident response.
Integrating operational HSMRTs into sector operations and exercises ensures
that health services providers remain directly tied to Coast Guard warfare and
national security, and that they serve in “military essential” positions (positions
that require uniformed military personnel). Maintaining military medicine de-
ployment capabilities guards against potential losses of billets from internal or
external reviews, as is happening in the Navy.24 HSMRT exercises and deploy-
ments would also serve as a structure to meet the readiness requirements de-
fined by the U.S. Public Health Service Office of Force Readiness and
Deployment.25
The creation of these HSMRTs will take time. As an interim step, Coast Guard
health services support personnel should be identified, trained, and qualified to
serve as medical and health experts on existing incident management assist
teams. This will introduce the health services community to the operational
arena and begin building the awareness and momentum necessary to overcome
the serious medical and health deficiencies in the service’s mass-casualty re-
sponse capability.
The Coast Guard has awesome responsibilities for the safety and security of
the U.S. maritime community. Since 9/11 the Coast Guard has made tremen-
dous strides forward in establishing maritime security measures to prevent a ter-
rorist attack. While the service’s search-and-rescue and mass rescue capabilities,
as demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina, are significant and steadily improv-
ing, the same cannot be said for the service’s efforts to strengthen its mass casu-
alty response capabilities. If the service is to succeed across the full spectrum of
maritime consequence management, its planning and preparedness process
must use a cross-program approach to incorporate all essential expertise and
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necessary perspectives. We must not let the highly visible successes of the Katrina
response overshadow the transparent, but significant, first-responder deficien-
cies that were not taxed during this incident. The Coast Guard has not made ad-
equate use of its health services support community, including the Coast Guard
Auxiliary, for planning or interagency communication and coordination, or as a
response asset. The Coast Guard must capitalize on its present expertise by fos-
tering an internal cultural change, introducing an operational aspect to the
health services’ traditional support role.
Alignment of the health and safety program resources and mission priorities
with the Department of Homeland Security strategy and Coast Guard Maritime
Strategy will not be without difficulties.26 Establishment of all-hazards-capable
Health Services Maritime Response Teams would be a tangible step toward that
alignment, one that would visibly demonstrate the “value added” of the health
services support program to the missions of the Coast Guard. Transforming tra-
ditional health services providers into operational first responders will require
innovation, “forward leaning,” and cultural transformation. Our maritime pop-
ulation is at risk, the responsibility is ours, and the time to act is now.
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GEOGRAPHY, TECHNOLOGY, AND BRITISH NAVAL
STRATEGY IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA
Jon Tetsuro Sumida
In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan ar-gued that the effective deployment of naval force had determined the outcomes
of the great European wars of the eighteenth century. Many, if not most, readers
believed that this historical survey was the basis of related major arguments that
were applicable to the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first was that
naval supremacy was the prerequisite to economic prosperity and international
political preeminence. The second was that naval supremacy could be achieved
only through the possession of large numbers of battleships, which were always
to be kept together in order to be able to contain or destroy enemy battleship
fleets. The notion of the naval supremacy of a single country based upon battle-
ships united in accordance with the principle of concentration of force thus be-
came identified as the essence of Mahanian strategic
theory. In effect, geopolitical and naval operational
strategic lines of argument were conflated into a recipe
for policy that was supposed to be universally valid.
Such an understanding of what were widely be-
lieved to be the two main components of Mahan’s
thinking, however, was seriously flawed. In the first
place, Mahan actually believed that naval supremacy
in his own time and in the future would be wielded by
a transnational consortium of naval powers acting in
defense of a global system of free trade to the mutual
benefit of participating parties. Secondly, Mahan’s
treatment of the principle of concentration of force in
his most popular book was heavily conditioned by the
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particular geographical circumstances of Great Britain and its empire. Thus while
the first proposition was addressed to the question of the nature of an inter-
national system, the second was to a very considerable degree concerned with
the character of the naval security problem of a single state. Insofar as naval pol-
icy in the industrial age was concerned, the relationship between the two argu-
ments was thus much weaker than has been supposed. As a general principle,
concentration of force was of course relevant to the maintenance of naval su-
premacy by either a single power or a coalition. But salient aspects of Mahan’s
historical case study were specific to British imperial strategic geography.
Mahan’s views on naval supremacy as a transnational phenomenon have
been explained elsewhere and will not receive further consideration here.1 His
recommended strategy for using a limited number of ships to defend interests in
widely dispersed seas, however, has escaped rigorous scrutiny.2 The present arti-
cle will analyze Mahan’s historical exposition with respect to this issue in the last
chapter of The Influence of Sea Power upon History and establish its relevance to
Britain’s naval circumstances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. It will then examine the thinking of Admiral Sir John Fisher, who as service
chief of the Royal Navy was actually responsible for the formulation of British
imperial naval defense policy between 1904 and 1910, and again from late 1914
to mid-1915. Mahan and Fisher held opposing views of capital-ship design and
the utility of history as a practical guide to policy. On the other hand, the con-
centration of Britain’s main naval strength in home waters as the best method of
defending an empire with widely dispersed territories and trade routes seemed
to constitute an important area of agreement. This article will demonstrate that
Fisher’s concept of the proper application of the principle of concentration of
force to Britain’s naval circumstances in the early twentieth century was diametri-
cally the opposite of that of Mahan, in spite of strong appearances to the contrary.
It will argue, moreover, that Fisher thought this way because he believed that ad-
vances in technology had radically altered the effect of geography on strategy.
The main event of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History was the
American Revolution. Mahan believed that this conflict was a “purely maritime
war”—that is, a dispute between two roughly equal sides over territories that
were for the most part remote from Europe. These conditions were unique in the
record of fighting between European great states in what had been the modern
period—every other war from the coming of Louis XIV to the fall of Napoleon
was about continental extension in one way or another, with military affairs thus
playing a major if not decisive role. In the American Revolution, the outcomes of
land campaigns on colonial territories depended completely upon control of
contiguous waters and ocean lines of communication. These circumstances
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seemed particularly relevant to the likely conditions of major conflict in the late
nineteenth century, a time of great-power rivalry over extra-European colonies
and maritime commerce.
In Mahan’s account of the American Revolution, the principals were the bel-
ligerent great powers, namely, Britain, France, and Spain. The American colo-
nists and the Dutch had large interests at stake but lacked the naval strength to
play significant roles at sea. Britain’s primary strategic goal was to maintain its
colonial empire intact, that of France and Spain to weaken Britain through the
facilitation of the American rebellion and the capture of important colonial ter-
ritory for their own use. Britain, therefore, stood on the strategic defensive, and
it did so with a navy that was not large enough to control with assurance all ma-
jor theaters of operations, which included not only European waters but distant
seas off North America and India. Britain responded to these circumstances by
dividing its fleet in a way that produced naval forces both at home and abroad
that were on occasion weaker than those of its opponents. At Yorktown, the re-
sult was a British military disaster, one that ultimately prompted the peace negoti-
ations that led to American independence. In the Indian Ocean, French tactical
successes were insufficient to overthrow the British position but were large
enough to demonstrate the great potential of naval force when used with intelli-
gent aggressiveness. In the end, British losses and French and Spanish gains, while
considerable, were not decisive—that is, Britain retained its naval and mercantile
predominance. But if the American Revolution did not change the European bal-
ance of power, it did offer Mahan an opportunity to explore the application of the
principle of concentration of force to an important and difficult case.
In Mahan’s view, Britain’s strategy had been fundamentally flawed. By send-
ing large contingents to extra-European waters while necessarily keeping a sub-
stantial fleet at home to prevent invasion and protect converging trade routes,
Britain exposed its navy to defeat in detail. The chosen policy, he argued,
to be effective, calls for superior numbers, because the different divisions are too far
apart for mutual support. Each must therefore be equal to any probable combination
against it, which implies superiority everywhere to the force of the enemy actually
opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly reinforced. How impossible and danger-
ous such a defensive strategy is, when not superior in force, is shown by the frequent
inferiority of the English abroad, as well as in Europe, despite the effort to be every-
where equal.3
The proper course given the near parity in battleship strength of the two
sides, Mahan counseled, was for Britain to have deployed a preponderant fleet in
Europe, whose job was the containment or destruction of the main French and
Spanish naval forces. These should have been watched “under all the difficulties
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of the situation, not with the vain hope of preventing every raid, or intercepting
every convoy, but with the expectation of frustrating the greater combinations,
and of following close at the heels of any large fleet that escaped.”4 In addition,
“the lines of communication abroad should not have been needlessly extended,
so as to increase beyond the strictest necessity the detachments to guard them.”5
In other words, Mahan’s strategic prescription for a Britain faced by a hostile
European naval coalition and burdened with the need to defend vital interests at
home and valuable possessions abroad was to maximize strength at the center
and minimize strength at the periphery.6
Mahan was aware that forfeiting contests abroad in the hope of achieving de-
cisive success at home, as opposed to distributing substantial strength around
the globe, could result in large losses of colonial territory and trade. “It has been
attempted to show the weakness of the one policy,” he conceded, “while admit-
ting the difficulties and dangers of the other.”7 The problem of defending a
global empire while keeping home territory secure posed a predicament. In-
toning concentration of force as a
principle was one thing; applying it
to the naval strategic circum-
stances of Great Britain in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was quite another when the consequences of such action could be the
loss of Egypt, South Africa, India, and Australia, and the destruction of the lu-
crative China trade. Faced with the prospect of war against France and Russia in
combination, Britain responded from 1889 with enormous building programs
that were intended to support a strategy of being strong around the world. In
1902, Britain was compelled to ally itself with Japan in order to overmatch the
growth of French and Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters. Better relations
with France and the destruction of the Russian navy by the Japanese in 1904 and
1905 enabled Britain to reduce its naval strength in distant seas without com-
promising imperial security, in order to facilitate reforms in manning and main-
tenance and to save money. The effect was a concentration of the main strength
of the Royal Navy at home, which was also convenient given the growing naval
strength of Germany.
The buildup of the British battle fleet in home waters through the withdrawal
of heavy units in distant seas seemed to follow Mahan’s recommendations in the
last chapter of The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Admiral Sir John Fisher,
the First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910 and also from late 1914 to the middle of
1915, was the instigator of the redeployment of the Royal Navy. Fisher’s hostility to
naval history as a guide to policy is notorious. In June 1909, his dismissal of the
practical utility of history outraged Captain Herbert Richmond. Fisher, Richmond
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wrote in his diary, had stated that the “teachings of the past are ‘the record of ex-
ploded ideas’” and that “the present needs no guide, it is self-sufficient.”8 But Fisher
excepted Mahan from his general strictures. The two men had met and corre-
sponded while delegates to the Hague Peace Conference in June 1899.9 Mahan
seems to have made a good impression, because Fisher’s first known references
to the American’s writing came not long after. The “‘teachings of history’ have
no value for us,” he wrote to Joseph Chamberlain in November 1900, “with the
one great exception so eloquently described by Captain Mahan, Vol. II, page 118
(I know the place by heart, so can quote it!) that sea power governs the world:
‘Nelson’s far distant storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never
looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.’”10 Fisher’s familiarity
with Mahan was not restricted to the American author’s most famous phrase.
Fisher quoted at length Mahan’s observations on the human element in war, the
disposition of navies, and much of the text surrounding the extract cited in his
letter to Chamberlain as well, in printed memoranda circulated in the Mediter-
ranean Fleet while he was its commander in chief, from 1899 to 1902.11
Mahan both criticized and praised in print Fisher’s actions as service chief. In
1906 Mahan condemned on financial, technical, strategic, and tactical grounds
increases in battleship size, criticism that in effect amounted to an attack on the
Admiralty’s decision to build Dreadnought, a battleship that was larger, faster,
and more powerfully armed than any other.12 In 1907, on the other hand, Mahan
noted that Britain had taken steps that would soon result in the concentration of
nearly nine-tenths of its battleship strength in home waters.13 Fisher was in-
censed by the former piece, which lent powerful support to critics of his judg-
ment with respect to capital-ship design;14 he was gratified, however, by the
latter, which shielded him from charges that his agreement to the Liberal gov-
ernment’s substantial reductions in naval expenditure had significantly weak-
ened Britain’s ability to deal with the German battle fleet in the event of war.15
Mahan’s punditry, in short, worked to Fisher’s political advantage as well as dis-
advantage. Fisher was still willing to quote Mahan with approval in 1907, even
after the appearance of the latter’s public criticism of large battleships.16
But the shift in the deployment of the Royal Navy was a short-term response
to fortuitous circumstances and immediate fiscal incentives, not a realignment
of naval strength in conformity with the recommendations of classic naval stra-
tegic theory. The Admiralty could not rule out the possibility of a hostile three-
power naval coalition of France, Russia, and Germany, capable of threatening
Britain in European and extra-European seas simultaneously.17 Indeed, Fisher’s
administration was confronted by this very contingency at the start of his tenure
as First Sea Lord. In 1904, relations between Russia and Germany improved
dramatically, and there was reason to believe that a British declaration of war
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against Russia in support of Japan would provoke France to join Russia in spite
of its growing friendship with Britain. Then, in October 1904, the Russian Baltic
Fleet fired upon British trawlers in the North Sea in the belief that they were Jap-
anese torpedo craft. This event very nearly brought Britain and Russia to blows,
which would almost certainly have precipitated a general European war that
would have pitted Britain, aided only by Japan, against three continental great
powers.18 Under such circumstances, an outnumbered Royal Navy would have
been charged with the tasks of preventing seaborne invasion of the home terri-
tory while seeing to the security of
far-flung trade routes and distant
colonies. Fisher, who took office
only three days after the North
Sea incident, seems to have been
confident of the Royal Navy’s
ability to do both jobs.19 Within four years, however, the combination of deep
cuts in naval spending imposed by a Liberal government bent on economy and
social reform, a sharp increase in German naval construction, and signs of a
Russian naval recovery had created the prospect in the not too distant future of a
Royal Navy that would be incapable of defending the center and the periphery
simultaneously against a hostile combination of European fleets.
But although the fiscal situation was unfavorable and the state of interna-
tional affairs uncertain, Fisher believed that strategic deliverance might soon be
at hand in the form of radical technological change. In 1908, the first battle
cruisers—vessels with the heavy armament of a battleship but the high speed
and long endurance of a cruiser—demonstrated that they could steam great dis-
tances at high speed without breakdown. In the same year, the Royal Navy re-
ceived its first submarine capable of operating effectively for long periods of
time. These events were of significance to Fisher, because in his mind battle
cruisers and submarines were going to be the basis of a fundamental change in
the British approach to imperial defense. Fisher was convinced that in the re-
stricted seas surrounding the British Isles submarines deployed in large num-
bers would be capable of acting as a barrier to invasion, because they would be
capable of inflicting heavy losses upon even heavily escorted convoys of troop-
ships. This form of operations was known as “flotilla defense.” On open seas or
in distant waters around colonial territory, where submarines could not be con-
centrated in large numbers in good time, Fisher counted upon battle cruiser
squadrons deployed by wireless instructions from the Admiralty to deal with en-
emy cruisers or battleships.
The effectiveness of such a centralized system of command and control de-
pended upon information collected and analyzed by a sophisticated intelligence
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and communications organization known as the “War Room System.” British
battle cruisers were to be capable of defeating foreign battleships because the
former would be equipped with a new kind of fire control system that would en-
able them to hit their opponents before they could be hit in return, which sup-
posedly would make their lack of heavy armor inconsequential. The
replacement of general sea control by battleships with local sea denial by sub-
marines and distant sea control by highly mobile battle cruisers reversed the
Mahanian formula for maintaining British naval security at home and abroad
when numbers of capital ships were insufficient to be able to deploy superior
force everywhere: surface heavy units were to be concentrated on the periphery
rather than at the center.20
In theory, a force of submarines that was strong enough to prevent the inva-
sion of Britain would cost much less than a large fleet of battleships and sup-
porting warships capable of accomplishing the same task. The great attraction
of Fisher’s vision, therefore, was that it offered an alternative to both the strategy
of fielding surface fleets that were more powerful than those of an enemy coali-
tion in all seas, which was fiscally out of reach, and the strategy of concentrating
the surface fleet in home waters, which exposed maritime lines of communica-
tion to disruption and overseas territories to seizure. Fisher was captivated by
enthusiasm for the potentially transformative effects of new technology, but the
adoption of his vision depended to a great extent upon fiscal and strategic neces-
sity forcing the hand of naval policy. In the event, however, neither factor played
out as Fisher had anticipated. In 1909, fear of German naval expansion com-
pelled the Liberal government to authorize an enormous increase in capital-ship
building. When units ordered by the Pacific dominions were added to the British
total, the effect was a program that was five times larger than the previous year.
To pay for a larger navy and an ambitious scheme of social reform, the govern-
ment implemented changes in taxation that in combination with an economic
upturn increased revenue substantially. Over the next three years, capital-ship
programs were smaller than in 1909 but still more than twice the size of 1908.
This surge of new construction was enough to make credible plans to maintain
powerful fleets both at home and abroad in the event of war.
The fiscal viability of building large armored ships in the numbers required
to implement a strategy of global numerical superiority weakened the case for
the replacement of the battleship by a combination of battle cruisers and sub-
marines. In addition, the delays in the development of gunnery instruments that
were supposed to give the Royal Navy a monopoly on long-range hitting under-
cut the argument that British battle cruisers would be able to defeat enemy battle-
ships in spite of their lack of heavy armor. This factor may have contributed to the
Admiralty’s rejection of Fisher’s call for all the capital ships of the 1909 program to
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be battle cruisers. As it turned out, only four of the big ships ordered were battle
cruisers, with the balance of six being battleships. By this time, Fisher’s effective-
ness as First Sea Lord had been compromised by political conflict and contro-
versy. He resigned as First Sea Lord in early 1910, and the programs of that year
and 1911 contained only one battle cruiser as opposed to four battleships. In Oc-
tober 1911, however, Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty
(that is, the civilian superior of the First Sea Lord, a naval officer). Fisher had im-
pressed Churchill in 1907, at which time he seems to have explained his ideas
about battle cruisers and submarines.21 The new First Lord began an intense cor-
respondence with Fisher upon assuming office, and for several months the re-
tired admiral had good reason to believe that his radical vision was upon the brink
of implementation. By the end of 1911, Fisher was convinced that Churchill had
been persuaded to suspend the construction of battleships in favor of battle
cruisers in the forthcoming year and to adopt his proposals for building sub-
marines in large numbers.
Fisher’s apparent capture of Churchill was the basis for what may have been
an explicit dismissal of the relevance of Mahanian thought to British naval strat-
egy. “I am in continuous and very close correspondence with Winston,” Fisher
wrote to Gerard Fiennes, a journalist, on 8 February 1912, “so I am precluded
from saying all that I desire, but so far every step he contemplates is good, and he
is brave, which is everything! Napoleonic in audacity, Cromwellian in thorough-
ness.”22 Although Churchill’s ability to act was restricted by the opposition of his
more cautious Admiralty advisers, Fisher was confident that submarines “have
made our supremacy more supreme than ever.”23 Here Fisher apparently—but
arguably only apparently—meant something other than flotilla defense. By
1912, the fact that the latest British submarines had much longer operating
ranges than their predecessors had given him grounds to savor the possibility of
sending such vessels to distant seas to protect colonies or other strategically im-
portant territory. In his letter to Fiennes, Mahan was “an extinct volcano,” be-
cause “our new submarines with over 6,000 miles radius of action, two 12-pdrs.
[pounders], and Whitehead torpedoes on the broadside, and seakeeping for
over two months, unattended and unfueled and self-sustaining, have woken up
vast dormant possibilities.”24 Fisher did not go on to discuss the ability of sub-
marines to prevent an invasion of Britain, which had been a major subject of his
discussions with Churchill.25 Disclosing the First Lord’s agreement to flotilla de-
fense to even a trusted journalist, however, would have been unwise, if not fool-
hardy, to say nothing of illegal. Speculation about a future possibility from
which certain inferences about flotilla defense might be drawn, on the other
hand, offered at least a fig leaf of discretion. Fisher’s opening caveat to his
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correspondent was probably a warning that his approach to the submarine
question was not exactly what it seemed.
In the short term, Fisher was to be disappointed. Royal Navy submarine pro-
curement was disrupted by disagreements within the Admiralty over design and
manufacturing. Churchill reconsidered his promise to build only battle cruisers
and in the end compromised by agreeing to the construction of higher-speed
battleships that were still considerably slower and much more expensive than the
kind of warship called for by Fisher. Also, British efforts to develop a naval long-
range gunnery system that was significantly superior to that of any foreign power
finally collapsed in 1912, which destroyed the technical premises of Fisher’s tac-
tical concept of the battle cruiser.26 In the longer term, however, adoption of the
flotilla defense component of Fisher’s radical strategy was favored by two factors.
In the first place, the construction of dreadnought battleships by potentially hos-
tile naval powers in the Mediterranean meant that Britain could no longer count
upon using its older battleships in that area. Replacing them with dreadnoughts,
however, would require increases in new construction and much higher manning
and maintenance costs that Britain could not afford. In the second place, fleet ma-
neuvers revealed that submarines were both mechanically reliable and militarily
effective, which convinced many senior naval officers of the Royal Navy that
flotilla defense of the British Isles was practicable, which in turn would free the
surface fleet—albeit made up of battleships rather than battle cruisers—for
deployment outside of home waters. For these reasons, the Admiralty in early
1914 made secret arrangements to reduce the construction of battleships and in-
crease the construction of submarines. These actions were expected to reduce na-
val spending to within the limits demanded by the Treasury. Fisher was recalled to
the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in October 1914, not long after the outbreak of
war. He immediately increased orders for submarines and, in spite of a cabinet
prohibition of large-warship construction, won approval for the construction of
five battle cruisers of unprecedented speed and gun power.27
War gave Fisher the opportunity to implement the strategic revolution that
he had sought in peace. The strategic circumstances of the hostilities that had
begun in August 1914, however, were not those for which Fisher had planned.
His great concern—which had also been that of Mahan in the last chapter of The
Influence of Sea Power upon History—was a maritime war in which a more or less
isolated Britain had to contend with a coalition of continental naval powers pos-
sessing naval forces that were numerically equal or even superior to those of the
island nation. From the outbreak of a war the main focus of which was on land,
Britain enjoyed the support of three great maritime powers—France, Russia,
and Japan—against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Britain lacked the large
numbers of submarines that were required to implement a sea-denial strategy in
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home waters, on account of the prewar disruption of design and production
mentioned previously, but it did not need to do so, because allied fleets were
strong enough to control distant seas with minimal assistance from the Royal
Navy. This meant that Britain was able to concentrate its battle fleet in home wa-
ters in overwhelming strength. While the Royal Navy did not have to deal with
both major threats in home waters and distant seas with inadequate forces, it did
have to be kept strong enough to be ready to meet a German foray in strength at
any time, an exhausting task that demanded a large numerical margin of safety.
Fisher was thus alarmed in the spring of 1915 by the dispatch of substantial
naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean in support of the assault on the
Dardanelles, where losses of ships and men were heavy. In April 1915 he in-
formed Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander in chief of the battle fleet in the
North Sea, that he would soon be
sending him “a bit from Mahan so
apropos” to their mutual concern
that strength at the vital strategic
center would be compromised by large detachments to a distant and therefore
secondary theater.28 There is no record of Jellicoe actually receiving the
Mahanian passage in question, but it is perhaps not a coincidence that he subse-
quently seems to have read Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History for
the first time.29
Mahan died shortly after the outbreak of war. Fisher left office in mid-1915 in
protest over the Dardanelles and never again exercised control of the Royal Navy.
It is ironic that in his last tenure as service chief, his efforts to create the material
means of executing a strategy that concentrated heavy ships in distant seas
rather than at home were juxtaposed to a commitment to maintaining the integ-
rity of battle fleet concentration in the British Isles, and that his resignation over
the latter ended his ability to implement the former. Moreover, although Fisher
had championed the submarine as a solution to the problem of British imperial
defense, the use of submarines against merchant shipping during the First
World War nearly resulted in Britain’s defeat. Finally, the advent of a vastly more
effective method of commerce raiding in the form of the submarine raised serious
doubts about the validity of Mahan’s argument that guerre de course was incapable
of producing decisive success.30 Thus in the end the views of both the master of
strategic theory and that of practice were confounded by the course of events.
Mahan and Fisher disagreed about capital-ship design and the utility of history
as a guide to formulating naval policy, but the main difference between their
ways of thinking about strategy was over the best means of defending the British
empire in a maritime war. Both dealt with the same geographical dilemma,
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which was the need to dominate home waters and distant seas with a navy that
was not large enough to be sufficiently strong in both places at once. Mahan be-
lieved that the geographical facts of life in the industrial era were the same as in
the age of sail, namely, that distance mattered because it prevented fleets in dis-
parate seas from being mutually supporting; this being the case, Britain had no
choice but to keep its main naval strength at home to defend vital interests while
minimizing deployments abroad. Fisher, on the other hand, was convinced that
the advent of new technology would enable Britain to finesse what had previ-
ously seemed to be an unchangeable geographic reality—that distance did not
matter in the same way it had, because flotilla defense at home would free all
Britain’s surface warships for service abroad, where they could be deployed effi-
ciently by the “War Room System” and wireless communications to defend in-
terests that were, if not vital, still extremely important. In short, where Mahan
called for concentration at the center, Fisher contended that it could be achieved
at the periphery.
This fundamental difference in strategic approach was never debated in pub-
lic, because important information about critical technological issues—such as
naval gunnery, new methods of command and control, and submarine design—
was kept secret. Moreover, the highly visible course of Anglo-German naval an-
tagonism and subsequent confrontation in the North Sea during the First World
War made it easy to assume that Fisher was concerned with the balance of naval
power in home waters to the exclusion of all else, which was not the case. Until
the internal policy making of the Admiralty was laid bare by recent scholarship,
sound consideration of how Mahan’s thinking on geography and strategy as ren-
dered in the last chapter of The Influence of Sea Power upon History was affected by
technological change in his own time was impossible.31 Even then, inattentive-
ness to detail and analytical nuance in Mahan’s text precluded proper handling
of the question. Mahan’s treatment of the subject of concentration of force was
not so much an enunciation of a general principle as an examination of its appli-
cation to a difficult case. Indeed, the story Mahan told in the finale of his most
famous book was a cautionary tale with a counterfactual speculative conclusion,
not an account of success caused by right conduct that proved a rule. His main
purpose was to engage a strategic quandary, not purvey strategic bromides. The
power of his conclusions in his own time was attributable to the fact that the es-
sential characteristics of the historical situation investigated had remained ap-
plicable to Britain and could easily be transposed to address America’s need to
defend two widely separated coastlines.32 In the last chapter of The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, as in so much of Mahan’s other writing, comprehension
of his strategic argument depended upon coming to precise terms with his his-
torical narrative.
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Mahan’s recommendation that Britain concentrate its battle fleet in home
waters when confronted by a hostile coalition with naval strength numerically
equal to or greater than its own was logically compelling within the realm of op-
erational theory, but from a larger practicable point of view as shaped by politics
and economics it was highly unpalatable. The negative consequences of expos-
ing valuable peripheral interests to enemy attack were so great that Fisher re-
sorted to a radical technological alternative, which was supposed to have
allowed Britain to concentrate its main strength at the periphery without jeop-
ardizing vital interests at the center. As it turned out, the implementation of
Fisher’s scheme was delayed by
technical difficulties and service
opposition and made irrelevant
by the actual course of events in
the short run; over the longer term
one of its main components, the
submarine, was transformed into
a dire threat to British trade routes. Fisher’s recipe for imperial naval defense at a
cost that Britain could afford, therefore, while plausible, was difficult to put in
place, inappropriate to changed circumstances, and encouraged the develop-
ment of new technology that became highly dangerous.
Readers interested in the national security dilemmas of the present day may
learn something of value from considering certain salient features of the
just-told story. First, any attempt to apply classical strategic theory to current
defense issues should take into account the specific intent of the author, espe-
cially with regard to the historical context of supporting argument and the ef-
fects of qualifying and contingent suppositions. Second, the applicability, if not
the validity, of even “immutable principles of strategy” may be affected critically
by technological change. Third, the complexity, difficulty, and above all, incon-
stancy of strategic problems are likely to upset plans based upon either adher-
ence to sanctified principles or the creation of technological panaceas.33 And
lastly, it is in the nature of things that in the real world, even the best efforts of
the best may be tried and found wanting.
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THE ATTACK AT TARANTO
Tactical Success, Operational Failure
Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Caravaggio, Canadian Forces
The lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamen-tally affected British maritime strategy throughout the Second World War.
The Royal Italian Navy, or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), exerted a disproportion-
ate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition, because its existence could
not be ignored and British operations to eliminate it failed. On 11 November
1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the British commander of naval forces in
the Mediterranean, had the opportunity to eliminate the entire complement of
battleships from the Italian order of battle, at Taranto. However, questionable de-
cisions in the planning process, combined with Cunningham’s decision to launch
a considerably reduced strike force, succeeded in only temporarily reducing the
Italian battle fleet from six to two battleships. More importantly, the British failed
to capitalize on the operational-level opportunities resulting from the success of
their attack. Britain held the initiative, but the window of opportunity to deci-
sively shape the conditions in the Mediterranean theatre after Taranto was finite,
and it closed with the arrival of the German Fliegercorps X in January 1941.1
The widely accepted assessment of the outcome of
the British attack at Taranto as a decisive victory with
strategic implications, then, is wrong.2 The failure to
exploit the favorable conditions generated by the at-
tack represented a missed opportunity that had signif-
icant ramifications for the disposition of British fleet
resources across all theaters, theater logistics within
the Mediterranean, and ultimately in the execution of
the British land campaign in North Africa. The failure
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to deliver a decisive blow at Taranto obliged the British to tie up in the Mediter-
ranean naval forces that otherwise could have been deployed to the Atlantic, In-
dian, or Pacific theaters. The lack of British strategic and operational focus at
this critical juncture of the war squandered vital resources and resulted in
missed opportunities.3 Consequently, the Italians were allowed to recover from
what was seemingly a decisive British victory and, in the following three years,
force Britain to commit, and subsequently lose, a sizable portion of its surface
fleet to contain the Italian “fleet in being.” By measuring success gained against
operational objectives assigned, this article will argue that the British attack at
Taranto was a tactical success but one that did not significantly alter the strategic
balance in the Mediterranean, because the British failed to capitalize on the op-
erational opportunities resulting from their attack.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: BRITAIN
Since the eighteenth century it had been British policy to maintain at least a
one-power standard of naval strength (that is, determination to exceed the
forces of any other single power) in the Mediterranean. With the opening of the
Suez Canal, the Mediterranean became the main artery of imperial sea lines of
communication, raising significantly the importance of this region.4 In the
interwar period, British naval planners were faced with the question not merely
of what sort of fleet they needed but also of how to balance commitments and
resources in an era of considerable political and technological uncertainty. The
decision was made to base much of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, a stra-
tegically sound position from which to move either to home waters against the
Germans or to the Far East against the Japanese.5
The key to the Mediterranean theater was the island fortress of Malta, some
sixty miles south of Sicily. The former had been under the British flag since 1800.
It supplied a refuge and refueling point for warships and merchant ships midway
between Gibraltar and Alexandria, and it served as a forward base for submarine
and light surface forces. Initially, Malta was considered indefensible in a Mediter-
ranean war, but this belief changed quickly once hostilities began and Italy failed
to invade it. Malta became the focus of British strategy in the Mediterranean.6
From the fall of France to May 1943, the Mediterranean was the main theater
for Britain and Italy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed that the British
position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had to be maintained and
strengthened, with seapower as the decisive factor. The operational objectives
provided to Cunningham as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, could be
summarized as follows:
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• Destruction of the Italian fleet and merchant vessels, and German ships if
they appeared
• Support for the army in North Africa or for any expedition it might
undertake
• Safe conduct of British and Allied merchant ships through the Mediterra-
nean and Red Sea
• Prevention of enemy attack by sea on Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, or
the Levant coast.7
To accomplish these objectives, the British decided to split the theater and es-
tablish two fleets. The first, under Cunningham and stationed in Alexandria,
was responsible for the eastern Mediterranean as far as the Sicilian narrows, a
zone that included Malta. The second, a new fleet called Force H, was established at
Gibraltar on 28 June 1940 under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. Force H was
to operate in the western basin of the Mediterranean and be available for opera-
tions in the Atlantic as required. Both fleets reported to the Admiralty in London.8
Even with the declaration of war by Italy on 11 June 1940 and the collapse of
France on 22 June, the fleet balance in the Mediterranean favored the British. At
that time, the British had available in the Mediterranean seven battleships, two
carriers, six cruisers, one antiaircraft cruiser, twenty-nine destroyers, and ten
submarines. Against this force, the RMI could array two battleships, nineteen
cruisers, fifty destroyers, and 115 submarines.9 Even though three of their battle-
ships were “unmodernized,” the British held a significant operational advantage,
since the Royal Navy could reinforce the Mediterranean as required from other
fleets outside the theater.10
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: ITALY
Italian strategic planning in the interwar period had precluded war with England.
It was assumed that Italy would have to face only France, which at most could
count on the support of Greece and Yugoslavia. Even after 1936, there was no
reason to believe that war with Britain was imminent.11 However, as Italian lines
of communication with their African colonies intersected the important British
routes from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal, any conflict in the Mediterranean
would draw in the British, to ensure the safety of their strategic lines of commu-
nication.12 The British viewed Italy’s interior position as an advantage; the Ital-
ians, however, viewed their geographic position as a disadvantage, seeing
themselves essentially locked in the Mediterranean with the British controlling
the exits.13
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After learning of Benito Mussolini’s plans for war, Admiral Domenico
Cavagnari, the Italian chief of naval staff, sent Mussolini a lengthy memoran-
dum arguing that Italy was not yet prepared for war. Cavagnari made it clear that
the Italian navy could not sustain a prolonged war and that Italy did not have the
industrial base to replace ship losses in such a war. Italian naval operations had
to be planned and conducted with the knowledge that losses could not be made
good.14 Perhaps most critical of all, a concern that would play a major role in the
coming campaign, was the fact that the Italians were almost completely depen-
dent for fuel on German stocks. The RMI would begin with oil reserves suffi-
cient to support only nine months of operations.15
The Italian military lacked well-defined strategic objectives beyond Mussolini’s
desire for offensive action “at all points in the Mediterranean and outside.”16 Opera-
tional directives issued by the Naval High Command (Supermarina) on 29 May
1940 established a defensive posture in both the eastern and western basins,
leaving the Sicilian Channel as the principal theater for offensive fleet opera-
tions. Operational-level tasks assigned to the RMI included protecting the Ital-
ian coastline and the sea lines of communication with North Africa, Albania,
and the Aegean. Fleet engagements were to take place only on terms favorable to
the Italians.17
Italian naval doctrine was based on the assumption that convoys and convoy
protection would not be required; protecting merchant shipping would not be a
primary task except on specific and infrequent occasions. However, by the mid-
dle of July 1940 the requirement for a permanent convoy organization was clear;
the RMI had to adopt convoy escort tactics, both air and sea, which had not been
originally contemplated.18 A major problem, however, was that the RMI did not
have aircraft carriers or its own naval air arm. It had to rely on the air force (the
Regia Aeronautica Italiana, or RAI) for air support.
Fault for the lack of aircraft carriers in the RMI has been assigned to both
Mussolini and his admirals.19 Regardless, all Italian military aircraft were placed
under the control of the RAI, and all aircraft development as well. The RMI as-
sumed that the air force would take part in maritime operations, but there was
no attempt on the part of senior officers or their staffs in either service to discuss
how operations would be coordinated. As it was, any air-related mission in sup-
port of the fleet and fleet operations had to compete for resources with other op-
erational tasks. The lack of operational-level cooperative arrangements between
the RMI and RAI and the complete absence of any clear doctrine for air support
of maritime operations significantly hindered the overall effectiveness of these
two services.20
The lack of a naval air arm also had an impact on harbor defense, in particu-
lar anti-torpedo netting. Since the RAI had no dedicated torpedo bombers or
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an attack. The navy
felt relatively safe





pedoes could not be
effectively launched
in waters so shallow.
The Italians did not
know that the Brit-
ish had overcome the problem of the initial sudden diving of a torpedo released
from an airplane. In addition, the RMI grossly overestimated the minimum
launch distance from the target required for the arming of a torpedo. Also un-
known to the Italians was the fact that a torpedo could now be triggered in two
ways: by contact, or by proximity to the magnetic field of a ship’s hull, using a de-
vice called a duplex pistol.21 These factors all influenced Italian defensive plan-
ning and created opportunities for exploitation by an enemy.
Anti-torpedo netting was considered the main defense for a ship in harbor
against an air-launched torpedo. Italian anti-torpedo netting of 1940 suffered
from two problems: the Italians did not have enough of it, and what they had
was of an inadequate design. Taranto, for example, required 12,800 meters of
anti-torpedo netting, but only 4,200 meters were in the water at the time of the
attack.22 The deployed netting was designed to protect against torpedoes armed
with contact pistols; it protected only the sides of a battleship, and only to the
depth of its maximum draft. Because it did not prevent the passage of a weapon
beneath the ship, this netting provided practically no defense against the duplex
pistol–armed torpedoes in use by the Swordfish aircraft of the British Fleet Air
Arm (FAA). The main component of Italian harbor defense, therefore, was
based on flawed assessments derived from incomplete knowledge of torpedo
warfare. The conditions at Taranto Harbor on 11 November 1940, then, were
ripe for a decisive British victory.
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THE PLAN
The naval war in the Mediterranean up to November 1940 involved many of the
functional roles of seapower. The first instances of power projection by naval
aircraft, which occurred here, presaged the center stage this capability would
take in the Pacific, while the attacks on trade and defense of shipping in the Med-
iterranean exhibited the characteristics of the convoy war in the Atlantic. Air-
craft, submarines, and escorts played major roles in the interdiction of seaborne
communications.23 The heavy losses by the opposing navies made it apparent
that neither side had a definitive superiority over the other. Everything de-
pended on which side could more successfully exploit the other’s weaknesses in
order to achieve naval supremacy.24
Cunningham saw his principal tasks as the disruption of Axis convoys to Af-
rica and the protection of British convoys to Malta.25 He felt that in order to ac-
complish these tasks he had to neutralize or destroy the Italian fleet at its main
operating base at Taranto. The only viable option available to him was an attack
by carrier-based planes of the Fleet Air Arm. The FAA possessed adequate num-
bers of only one type of attack aircraft, the Fairey Swordfish, which could carry
either bombs or torpedoes.26 Despite its age and slow speed the Swordfish could
operate at night, a unique attribute for its time and one that provided the British
with the vital capability necessary to launch an operation against Taranto.
Taranto Harbor lay in the Gulf of Taranto some 320 miles from Malta. The in-
ner harbor (Mar Piccolo) was completely landlocked except for a narrow chan-
nel, which would admit ships only of cruiser size or smaller. It contained
extensive dock facilities, and its small size made surface ships within it virtually
safe from attack with torpedoes. The larger outer harbor (Mar Grande), which
opened to the west and where capital ships were obliged to moor, was protected
from surface attack by long breakwaters.27 Taranto’s location was a key element
of its value to the Italian navy—it was conveniently close to the British
Malta-to-Suez run yet sequestered enough to be easily guarded by land-based
planes.
The idea of an airborne torpedo attack at Taranto had its genesis in 1935 after
Italy invaded Abyssinia. Admiral Dudley Pound, then commander of the British
Mediterranean Fleet, ordered the preparation of a plan for such an attack. The
resulting plan sat in a navy safe until 1938, when Captain Arthur L. St. George
Lyster arrived to take command of Glorious, then the only British carrier in the
Mediterranean. Lyster reviewed the plan, updated it, and tested its precepts. Af-
ter extensive testing and training, Lyster and his senior officers decided that the
scheme was plausible, given surprise and luck. In September 1940, Lyster pre-
sented the updated plan to Cunningham at a meeting in Alexandria.28
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In general, Lyster’s plan envisioned a moonlit attack against the harbor, with
torpedo-equipped planes striking the battleships moored in the outer harbor
while bombers would aim for ships and installations in the inner basin. It envi-
sioned a force of thirty Swordfish in two waves of fifteen aircraft. Each wave
would have nine aircraft armed with torpedoes to attack the battleships, five
with bombs to dive-bomb the cruisers and the destroyers, and one armed with a
combination of bombs and magnesium parachute flares. The plan called for a
repeat of the operation the following night with a single strike force of fifteen
aircraft comprising six torpedo aircraft, seven dive-bombers, and two flare
droppers.29
The torpedo attack was to be made from the west and toward the rising
moon. The date for the attack would, therefore, be dependent on the phase of the
moon and time of moonrise. Based on the time and distance factors required to
achieve surprise—getting the carriers to the launch point under the cover of
darkness, launching and recovering aircraft in darkness, and then exiting the
area—the planners determined that the carrier force could not be north of a line
from Malta to Kithera before dark. The run north had to be made before
moonrise and the aircraft launched by 9 PM. A further restriction involved the
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speed and endurance restrictions of the aircraft; their return trip could be no
greater than four hundred miles. The launch point for the attack was established
as forty miles from Kabbo Point, just west of the Greek island of Cephalonia,
about 170 miles southeast of Taranto.
Originally, two carriers, Illustrious and Eagle, were to take part in the attack,
and by mid-October both had completed a series of rigorous exercises, including
night flying, and were considered ready for the operation. The attack was planned
for the night of 21 October but had to be deferred because of a fire in Illustrious’s
hangar that destroyed or damaged a number of aircraft. The attack was resched-
uled for 30 October, but again it had to be delayed, since on that night the moon
would not provide the required illumination.30 Any night from 11 to 19 November
would offer suitable moonlit conditions; the date was fixed for the 11th, to take
advantage of the confusion among the Italians that could be expected from the
larger undertaking, known as Operation MB8, of which the Taranto attack, Opera-
tion JUDGEMENT, was to be a part.31
MB8 involved a series of ten operations to be executed between 4 and 14 No-
vember, including:
1. Convoy AN6: from Egypt to the Aegean
2. Convoy MW3: from Egypt to Malta and Souda Bay
3. Operation COAT: passage from Gibraltar to Alexandria of Force F, com-
prising the battleship Barham, the cruisers Berwick and Glasgow, and
three destroyers carrying troops and stores that were to be landed at
Malta en route
4. Operations COAT and CRACK: passage of Force H from Gibraltar to the
Sicilian Narrows followed by an air attack on Elmas airfield at Cagliari
5. Convoy ME3: four empty merchant ships steaming from Malta to Egypt,
in conjunction with the passage of destroyers Terror and Vendetta from
Malta to Souda Bay
6. Convoy AS5: from the Aegean to Egypt
7. Passage of the cruisers Ajax and Sydney from Port Said to Souda Bay
with troops and equipment
8. Transit of the cruiser Orion from Port Said to Piraeus and Souda Bay
with Royal Air Force stores and personnel
9. JUDGEMENT: passage of the Mediterranean Fleet, Force A, from Alexan-
dria to meet Force F off Gozo, then to carry out a Fleet Air Arm attack
on Taranto
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10. A raid on the Strait of Otranto by the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Sydney
and two destroyers.32
Altogether, British forces at sea for this operation amounted to five battleships,
two aircraft carriers, ten cruisers, thirty destroyers, and a few auxiliaries.
Unfortunately for the British, Eagle had to be withdrawn because of serious
defects in its fuel system caused by near misses in an air attack on 11 July. Five of
its aircraft were flown off to Illustrious; this set the strength of the striking force
at twenty-four planes. Further mishaps involving contaminated fuel and other
technical difficulties reduced the actual number to twenty-one.33
Using reconnaissance aircraft from Malta, the RAF kept Taranto under nearly
continuous observation until 11:30 PM on 11 November. Photographs taken
that day revealed that six Italian battleships and three cruisers, together with
some destroyers, were moored on the shoreward side of Taranto’s outer harbor,
with two more cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, sixteen submarines, nine tank-
ers, and many more smaller craft in the inner harbor.34 These photos also re-
vealed that the torpedo planes would have to fly through a barrier of balloons to
reach their dropping positions. By the time the first flight left Illustrious, all of
the observers on board the Swordfish knew the exact positions of the six battle-
ships in the outer harbor and the latest arrangements of the balloon barrage and
net defenses.35 Originally, ninety balloons, tethered by steel cables, had been de-
ployed across the harbor in three rows, but luckily for the British a lack of hydro-
gen had reduced the number to twenty-seven on the night of the attack: sixteen
moored west and north of the ships on the Tarantola Jetty and eleven along the
eastern part of the same jetty.
British planners were concerned that searchlights aimed at low angles might
dazzle the pilots of the torpedo-armed aircraft. It was decided that a distraction
was needed to keep the searchlights directed upward. Originally, this distraction
was to have been provided by Wellington bombers from Malta that were to at-
tack the dockyard and ships in Mar Piccolo between 8:30 and 9:15. Inexplicably,
this proposal was not adopted.36 Instead the British decided to use some of the
attacking Swordfish as dive-bombers to provide the desired distraction. Their
confidence in so reducing the strike force to only two-thirds of its original
strength may have been based, in part, on experience gained in earlier opera-
tions against similar targets.
British experience, technology, and doctrine in attacking ships in harbor had
in fact progressed steadily since the outbreak of the war. The event having key in-
fluence on the Taranto attack occurred at Dakar on 8 July 1940—a torpedo at-
tack of six Swordfish aircraft from 814 Squadron of the carrier Hermes upon the
French battleship Richelieu in the harbor.37 Three torpedoes were armed with
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duplex pistols and three with contact pistols. The duplex torpedoes were set to run
at thirty-eight feet, under the ship, and those carrying the contact pistols at
twenty-four feet. All six were set to run at forty knots.38 French sources later revealed
that Richelieu was hit by one torpedo that blew a twenty-five-by-twenty-foot
hole in the ship. The explosion fractured the sternpost, distorted the starboard
inboard propeller shaft, and flooded three compartments. Repairs to the
Richelieu would take more than a year to complete.39
The extent of the damage caused by one torpedo at Dakar was not lost on the
British, whose analysis of this attack was critical to the success of the Taranto op-
eration. Taking into consideration the shallowness of the water (forty-two feet)
at Dakar and the fact that the target had been at anchor, it was determined that
the torpedo high-speed setting of forty knots should not have been used. It was
known that at forty knots the Mark XII torpedoes were prone to an excessive
dive upon striking the water, significantly less so at the twenty-nine-knot set-
ting. In addition, the running depth of the duplex-pistol torpedoes at Dakar was
assessed as having been too deep, and thirty-two feet was recommended for fu-
ture operations. Since the conditions at Taranto Harbor would be similar—
ships at anchor in forty feet of water—these findings were the basis for new set-
tings established for Taranto. All torpedoes were to run at twenty-seven knots
and at a depth of thirty-three feet, and all were armed with duplex pistols.40 Brit-
ish experience and planning had correctly assessed the tactics necessary to
achieve the desired effect.
THE ATTACK
The twenty-one Swordfish were launched in two waves: the first, of twelve air-
craft, was airborne by 8:40 PM, and the second, with nine aircraft, was away by
9:34. Six of the first wave and four of the second wave carried bombs.41 Each
bomb-armed Swordfish carried six 250-pound bombs, and the flare aircraft
each carried four bombs and sixteen flares.42 It was the first duty of the latter to
lay the flares in a line so as to show up in silhouette the Italian battleships in the
outer harbor.43
When the last Swordfish attack was complete, Italy’s serviceable battleships
had been reduced from six to two—only Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare had
escaped damage—and all of this had been accomplished at the cost of only two
Swordfish shot down.44 In all, the British launched eleven torpedoes. Littorio suf-
fered three torpedo hits, Duilio and Cavour one each. Several torpedoes became
stuck in the muddy bottom of the harbor. Of the sixty bombs dropped, a quarter
failed to explode, including the bombs that hit the cruiser Trento, the destroyer
Libeccio, and two fleet auxiliaries. Other bombs caused fires in the dockyard and
at the seaplane base, where two aircraft were destroyed. A number of bombs fell
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:51 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
118
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/22
near the Chiappare oil depot; many fell in the dockyard, but only four of these
exploded.45
The strike aircraft were successfully recovered aboard Illustrious. British air-
crews were anxious to repeat the operation the next night in accordance with
the original plan. However, on the strength of a forecast of bad weather,
Cunningham decided against the idea. Illustrious and its escorts withdrew unde-
tected and rejoined the fleet.46
On 12 November the battleships that could steam—Giulio Cesare, Vittorio
Veneto, and Andrea Doria—were transferred to Naples. Meanwhile, salvage op-
erations began on the damaged ones. Littorio and Duilio could be moved within
a few days to shipyards for repairs. Littorio was ready for sea by the end of March
1941, and Duilio was ready by the middle of May. Cavour had to be beached after
the torpedo attack. It was refloated in July 1941 and towed to Trieste to be re-
paired, but the work was not complete by the time of the armistice.47
THE CONSENSUS REVISITED
The general consensus of the historical analysis from immediately after the
event until now is that the attack was a decisive blow that altered the balance of
naval power in the Mediterranean. “In a total flying time of about six hours,”
wrote Cunningham, “twenty aircraft had inflicted more damage on the Italian
Fleet than was inflicted on the German High Seas Fleet in the daylight action at
the battle of Jutland.”48 Churchill declared enthusiastically to the British House
of Commons, “The result affects decisively the balance of naval power in the
Mediterranean and also carries with it reactions upon the naval situation in ev-
ery quarter of the globe.”49 The German naval command mirrored Churchill’s
assessment, suggesting that the British would now have complete freedom to re-
inforce their positions in the Mediterranean and Middle East, transfer ships to
the Atlantic, and mount offensive operations that would place the Italian land
operations in Egypt in jeopardy.50
Cunningham was convinced that the attack greatly increased British freedom
of movement in the Mediterranean and strengthened British control over its
central area.51 Operationally, Cunningham felt, the Taranto raid reduced if not
altogether eliminated the threat of the Italian fleet’s interfering with British
convoys to Greece and Crete. Cunningham also claimed that the success of the
raid allowed British battleship strength in the eastern Mediterranean to be re-
duced. The immediate tactical impact, however, was relief for the British de-
stroyer flotillas, as fewer of them were now required to screen for the smaller
battle fleet.52
The current literature generally supports these deductions. The most com-
monly repeated statement about the effect of the raid at Taranto is that the
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attack established British “moral ascendancy” over the RMI.53 James
Sadkovich, a historian of the Italian navy, views these assessments as part of an
Anglo-American consensus that has determined that the RMI “lacked will-
power,” avoided the British fleet, and was generally “inept.”54 Sadkovich dis-
agrees with this standard view, pointing out that despite the loss of four
battleships, by 28 November the battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare
and their escorts were again at sea attempting to intercept Force H and the
Malta-bound convoy it was covering.55
While the Italian battle fleet may have remained elusive, the Italian escort
forces got on with their primary task of supplying Italian armies in Albania and
Libya across the breadth of the Mediterranean, with near-daily sailings of con-
voys and single ships. In this task they were highly effective. The reality of the op-
erational situation was that the continued existence of Italian battleships, even if
they never put to sea, necessitated the retention of British capital ships in a state
of readiness at both ends of the Mediterranean.56 The attack at Taranto provided
the British with a temporary superiority in capital ships but was far from the sig-
nificant victory proclaimed. Had other options been chosen, however, the out-
come could have been decisive.
Options Available to Cunningham
The decisions made in preparing the attack plan at Taranto have not received the
critical scrutiny that they deserve. Wayne Hughes, a longtime scholar of fleet tac-
tics, has stated as the great naval maxim, “Attack effectively first.” This motto is
the very essence of tactical action for success in naval combat.57 The Taranto at-
tack, while generally successful, could have been far more effective. The plan suf-
fered from a number of significant weaknesses, including the lack of a clear
intent, questionable targeting and apportionment decisions, and lack of provi-
sion for exploiting success. Assessment of the success of the attack hinges on the
answer to one key question—why was the attack launched? The answer is not as
clear as might be expected.
The information available today offers conflicting evidence as to the true in-
tent of the attackers.58 Was the attack envisioned as a hit-and-run-type raid to
inflict damage on the Italian fleet, for a temporary tactical advantage, or was it a
coordinated effort to eliminate the Italian battleships, for long-term gain? The
plan contained components of both types of naval actions. For example, a raid
would not normally have included provisions for a follow-up strike the next eve-
ning, whereas a plan designed as a sustained effort would have done so. If sus-
tained effort was indeed the intent, then the operation should have been delayed
until more forces were available. Those allocated were woefully inadequate, due
to the dispersion necessary to achieve simultaneously all the objectives of
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Operation MB8. The Taranto operation was too important to conduct as a side-
show of an already complicated plan. A deliberate operation against Taranto
with all available resources, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, would have pro-
duced, we must presume, the truly devastating results envisioned.
If the intent was to execute a hit-and-run attack, other options available to the
British would have increased its effectiveness. The actual target-selection and
arming decisions made for the attack reflect a fundamental lack of understand-
ing of targeting.59 Arming six of the planes with bombs for use against cruisers
and destroyers in the inner harbor at the expense of six more torpedoes for at-
tacks against the battleships diluted striking power. The decision in the planning
stages of the attack to limit the number of torpedo planes to six per wave was
based on an erroneous assessment that balloons and net obstructions would re-
strict suitable dropping places in the harbor.60 Even though intelligence photos
had revealed that the Italian balloon defense was considerably weaker than ex-
pected, the arming decisions were not changed. These decisions are indicative of
the relative infancy of British strike warfare at the time.
Other decisions in force apportionment highlight the weakness in British plan-
ning in other ways. Four battleships (Cavour, Littorio, Duilio, and Vittorio Veneto)
and the Gorizia, a heavy cruiser (that is, with a main battery of eight-inch guns),
were designated for torpedo attacks. Cavour was targeted by three planes, Littorio
by five planes, Duilio by one, Vittorio Veneto by two, and Gorizia by one. 61 Giulio
Cesare and Andrea Doria were not targeted either by bombs or torpedoes.62 Vittorio
Veneto, as one of the two most powerful battleships in the Italian navy, should have
received a greater relative weight of effort. Damage to both Vittorio Veneto and
Littorio would have created severe problems for the Italians, since there was only a
single dry dock in the entire country (in Genoa) capable of taking those new ships,
and then only one at a time.63 Arming six more planes with torpedoes would have
allowed all the battleships to be targeted with multiple attacks; even this small ad-
justment in the plan would very likely have proven devastating.
Further, the weight of the attack could have been significantly increased by a
second carrier. Admiral Lyster deeply regretted the unavoidable absence of Eagle.
“Her fine squadrons,” he wrote in a private letter, “would have increased the
weight of the attack considerably, and I believe would have made it devastating.”64
In fact, however, Cunningham could have replaced Eagle with Ark Royal.
Ark Royal had been undergoing a refit for most of the month of October 1940
and had returned to Force H on 6 November.65 The ship and its squadrons had
gained considerable combat experience. They had participated in the Norwegian
campaign and had taken part in the attack on the French navy at Mers-el-Kebir,
Algeria, in July and again at Dakar in September. Ark Royal could accommo-
date between sixty and seventy-two aircraft. While some of its experienced
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aircrew had been siphoned away during its refit, two of its squadrons, one of Skuas
(810 Squadron) and one of Swordfish (818 Squadron), retained their experienced
leadership.66 The input of these veterans during the planning might have pro-
duced critical improvements in such areas as targeting and allocation that would
have increased the decisiveness of the attack.
Ark Royal could have been used in two ways. First, its Swordfish squadrons
could have replaced those of Eagle. This would have required a slight delay while
the aircrews were briefed and the ships repositioned. In this case, it would have
been necessary to weigh the addition of twenty-six Swordfish against the relative
inexperience of the Ark Royal squadrons in night flying. The latter risk, however,
could have been mitigated by having Illustrious aircraft lead the attack waves to
the target. Alternatively, all of the Eagle’s attack aircraft could have been trans-
ferred to Ark Royal and flown from that ship, either alone or with augmentation
from Ark Royal’s air group. In addition, Ark Royal’s radar combined with its
larger complement of fighters would have provided the task group with the abil-
ity to loiter in the central Mediterranean and effectively protect itself while wait-
ing for a decision to reattack.67
Another option available to Cunningham was to insist on a supporting attack
by RAF Wellington bombers from Malta.68 The target would have been Taranto’s
port facilities, in particular the oil storage tanks; the aim would have been to deny
Taranto to the RMI as an operating base. An attack on the harbor facilities by
Wellingtons, with their heavy bomb loads, would have allowed the FAA, with its
torpedo-armed Swordfish, to concentrate a maximum effort against the battleships.
Moreover, the confusion resulting from a coordinated attack could have facilitated
the attack by the torpedo planes. That the RAF was capable of conducting this op-
eration was made evident two days later, on 13 November, when ten Wellington
bombers from Malta did indeed attack the port facilities at Taranto.69
Regardless of the type of attack envisioned, the plan should have dealt with
surviving Italian ships, battleships in particular, that attempted to escape to safer
harbors after the initial attack. There is no indication that the British ever con-
sidered this contingency. The British knew that there were six battleships in
Taranto, but the best they could hope to accomplish, as the attack was laid out,
was damage to four of them. Thereafter the two undamaged battleships and any
other major combatants that could do so would undoubtedly get out of Taranto
as quickly as possible. That there were no provisions for this response must be
viewed as a critical flaw in the plan. Stationing reconnaissance aircraft and sub-
marines to watch the Straits of Messina and the likely escape routes, with Force
H and Ark Royal’s strike aircraft ready to respond to sightings, would have af-
forded the British the opportunity of damaging or even eliminating perma-
nently ships not damaged in the attack itself.
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Aside from that, the effort against the remaining Italian capital ships could
have been sustained in two other ways: targeting the ships themselves or denying
them infrastructure and resources they required. As for the first, the remaining
battleships could, for example, have been targeted by Operations MC2 and MC3,
which were carried out between 16 and 22 December 1940. These operations
had the following elements:
• Attacks on Italian bases in the Dodecanese by aircraft from Illustrious
• Bombardment of the port and military objectives at Port Skala, Valona
• Attacks on Italian forces and shipping in the Adriatic
• Attacks with torpedo aircraft on shipping in Port Skala
• Cover for several convoys: MW5A and B (fast and slow convoys from
Alexandria to Malta), the Ulster Prince (with personnel from Port Said to
Crete and Greece), ME5A (from Malta to Alexandria and Port Said), and
AS 9 and AN 10 (Aegean convoys).70
Here, as at Taranto, British intelligence sources provided the information
needed for another attack against the remaining Italian battleships. Reconnais-
sance pinpointed the disposition of the three Italian battleships—Giulio Cesare,
Vittorio Veneto, and Andrea Doria—on 15 December, confirming one back at
Taranto and the other two at Naples.71 British forces were conducting operations
in and near these ports, and both RAF bombers from Malta and FAA aircraft
from Ark Royal and Illustrious were available for a strike. However, there is no ev-
idence to indicate that another attack by FAA aircraft was contemplated.
Another possibility would have been to use the growing Royal Air Force re-
sources available at Malta. A comprehensive RAF air campaign against support
infrastructure, especially the dry dock in Genoa and oil storage facilities, would
have hampered the Italians’ ability to repair damaged ships and crippled any re-
maining operational capability. A comprehensive air campaign against Italian
harbors was eventually initiated, in mid-December, but by that time the oppor-
tunities offered by the success at Taranto were vanishing.
One of the most important operational advantages that could have been
gained from a more aggressive posture after Taranto would have been in opera-
tional logistics. Up until this point in the war, the British had been unable to use
direct sea routes through the Mediterranean except for the occasional heavily
defended convoy. The British success at Taranto did not change this policy. For
example, of the twenty-one British supply ships destined for the Middle East
that left Britain on 18 December 1940, sixteen sailed round the Cape and only
five risked the Mediterranean. The majority of British supply ships destined for
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the Middle East continued to be routed around the Cape of Good Hope even
though this route involved as much as a four-month round trip for the ships
involved.72 Routing convoys through Cape Town and Durban increased cycle
times and was to blame, in part, for a shortage of mercantile tonnage at this
stage of the war.73 The proven scarcity and ineffectiveness of Italian air recon-
naissance combined with a reduced surface threat should have enticed the
British to send more convoys through the Mediterranean, thereby providing
greater flexibility in managing their theater logistics.74 The threat from the sur-
viving Italian battleships and an exaggerated fear of Italian airpower continued
to influence British naval operational planning inexplicably in the months fol-
lowing Taranto.75
Further, there is clear evidence that British fleet resources committed to the
Mediterranean after Taranto were desperately needed elsewhere. An Admiralty
message to Cunningham on 22 November 1940 stated urgent considerations
that demanded redistribution of the fleet. These factors included:
• The appearance of the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in the North
Atlantic
• Uncertainty as to whether the Admiral Scheer had proceeded south76
• The existence of, probably, five disguised enemy surface raiders in the
South Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, where they were taking a heavy
toll of shipping
• The need for escorts for troop convoys carrying reinforcements to the
Middle East.77
“Under these circumstances,” said the First Sea Lord, “it is considered imper-
ative that raider hunting groups shall be formed without delay.”78 For these
hunting groups the Admiralty wanted the battleships Renown from Force H and
Ramillies, either Ark Royal or Formidable, and two cruisers, Manchester and
Southampton. As a contingency, the battleship Valiant was to be transferred
from the eastern to the western basin. Cunningham responded that he would
find it difficult to part with Valiant, because of its powerful antiaircraft arma-
ment; none of the remaining battleships were similarly armed or had radar. If
Valiant were to be withdrawn, he would be left with only one battleship,
Warspite, that could engage the Italians at long range. He offered to surrender in-
stead the eight-inch cruiser Berwick. In the end, only the Ramillies and Berwick
were made available for reassignment.
By December the Italians had recovered from the psychological impact of the
Taranto attack and had greatly increased their harbor defenses.79 Littorio and
Duilio were under repair, and German air units of Fliegerkorps X, specializing in
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antiship attacks, were being transferred to the Mediterranean. The balance of
power, especially in the air, was rapidly changing back in the Axis’s favor.
Measures of Success
In terms of the objectives of holding Malta as an advanced base of operations
and keeping the Mediterranean open to maritime traffic, the raid on Taranto
had little effect. In a letter to Admiral Pound on 22 September 1940,
Cunningham expressed his desire to make Malta a fully operational “strike base”
by 1 April 1941, capable of supporting sustained operations by all three services.
In particular, Cunningham expected that Malta would have a force of cruisers
and destroyers permanently based on the island; safe docking, refit, and repair
facilities for warships; a submarine flotilla; airfields from which to operate
bomber, reconnaissance, and four fighter squadrons; and raiding forces of troops
that could operate from Malta.80 According to Cunningham’s estimate Malta
would need for these approximately four hundred thousand tons of supplies.81
The aftermath of the Taranto strike presented an excellent opportunity to ex-
ploit a weakened Italian position and to bolster the British position in Malta, but
the response was anemic. From the attack until the end of December 1940 the
British sailed only three convoys totaling fourteen ships to Malta, approximately
sixty thousand tons of supplies.82 The important fact buried in this statistic is
that all of the merchant ships got through safely. Had a greater effort been ex-
pended to resupply Malta at this point, the island could have been in a better po-
sition to defend itself and to have become a fully operational base for the British
early in 1941. Instead, Malta became a vortex that drained away vital resources as
the British desperately attempted to sustain the island, its population, and the
marginal operational capabilities that had been established there. Axis forces, in
contrast, operated with great effect in transporting men and supplies through-
out the theater.
Measured against the principal task of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the
Taranto attack had literally no effect; it increased not at all the British ability to
stop deliveries to Libya. In fact, Italian deliveries to Libya increased during the
months of October 1940–January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month,
up from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months.83 Losses for the
seven-month period of June–December 1940 were less than 2 percent.84 The
February 1941 to June 1941 statistics are even more telling, with the average
monthly Italian deliveries to Libya almost doubling, to 89,563 tons per month.85
Effective Italian intelligence enabled the RMI to route convoys to Libya and so
avoid British forces. It was not until 21 December 1940 that aircraft, from Illus-
trious, sank the first two ships of an escorted convoy on the Tripoli route.86
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Even with the significant advantage of advanced warning from ULTRA, the
British were unable to disrupt the German buildup in North Africa during the
early part of 1941.87 In February and March 1941, two hundred thousand tons of
Axis shipping was sent from Italian ports to Libya, mainly to Tripoli. During
March 1941 eighty-nine Axis merchant vessels set out in twenty-nine south-
bound convoys, of which only two were intercepted. Just three ships were lost
and a fourth damaged; although nine thousand tons of stores were lost, 92,700
tons arrived safely at Tripoli.88 This strong logistical position allowed the Ger-
man commander, General Erwin Rommel, to start on 31 March 1941 an offen-
sive that would sweep the British Eighth Army back through Libya to the
Egyptian frontier by 14 April.
The notable failure of British antishipping forces at this critical juncture in
the war has been overshadowed by the British success at Cape Matapan on 28
and 29 March 1941.89 The extent of the British frustration at this lack of success
was vividly illustrated when on 15 April 1941 Admiral Pound directed
Cunningham to take every possible step to prevent supplies from reaching Libya
from Italy or by coastwise traffic, even if that resulted in serious loss or damage
to His Majesty’s ships: “Failure by the navy to concentrate on prevention of such
movements [enemy supplies to Libya] to the exclusion of everything not abso-
lutely vital will be considered as having let side down.”90 Ultimately the German
offensive and the Italian requirement to support it were confounded by the
RMI’s inability to fight offensively, either at the tactical or operational level. In
light of that, an antishipping surface force operating out of a fully operational
base at Malta, as envisioned by Cunningham, could have been what was needed
to interdict Italian convoys to Africa. Even marginal increases in the shipping
loss rates in early 1941 could have impacted Rommel’s ability to launch and sus-
tain his desert offensive.
Measured against the operational objective of defeating the Italian navy, the
Taranto attack was only marginally effective. Evidence of this came immediately
after the attack during Operation WHITE, another British attempt to deliver Hur-
ricane fighters to Malta from the carrier Argus. Somerville departed Gibraltar on
15 November 1940 with Renown, Ark Royal, two cruisers, and eight destroyers.
The Italians sortied two battleships, three heavy cruisers, and a force of screening
destroyers. When it became known that the Italian fleet was at large, Somerville
launched the Hurricanes at the extreme limit of their range and then withdrew, re-
sulting in the loss of eight of the twelve aircraft.91 On 28 November major portions
of the RMI, including Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, six heavy cruisers, and
sixteen destroyers, engaged Force H at Cape Teulada.92 The Italian commander,
Admiral Inigo Campioni, fearing continued attack by FAA aircraft and lacking air
support of his own, decided to avoid a pitched battle and withdrew his forces after
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a brief exchange. This engagement established a pattern that would continue
through the rest of the war—an Italian determination to engage but only when
the tactical situation favored. When important combat factors such as air support,
reconnaissance information, or daylight were questionable, the Italians retired to
fight another day and protect their “fleet in being.” This pattern has often been
used as evidence of an Italian fear of engaging the British. The Italian reality, how-
ever, was that they had little to gain from taking chances or pressing unfavorable
tactical situations. The British reality was contested sea control until the Italian ca-
pitulation in 1943.
By late August 1941, London had assigned top priority to the Mediterranean.
Only three of Britain’s battleships were stationed with the Home Fleet, while Gi-
braltar had one and Alexandria four. The remainder was split between Singa-
pore (three ships) and the Indian Ocean (four ships), the latter conveniently
placed for use in either the Middle Sea or the Pacific. Aircraft carrier deploy-
ments also favored the Mediterranean, with two each in Alexandria and Gibral-
tar, one in home waters, and three in the Far East. In short, nine of fifteen British
battleships and four of eight carriers were in or near the Mediterranean.93 In the
course of 1941, actions in the Mediterranean would cost the Royal Navy a total
of one battleship sunk and four badly damaged, one carrier sunk and two dam-
aged, seven cruisers sunk and ten damaged, and sixteen destroyers sunk and
twelve damaged—all with little hope of replacement.94 Far from granting the
strategic freedom claimed by Churchill, the raid on Taranto proved to be a com-
plicated and costly affair for Britain.
After the fall of Greece and Crete there was even less hope of sending ships to
other theaters, and by mid-1942 there were no capital ships left in the Mediterra-
nean Fleet to send.95 The Mediterranean campaign would eventually cost the
British 244 merchant ships and 135 warships, representing 930,673 and 411,935
tons, respectively.96 The Axis powers had effectively denied the British the cen-
tral Mediterranean for a protracted period and exacted a terrible cost in men
and ships. The positive results of the British efforts at Taranto could hardly have
justified such catastrophic losses. Decisive action by the British in the two
months after the attack could have turned the tactical success into a monumen-
tal victory, but in the event, it was lacking. This raises serious questions about
the conduct of the British campaign in the late 1940–41 time frame. In the con-
text of history, however, the attack at Taranto presents a fascinating insight into
both the limitations and the capabilities of the Royal Navy and its Fleet Air Arm.
A PRICELESS OPPORTUNITY
The British attack on the Italian battle fleet at Taranto Harbor has been celebrated
for the bravery of the pilots who flew the mission and for the great tactical victory
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they achieved. This is just. However, military analysts have further claimed that
Taranto changed the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean and established
the moral ascendance of the Royal Navy over the Italian navy. Unfortunately, the
facts do not support this rhetoric. Despite reducing the effective strength of the
Italian fleet to two battleships, the British had to mount a full-scale operation with
their entire Mediterranean fleet in order to enter the central basin. Italian, and
later German, land-based aircraft allowed the Italians to continue to dispute the
Mediterranean even while the battle fleet was temporarily out of action.
After the attack at Taranto, British naval authorities exhibited a lack of opera-
tional insight and so failed in three critical areas: they failed to finish the de-
struction of the Italian battleships; they failed to eliminate the critical
infrastructure support needed to sustain the battle fleet, in particular the dry
dock and fuel at Genoa; and they failed to exploit their newly won operational
freedom to achieve a theaterwide buildup in logistics by pushing convoys
through to Malta and Alexandria. The Royal Navy had the RMI on the ropes af-
ter Taranto but failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed
the context within which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought.
Destruction of the Italian battle fleet in 1940 would have given the British out-
right sea control in the Mediterranean. Instead, conflict of priorities squandered
a priceless opportunity.
An Italian navy without battleships would have meant a significantly lessened
threat for the British during the remainder of the Mediterranean campaign. In-
stead, as it was, the continuing presence of the Italian battle fleet had a dispro-
portionate influence on the balance of naval and military power in the
Mediterranean. Admiral Cunningham and his staff struggled to maintain the
appropriate fleet mix to counter this potential threat.97 Simply containing the
Italian capital ships put a huge strain on British resources. Italian battleships
could not be discounted, and on more than one occasion their existence led the
British to scuttle damaged ships that might have been saved.98
Portrayals of the Italian navy as inept have served to mask the impact of ULTRA
and excuse the British navy’s failure to destroy the Italian fleet, gain control of
the Mediterranean, and cut Axis supply lines to Africa before 1943.99 A decisive
effort against the Italian battleships at Taranto would have destroyed the RMI
strategy of a “fleet in being” and allowed the Royal Navy greater flexibility in
conducting its campaign against a reduced Italian naval threat. The critical deci-
sions made in the planning and execution of the attack at Taranto highlight the
limits of Admiral Cunningham’s appreciation of the new interplay between the
modern elements of sea and air power. Measuring the success gained against the
objectives assigned, the outcome of the British attack at Taranto can be assessed
only as a limited tactical victory with limited operational impact.
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NIGHT SESSION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, 22–23 OCTOBER 1962
Alexander Fursenko
Translated by Yuri M. Zhukov
On the night of 22 October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev* arranged for all mem-bers of the Presidium† to be telephoned and summoned to a meeting. At
about seven o’clock at night, Moscow time, all were asked to promptly report to
the Kremlin. When the Central Committee’s secretary, Frol R. Kozlov, then
Khrushchev’s right-hand man, was asked by deputy premier Anastas I. Mikoyan
the reason for the emergency session, the former replied that “an important an-
nouncement is expected from [President John F.] Kennedy regarding Cuba.”1
According to official records, the session in the Kremlin commenced at ten
o’clock at night, while it was still midday across the Atlantic.2 The agenda before
the Presidium was entitled, “On the determination of a position on further steps
regarding Cuba and Berlin.”3 Although no one yet had a clear understanding of
what Kennedy was planning on announcing, Khrushchev had received informa-
tion indicating that the president’s address would be devoted to Cuba.
At a morning meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in
Washington, the resident chief of Soviet military intelligence (the GRU) re-
ported that a large redeployment of American forces was taking place in the
southern United States. In its corresponding cable to Moscow, the GRU also re-
ported that “since morning in Washington there has been heightened activity
among the most senior government and military authorities,” a meeting had
* 1894–1971; premier of the Soviet Union—formally general secretary of the Communist Party
(1953–64) and chairman of the Council of Ministers (1958–64).
† The Politburo (Political Bureau, the standing executive group) of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union was known as the Presidium from 1952 to 1966.
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been scheduled between the president and congressional leaders, and at noon it
was announced that a televised address by Kennedy would air at seven o’clock in
the evening concerning an important matter of U.S. national security.4
Three days prior, a leading American observer, Joseph Alsop, had argued in a
New York Herald Tribune opinion column entitled “What Is More Important?”
that the central focus of a future Soviet-American conflict would be Berlin, lam-
basting those “pre-election campaign orators”* who “shriek of Cuba”:
To consider Cuba to be more important than Berlin at such a moment, when in
Berlin, in all likelihood, a crisis is headily ripening . . . is the same as making every ef-
fort to cure a patient’s bursitis while paying no attention to his cancerous tumor.
Cuba is sooner like bursitis—a disease that irritates the afflicted and brings him
much discomfort. As is done with bursitis, it will likely need to be treated, perhaps
even necessitating some radical measures. However, to complicate the critically dan-
gerous Berlin problem by madly insisting on the immediate resolution of the situa-
tion in Cuba is not only irresponsible, but simply criminal. 5
This article was sent to Moscow via a cable the same day, arriving on the desks of
Kremlin leaders.
Despite his close ties to the White House, Alsop did not know at the time that
a U-2 spy plane had just discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba or that top-secret
meetings were being held day and night by the Executive Committee of the Na-
tional Security Council (ExCom), a body created by President Kennedy for the
purpose of developing a response to this Soviet challenge.
Soviet intelligence found itself in the dark as well. Even though the resident KGB
official in Washington, A. S. Feklisov, had assured his superiors that he had four reli-
able informants in the highest echelons of the U.S. government, he received no word
from them about this development and consequently was almost completely unable
to keep Moscow informed. Neither he nor Dobrynin knew that there were Soviet
missiles in Cuba in the first place. This secrecy was an important precondition of
Operation ANADYR†; by narrowing as much as possible the circle of those who knew
about its existence, its planners could more easily prevent inadvertent leaks of infor-
mation. As a result, when he was invited to the State Department to receive the text
of Kennedy’s speech at six o’clock in the evening, Dobrynin did not yet know what
topic the president would address, Berlin or Cuba. As suggested by their cables,
GRU officials did not know either. “The press emphasizes,” they reported, “that the
reasons for this vigorous government activity are being held in the strictest secrecy.
Plans are being discussed about possible new steps with regard to Cuba or Berlin.”6
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Midterm elections were to be held that November.
† The Soviet code name for the 1962 plan to deploy ballistic missiles, medium-range bombers, and a
regiment of mechanized infantry in Cuba.
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THE SESSION OPENS: WHAT WILL KENNEDY SAY ON CUBA?
Khrushchev, who knew of neither the photographs taken by the U-2 nor the se-
cret ExCom sessions, understood that a potential leak of information would
turn Cuba into an object of acute confrontation, irrespective of Moscow’s exten-
sive precautions. “It has become known,” he stated in his opening remarks to the
session, “that [Kennedy] is preparing some kind of address.” The General Secre-
tary cited a report from the Soviet news agency TASS that “in the area of the Ca-
ribbean Sea, U.S. naval vessels carrying infantry are massing.”7 He named no
other sources and promptly yielded the floor to the minister of defense, Marshal
Rodion Y. Malinovsky, who had been invited to the session to propose options
for managing the impending crisis.
Having now received information through military intelligence channels that
the topic of Kennedy’s speech would be Cuba and having assessed the correla-
tion of forces in that theater, the defense minister concluded that a “blitzkrieg”
was impossible. “I don’t think [the Americans] would be able to launch some-
thing right away,” he said. “If an invasion of Cuba will be announced, then an-
other day would have to pass [for the United States] to get ready.” Malinovsky
did not exclude the possibility that Kennedy’s radio address would be a
“pre-election trick”; in fact, the defense minister evidently wanted this to be the
case. In addition, Malinovsky stressed that Soviet missiles had not been de-
ployed to Cuba for the mission of a military assault on the United States, noting,
“We have not striven to place the missiles on an hour’s alert.” The minister’s re-
marks were followed by those of the General Staff ’s chief of operations, General
Semyon Ivanov, who reported on the capabilities of military installations as en-
visioned under Operation ANADYR and on the movement of ships carrying mili-
tary cargoes to Cuba.8
Having listened to the military briefings, Khrushchev agreed with his col-
leagues’ conclusions. He remarked that a cable just received from Foreign Minis-
ter Andrei Gromyko regarding meetings [in the United States with Secretary of
State Dean Rusk] stated that “Kennedy was very cautiously formulating his
thoughts on Cuba,” while Rusk “had been drinking during the meeting and
leading discussions about Berlin, insistently hinting at Cuba.” Rusk had declared
to Gromyko, “Cuba is to us what Hungary is to you.”9 Rusk’s words were a nearly
verbatim repetition of a statement Kennedy had made to Alexei I. Adzhubei,
Khrushchev’s son-in-law and editor of Izvestia, during a meeting in the White
House in early 1962. Khrushchev remembered this well and concluded that the
coincidence could not have been unintentional.
Expounding his own position, Khrushchev asserted, “The heart of the matter
is that we don’t want to unleash a war. What we want is to cause a bit of a scare, to
deter [U.S.] forces with respect to Cuba.”10 “In their own time, the U.S. did the
F U R S E N K O 1 3 1
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same thing, placing a belt of missile bases around our country. That deterred us,”
he admitted.11 Khrushchev observed that the difficulty of the situation was that
“we have not deployed everything that we wanted [and] didn’t make public the
agreement [on mutual assistance with Cuba].” Soviet ships had managed to de-
liver SS-4 (R-12) missiles, with a two-thousand-kilometer range, but the longer-
range SS-5 (R-14) missiles were still en route. In sum, Khrushchev described the
state of affairs as “tragic.” He predicted, “They could attack, we would respond.
This could spill out into a big war.”12
What solution could there be? Khrushchev suggested publicly announcing
the USSR’s mutual assistance treaty with Cuba. He asked himself, “How would
the U.S. react to this?” In a first scenario, he anticipated that “they could an-
nounce a blockade of Cuba.” Second, “[they could] commandeer our ships pass-
ing to Cuba.” Third, Washington could announce that the United States “was not
even thinking about attacking Cuba.”13 Khrushchev now proposed to authorize,
in the event of a U.S. invasion, a resort to emergency measures, up to and includ-
ing the use of tactical nuclear weapons.14 “All forces are not to use tactical nuclear
weapons in the opening phase,” he ordered. “If there is a troop landing—[use]
tactical nuclear weapons. As for strategic [weapons]—wait for orders.”15 He
then suggested sending the relevant instructions to the commander of Soviet
forces on the island, General Issa A. Pliev. Having shared these thoughts with the
Presidium’s members, Khrushchev announced a five- or ten-minute break “so
the comrades could think and express their opinions.”16
PREPARING FOR THE WORST
By the time the meeting was readjourned, the deputy foreign minister, Vasily V.
Kuznetsov, had reported that the U.S. embassy in Moscow was requesting a
meeting with a Foreign Ministry representative an hour before Kennedy’s ad-
dress. Additionally, Defense Minister Malinovsky and the chief of the General
Staff, Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, announced that according to their sources—
which evidently meant the GRU—ambassadors from NATO and South Ameri-
can countries were being recalled for consultations.
The discussion that followed took place in an increasingly tense environ-
ment. The official minutes provide only a glimpse of the session’s actual pro-
ceedings. Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov* expressed deep concern about the
situation that had developed. Khrushchev suggested that the Presidium discuss
the text of the directive to be given to General Pliev. Malinovsky read aloud a
draft directive, after which the nuclear question became the center of attention.
Mikoyan spoke out pointedly against Malinovsky’s proposed directive, arguing
that it was fraught with the risk of war. In response, the defense minister was
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* 1902–82, leading party theoretician, a member of the Presidium since 1955.
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forced to admit that “if nuclear weapons are to be used, then there are not that
many of them on Cuba.” He added that the Cubans themselves could be blamed
for a first strike.
Khrushchev protested, “If we do not use nuclear weapons, they could capture
Cuba.” Malinovsky replied, “The forces that the U.S. has in the Caribbean won’t
capture Cuba.” Khrushchev retorted, “The Americans could fire salvos from
their missile carriers, without sending aircraft.” Alexei N. Kosygin* then entered
the fracas (but the record of his comments is indecipherable). After Kosygin
spoke, Khrushchev declared, “I forbid the use of nuclear weapons against Cuba,”
implying that the Americans would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.17
While he objected to the view presented by defense officials, Mikoyan did not
want—and was effectively unable—to challenge Khrushchev. The established
tradition of deference to the general secretary prevailed, although the deputy
premier disagreed with him. Mikoyan was categorically opposed to the use of
any form of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev, meanwhile, believed that any other
course of action was impossible. He then proposed that the crisis would be dif-
fused if an announcement were made that “all the [missile] facilities are Cuban,
and the Cubans declare that they will respond [to U.S. attack].” Mikoyan em-
phatically objected to this proposal, saying that if Washington recognizes that
“the missiles are under our operational control, the Americans will understand
that we won’t be able to go on this adventure, since we know its consequences. . . .
And if they find out that the missiles belong to the masters of the island, they will
interpret this as a provocation, not ruling out that the Cubans could launch the
missiles preemptively.” Khrushchev agreed with this argument: “We’ll leave the
missiles as Soviet property, subordinate only to us.”18
The instructions drafted for Pliev, proposed by Malinovsky and endorsed by
Khrushchev, stated that in the event of U.S. attack on the island, it was essential
to counter—jointly with the Cubans—the aggressor “with all means.” Mikoyan,
noting that “with all means” implied an authorization to use nuclear weapons,
raised the question of how one was to interpret the instructions: “So that means
[one could respond] with missiles as well . . . [causing the] beginning of a thermo-
nuclear war?” Malinovsky, as Mikoyan recalled, “was not able to give an answer,
since this ambiguity was an obvious oversight on his part.” In Mikoyan’s words,
the defense minister “irresponsibly and unconditionally supported everything,”
never deviating from Khrushchev’s positions regarding any form of military re-
sponse to the Americans.19
Indeed, if one recalls the insistence with which the defense minister had been
seeking a decision in May regarding the deployment of missiles to Cuba, it
F U R S E N K O 1 3 3
* 1904–80; at that time first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Khrushchev’s successor as
premier from 1964 until just before his death.
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becomes apparent that the head of the military department was particularly
hawkish and risk-acceptant in his reasoning, which became a source of conflict
with proponents of a softer line—above all Mikoyan, whom Khrushchev re-
garded as a “Cuba specialist.”
The official record of Central Committee Presidium sessions over Khrush-
chev’s entire period in office shows that he and Mikoyan had frequent differ-
ences of opinion. Khrushchev could not stand objections but occasionally felt
compelled to agree with his colleague. On this occasion it became necessary to
soften the wording of the instructions. He asked Malinovsky to read “how the final
directives to Pliev will sound.”20 The text of the instructions was modified with a
caveat that all means were to be used “with the exception of the assets of
Statsenko [commander of the missile divisions] and Beloborodov [i.e., nuclear
warheads].”
In an uncharacteristic display of caution, having read out the text and as-
sessed the situation, Malinovsky proposed that the final instructions not be
written in haste, preferring to wait and see what President Kennedy would say. In
essence, the marshal was following the lead of Khrushchev, who had just hy-
pothesized that the United States might either announce a blockade or not take
any action at all, meaning that neither a bombardment nor an invasion of Cuba
would follow. Malinovsky proposed to wait one hour, until Kennedy’s an-
nouncement, and only then proceed with drafting detailed instructions. “Or
otherwise,” he said, “[the Americans] would be given a pretext to use nuclear
weapons.” All came to agreement on this rationale.
By the end of the night’s discussions, Khrushchev too had softened his tone.
He did not want to yield to pressure from Kennedy, who wanted, in his words,
“to demonstrate his firmness.” “It could not be ruled out,” he reiterated, “that
this is a bluff ahead of the congressional elections.” However, practical consider-
ations ultimately trumped emotions. Khrushchev was concerned about the
heavy-lift ship Aleksandrovsk, which had been sent to Cuba with a cargo of nu-
clear warheads, and suggested that caution be exercised. “If we give Pliev the in-
structions [already approved and now being relayed to the General Staff by
General Ivanov], we shouldn’t make an announcement about the agreement [on
mutual assistance with Cuba] now, since they may not hold back.” The
Aleksandrovsk, then in the approaches to Cuba, was given orders “to proceed to
the nearest port.” As a result, the vessel was able to evade U.S. pursuit and cross
the quarantine line before the blockade was launched, entering the Cuban port
of Mariel instead of the original destination of Havana.
At 1:15 in the morning, Kuznetsov delivered the text of Kennedy’s address,
which had just been received by the Foreign Ministry. Having read it, Khrushchev
concluded, “It seems to me that according to the tone this is not a [declaration
1 3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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of] war against Cuba, but some kind of ultimatum.” On this point it was decided
to close the session and readjourn later in the morning.21
Khrushchev spent the rest of the night in the Kremlin. He slept, fully clothed, on
the sofa in his office. The session resumed at ten in the morning, after Kennedy’s
address had been thoroughly analyzed. If the Kremlin had been dominated by an
atmosphere of anxious suspense and alarm prior to the U.S. president’s an-
nouncement, this morning the situation was radically changed. The previous
buoyancy had returned. The Presidium approved the substance of the Soviet
government’s official response to Kennedy’s announcement of a Cuban block-
ade; the Foreign Ministry drafted the resulting statement’s text, sent it to the
press, and broadcast it on the radio.22
THE SUBMARINE QUESTION
During the day that followed, in a discussion of further actions regarding four
Soviet [Foxtrot-class, diesel-powered] submarines sent to the region several
weeks before, Defense Minister Malinovsky’s proposals met fresh objections
from Mikoyan. Malinovsky was not a member of the Presidium and was present
only by invitation. Mikoyan spoke out decisively against the plan to send Soviet
submarines to Havana,* preferring to keep them outside Cuban territorial waters,
at a distance of a three-day passage. In his opinion, the boats could be discovered
rather easily while they were approaching the Cuban coast, inevitably resulting
in a confrontation with the U.S. Navy, which would “worsen the situation even
more and give rise to a serious conflict.” Nevertheless, Malinovsky, having gar-
nered the support of several members of the Presidium, insisted on sending the
submarines to Cuba.23
During lunch, Mikoyan sat next to Khrushchev and tried to convince him to
change his mind. “I thought about it a great deal,” he said, “and believe that it is
necessary to return once again to the discussion of the submarine question, be-
cause I think [my] suggestion was wrongly rejected.” Khrushchev agreed, and
the issue went back on the table. Malinovsky continued to insist aggressively that
the submarines could “approach the shores of Cuba undetected.” Mikoyan at-
tempted to convince the members of the Presidium that the defense minister’s
suggestion was impossible and dangerous. However, his concerns were brushed
off once again. The “Cuba specialist” decided to make one final attempt. He pro-
posed to summon to the evening session the commander in chief of the Soviet
Navy, Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, with the apparent intention of exploiting the
well known friction between the defense minister and the naval commander.
F U R S E N K O 1 3 5
* See Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, “A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973
Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004), esp. pp.
28–29.
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Gorshkov, as Mikoyan later remembered, “very clearly showed on the map”
that the proposed approaches to Cuba were exceedingly problematic for sub-
marines, since the littoral region was shallow, sinuous, and full of small islands.
In order to approach the island, the submarines would need to pass through a
narrow strait, which was under radar surveillance by a U.S. naval base located on
a nearby island.* In other words, to cross this choke point covertly was impossi-
ble. Gorshkov suggested that the submarines be held two or three days from the
island, which was precisely what Mikoyan wanted. Mikoyan, revolted by
Malinovsky’s incompetence on the issue, later recalled that the defense minister
“was unable to raise any objections” to the admiral’s assessment. Gorshkov,
meanwhile, “proved to be of very great service [in preventing] the false move the
defense minister wanted to make,” enabling the deputy premier ultimately to
outmaneuver the defense minister. In this quarrel with a Presidium member—
and a skillful politician—Malinovsky was forced to concede.24
At last, Khrushchev authorized sending the four diesel submarines destined
for Cuba to a point two days from the island. The full significance of this deci-
sion became known only in subsequent decades, when it was revealed that each
had been armed with one nuclear-tipped torpedo. Due to numerous technical
problems and deficiencies, the diesel boats were forced regularly to the surface,
where they were easily—and repeatedly—spotted by U.S. antisubmarine forces.†
Recent eyewitness accounts indicate that only with great difficulty did the
submariners avoid becoming engaged in armed confrontation. On returning to
the motherland the participants of the submarine mission were awaited by nei-
ther honor nor reward. To the contrary, the commander in chief of the Warsaw
Pact forces, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, pounced on them with the accusation
that the boats, by rising to the surface, had allowed themselves to be discovered
by the enemy; he declared that the submariners deserved court-martial. Admiral
Gorshkov came to their defense, extinguishing the fury of the army leadership.
Nevertheless, the identity of the submariners, who had exhibited uncommon
endurance and bravery under the difficult circumstances of the Cuban missile
crisis and successfully returned the boats to their docks, remained secret for
1 3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Referring generally to the transit of the Bahamas chain. In view of the short detection range of sur-
face radar against a periscope or snorkel, the location of the U.S. bases, and the variety of routes
available to the submarines, it is not clear to what Gorshkov might have been referring or why he
gave such prominence to U.S. shore-based radar (as opposed to surface and air antisubmarine
forces) as a threat. The editors are grateful for the views on this point of Capt. Joseph Bouchard,
USN (Ret.).
† See John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,”
Naval War College Review 58, no. 2 (Spring 2005), esp. p. 98. See also Goldstein and Zhukov, and
Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with So-
viet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), chap. 4.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:54 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
142
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/22
many years. This issue entered the public domain only on the fortieth anniver-
sary of the crisis; subsequently it received much attention in the press.25
WAS A NUCLEAR GREEN LIGHT EVER GIVEN?
The story of the night session of the Presidium of the Central Committee and
the questions discussed therein would not be complete without mention of
Khrushchev’s attitude on the use of nuclear weapons. In the course of the meet-
ing he made his position unmistakably clear. Although Khrushchev repeatedly—
both at the time of the crisis and afterward—emphasized that an attack on the
United States was never the purpose of deploying missiles to Cuba, under the
circumstances of the crisis he did not exclude their use as a means of defense. It is
not difficult to imagine what would have been the outcome of such a course of
action.
This question became a subject of debate and speculation after Khrushchev’s
death. At the 1992 Havana conference of participants of the Cuban crisis and
scholars who had studied its history, General Anatoly N. Gribkov announced
that the commander of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, General Pliev, was given
the authority—in the event of an emergency situation brought about by U.S.
land invasion and interruption of communication with Moscow—to use tacti-
cal nuclear weapons. This announcement became a sensation and was covered
in world newspapers. However, Gribkov’s revelation also provoked numerous
questions at the conference, as well as much doubt. In support of his version of
the story, Gribkov subsequently published a General Staff document containing
the relevant instructions in his book on Operation ANADYR, coauthored with a
U.S. general, William Y. Smith. At the bottom of the document were the signa-
tures of Malinovsky and the chief of the General Staff, Matvei Zakharov.26
The Defense Ministry archives indeed have such an instruction on file, which
had to be cosigned by the said individuals to have become official. However, the
document was signed by Zakharov alone. Malinovsky did not place his signature
on it, since the document had been sanctioned neither by the Presidium of the
Central Committee nor personally by Khrushchev. In publishing this document,
Gribkov failed to specify that the minister’s signature was not on it, admitting to
this omission in a Russian publication only a few years later. The general, how-
ever, insisted that Pliev had in any case received such authorization in the form
of an oral order relayed through Gribkov personally, who arrived in Cuba three
days before the beginning of the crisis.
Although the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S. invasion of
the island was a possibility, it is highly doubtful that the Party’s leadership would
have delegated to the military the authority to make that decision. The Soviet
system prohibited in principle such an option. Meanwhile, it was absolutely
F U R S E N K O 1 3 7
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impossible that Malinovsky, who Gribkov said tasked the latter with orally com-
municating the orders to Pliev, could have done so without Khrushchev’s official
approval. For his part, Khrushchev, who at all times covered himself by diffusing
accountability through “collective” resolutions, was unlikely to have resorted to
such imprudent means. It is thus difficult to imagine that such orders affecting
the fate of the world could have been relayed orally or, more importantly, come
into force as the result of communication through any one person, however high
a position he held. Not only under the Soviet system but in the framework of any
system such a practice was unthinkable, whatever eyewitnesses may later claim.
Neither archival documents nor the testimonies of the direct participants con-
firm that such a decision was ever made.
From the moment of Gribkov’s arrival in Cuba in 1962 as part of the General
Staff ’s delegation, he was continuously escorted by Pliev’s deputy for combat
training, Major General Leonid S. Garbuz. The latter has categorically denied
that such an order existed or that its very possibility was even a subject of discus-
sion. Garbuz, who had served in missile divisions since 1952, had other ways of
knowing what Khrushchev’s actual orders were. Prior to being dispatched to
Cuba in mid-July 1962, he—along with General Pavel B. Dankevich, another of
Pliev’s deputies, who was initially to have led the group of Soviet forces in
Cuba—was received by Marshal Malinovsky and then Khrushchev himself. “We
have decided to slip a hedgehog under America,” Khrushchev said, “to help
Cuba, so America doesn’t swallow her up.” But the burden of his remarks, ac-
cording to Garbuz, was that nuclear weapons were being deployed to Cuba
exclusively as a means of “deterrence,” not to be launched under any circum-
stances. Later this formulation was confirmed by written orders from the Minis-
try of Defense.27
The ambassador to Cuba at the time, Aleksandr I. Alekseev, has been just as
categorical on this question. He was the most trusted Kremlin representative on
the island and, as a member of the Military Council,* would certainly have
known of the existence of such an order. Alekseev recalled that Gribkov’s asser-
tion at the 1992 Havana meeting irritated Fidel Castro.† The latter was present at
all the conference’s panel discussions but did not take the floor on this subject,
since he was, in Alekseev’s words, preoccupied with preventing denigration of
the conduct of the Cuban leadership during the crisis.28
All that is known from archival documents and the memoirs of the partici-
pants demonstrates that Pliev was unconditionally forbidden to make any
1 3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Main Military Council comprised the senior leadership of the Defense Ministry, reporting in
wartime to the Defense Council, the supreme national-security decision-making organ.
† Castro had taken power in Cuba in 1959.
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discretionary decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. On 27 October
1962, via special cable, Malinovsky confirmed the ban on the use of any such
weapon.29
A SOLITARY VOICE OF RESTRAINT
Despite the fortunate fact that Soviet ground commanders in Cuba were not autho-
rized to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. aggression, the minutes
of the 22–23 October 1962 emergency Presidium session reveal a disturbing pic-
ture. A lack of actionable intelligence regarding deliberations within the Kennedy
White House left key decision makers in the Kremlin uninformed and com-
pelled to act on the basis of unsubstantiated worst-case scenarios. This made for
a particularly volatile atmosphere, given the high profile of hawkish voices—
notably Khrushchev’s and Malinovsky’s—in the discussions. The debate over
the wording of orders to be given to theater commanders on the use of tactical
nuclear weapons is a clear demonstration of this precariousness. This volatility
was confirmed further by even more ill-conceived and sometimes outright bi-
zarre suggestions, such as Khrushchev’s proposal to deceive the United States
into believing that the missiles were under the Cuban leadership’s command.
Another dangerous element that becomes apparent in the proceedings is an
utter lack of understanding of naval matters—in part by Khrushchev but espe-
cially by the ground forces, which dominated the Ministry of Defense leadership.
Only intervention by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the country’s leading maritime
strategist and the naval commander in chief, convinced the Presidium not to
send the already-imperiled Soviet submarines on what in all likelihood would
have become a suicide mission at best and the first salvo of a global nuclear war
at worst. While the results of this decision not to send the Foxtrots all the way
into Cuba were themselves less than rosy,* the alternative would almost certainly
have been perceived by the United States as a provocation, inviting unimagin-
able consequences.
In assessing this rare look at Soviet decision making during perhaps the most
dangerous gamble of the nuclear age, it is hard to overlook the critical role
played by Anastas Mikoyan. Through remarkable political maneuvering within
a decision-making apparatus that eschewed differences of opinion, Mikoyan
managed to calm the famously emotional Khrushchev and discredit the forceful,
if obsequious, Malinovsky. Had this powerful, if nearly solitary, voice of re-
straint been absent from the emergency Presidium session, one would be hard
pressed to conceive of a positive outcome to the Cuban missile crisis.
F U R S E N K O 1 3 9
* In that by 20 November all four had been detected by U.S. antisubmarine forces—see Benedict, also
Goldstein and Zhukov.
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N O T E S
This paper was originally commissioned for
a conference on the “Cold War at Sea,” held
7–8 May 2004 at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. This article reflects
the personal views of the author and not
necessarily those of the government of the
Russian Federation. The editors express their
appreciation to Mr. Zhukov for his coopera-
tiveness in preparing the translation.
1. Stenograph record of Anastas I. Mikoyan’s
memoirs, 19 January 1963. A. I. Mikoyan Ar-
chives, Russian State Archives of Socio-Political
History.
2. Proceedings of the sixtieth session of the Pre-
sidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22–23
October 1962, recorded by A. K. Serov, Rus-
sian State Archive of Contemporary History.
3. Proceedings of the sixtieth session of the Pre-
sidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22–23
October 1962, recorded by V. N. Malin,
Kremlin Archives, Presidium of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1954–1964 (Moscow: 2003),
p. 617.
4. Residency of the Main Intelligence Adminis-
tration Center (GRU), 22 October 1962.
5. New York Herald Tribune, 19 October 1962.
6. Residency of the GRU, 22 October 1962.
7. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
8. Proceedings, recorded by Malin, p. 617.
9. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
10. Proceedings, recorded by Malin.
11. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The decision to send tactical nuclear weapons
to Cuba was made by Khrushchev on 7
September 1962, in reaction to an announce-
ment by Kennedy threatening an invasion of
Cuba in the event that a Soviet missile base
was discovered there.
15. Proceedings, recorded by Malin.




20. Proceedings, recorded by Serov.
21. Ibid.
22. See Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro,
and Kennedy 1958–1964 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1997), pp. 247–48.
23. Proceedings, recorded by Malin. Kremlin Ar-
chives, Presidium of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1954–1964 (Moscow: 2003), p. 619. (In the
original recording only 22 October 1962 is
cited in the sixtieth proceedings. Serov’s pro-
ceedings are dated 22–23 October 1962,
which corresponds to the substance of the
events’ development.) Proceedings, recorded
by Serov.
24. Mikoyan memoirs.
25. For a recent eyewitness account, see Ryurik
A. Ketov, “The Cuban Crisis as Seen through
a Periscope,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28,
no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 217–31.
26. Anatoli I. Gribkov, General William Y. Smith,
and Alfred Friendly, Operation Anadyr: U.S.
and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1993), p. 183.
27. L. S. Garbuz, interview, October 1994.
28. A. I. Alekseev, interview, 15 November 1995.
29. Malinovsky, telegram to Pliev, 27 October
1962, Archives of the President of the Russian
Federation.
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The central thesis of the article entitled “U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light
Weapons,” by Loretta Bondì, which appeared in the Winter 2006 edition of the
Naval War College Review, is that the U.S. system of export controls on small
arms is as good as any, and better than most other countries, but that American
moral authority in this area is undermined by its permitting widespread civilian
ownership of firearms.
The U.S. commitment to widespread firearms ownership among civilians
represents the clear preference of the American people. After passage of the
Brady Act in 1993 and the ban on the future sales of military look-alike firearms
in 1994, the next election resulted in control of both the House and the Senate
shifting to the Republican party for the first time since the Eisenhower
administration. Former president Bill Clinton himself credited the efforts of the
National Rifle Association as a significant factor in that historical electoral
turnaround.
The clear preference of the American electorate for continuing the U.S. tradi-
tion of individual armed self-defense has also been expressed in other contexts.
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 21st century, increasing numbers of
state legislatures passed laws requiring authorities to issue concealed weapons
permits to citizens who meet certain objective criteria. State legislatures are also
considering “Stand Your Ground” legislation, which recognizes a citizen’s right
to remain in any place where he or she may lawfully be and to resist aggression,
with deadly force if necessary, without any “duty to retreat” to spare attackers the
consequences of their actions. In 2004 Congress let the ban on military
look-alike firearms expire, and in 2005 it protected the firearms industry from
logic-twisting lawsuits filed by individual plaintiffs and by municipalities that
sought to hold firearms manufacturers liable for injuries associated with the use
of their products.
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If Ms. Bondì wishes to change the clear preference of the American body poli-
tic for its tradition of armed self-defense, she is free to do so through the Ameri-
can political system. But Americans who value and wish to retain a tradition of
individual armed self-defense need not submit to the emotional blackmail that
their tradition is responsible for atrocities in countries with far different politi-
cal and cultural systems.
DENNIS B. WILSON
SSGN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Sir:
In his article “SSGN: A Transformation Limited by Legacy Command and Con-
trol” in the Winter 2006 Review, Captain Charles Sykora makes the case for com-
mand of the new SSGNs harder than it need be. There are precedents for the
kinds of organizational and operational dilemmas that he creates. When nuclear
attack submarines were used in direct support of carrier task groups in the late
seventies and when ballistic missile submarines began operating in conjunction
with other forces during periods of relaxed readiness in the eighties, the poten-
tial and actual conflict of missions outlined by Captain Sykora existed, albeit not
in wartime conditions. Rather than creating elaborate hierarchies or mission
matrices or formal declarations of priorities, these operations moved the deci-
sion points that Captain Sykora assigns to the commanding officer to the next
higher level of authority. These operations were conducted under the existing
tactical rubrics, with two notable exceptions.
Competent and senior submarine officers were collocated with the tactical
and strategic operational commanders. These officers were in tactical command
of the assigned submarines or were the principal advisers on submarine matters
to the officers who had tactical command. The resulting face-to-face dialogue
between these two resolved any conflicts of orders or desired activities in mis-
sion and tactical employment of the submarines assigned. More importantly,
such assignments created a communications link—one that operated without
signals—between the submarine warfare officers at each end in their mutual
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understanding of the nature and limitations of and processes for submarine op-
erations. This not only prevented orders that could not be executed from being
formulated in the first place but also obviated any need for the submarine to re-
port routine matters.
The second aspect that at the time was novel to surface forces but routine in
submarine matters involved the communications paths for the directions to and
reports from the submarines. These paths, regardless of their origin, pass
through the submarine Broadcast Control Authority (BCA) en route to delivery
to the destination. The BCA is collocated with the command centers of the sub-
marine forces. This allowed oversight by the submarine force commanders who
were the operational commanders for the fleet commanders. This overlay could
hinder operations, in the sense that tasks from higher authority might infringe
on the tactical commander’s initiative, but the arrangement kept all the partici-
pants in the chain of command aware of the nature and priority of various mis-
sions. Conflicts in direction were avoided, and when they arose they could be
resolved quickly.
This command-and-control (C2) schema works well and smoothly where
there is an adequate doctrinal base (not necessarily technical knowledge) and a
mutual respect for the capabilities of the participants. Good communications
are essential, but as demonstrated in many exercises with submarines operating
as part of a joint force, this does not translate into the need for instantaneous
and direct connectivity.
The model outlined herein applies to other forces and situations. Arrange-
ments much like these are used in clandestine operations where communica-
tions must be intermittent and sensors remote from the operators. Key is mutual
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the forces involved. Mutual
understanding is easier in organizations with few highly professional senior de-
cision makers—that is, the Navy, Air Force, and Special Forces—than for orga-
nizations with diverse components and many junior decision partners, such as
the Army. Jointness should not be a mandate for attempts to design universal C2
processes.
W. J. HOLLAND, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
I N M Y V I E W 1 4 3
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THE NATURE OF WAR
Sir:
I fear that the statement by Rear Admiral Shuford in his recent President’s Fo-
rum (Naval War College Review, Winter 2006, pp. 11–15) that the nature of war
is changing is not in step with the way other OPMEP [Officer Professional Mili-
tary Education Policy] courses have approached this issue regarding the “nature,
character, and conduct” of war. I believe it will cause much confusion among
Naval War College graduates as they meet with peers who have graduated from
other senior service colleges or from National Defense University courses, or the
major national security studies programs with which I am familiar.
The OPMEP is pretty clear regarding the way the senior service colleges have
approached teaching the subject covering the nature, character, and conduct of
war. The “gouge” as reflected by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Thucydides, Basil Liddell
Hart, Colonel John Boyd, etc., has been that the nature of war is unchanging but
that its character (who fights and why) and its conduct (how, and where, with
what, etc.) are always changing and adapting. War’s nature is what makes the
ideas of those “old dead guys” still live.
I realize there have been several recent best-sellers proclaiming the “changing
nature of war,” but when a learned reader explores the assertions, one concludes
the author did not understand the three “faces” of war (nature, character, and
conduct) as laid out by the great writers. Please revisit the idea that the nature of
war is changing—against the idea that it is really the character and conduct of war
that have changed (and will ever do so).
DAVID K. BROWN
Dynamics Research Corporation,
supporting Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command
and Navy Warfare Development Command
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REVIEW ESSAY
HOW THE JAPANESE LOST THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
Thomas Wildenberg
Parshall, Jonathan B., and Anthony P. Tully. Shattered Sword:
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books, 2005. 613pp. $35.00
Kernan, Alvin B. The Unknown Battle of Midway: The De-
struction of the American Torpedo Squadrons. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2005. 181pp. $26.00
Midway was one of the most decisive naval battles of all time. It was a battle that
should have been won by the Japanese but wasn’t. Future American writers
would dub it an incredible or miraculous victory, based on the superiority of the
Japanese and the widely held perception before the battle that the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy was invincible. During the six months of war preceding Midway the
Japanese carrier fleet rampaged unchecked throughout the Pacific, destroying
the U.S. battle line at Pearl Harbor and enabling Japan to seize the Philippines,
capture Singapore, and overrun the Dutch East Indies. Since the opening attack
on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had conducted a series of spectacular campaigns
and smashing victories that seriously weakened American and Allied naval
power in the Pacific. The Japanese navy successfully attacked and damaged a sig-
nificant portion of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, obliterated British seapower in
the Pacific, and won an overwhelming victory over the
hodgepodge of Allied forces that had been caught in
the Java Sea. To most observers it seemed as if the Jap-
anese navy was indestructible. Then came Midway—a
battle in which a supposedly weaker American force
won a spectacular victory that blunted the Japanese
advance in the Pacific. It was the turning point in the
Thomas Wildenberg received the Surface Navy Associa-
tion’s 2005 Literary Award for his article “Midway:
Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?” published in the Winter
2005 issue of the Naval War College Review. His cur-
rent project is a book on the history of the torpedo in the
U.S. Navy.
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war against the Japanese empire—the point at which the U. S. Navy took over
the strategic initiative, and after which it never looked back.
The battle of Midway was a tragic defeat for Japan and its navy. The Japanese
had placed their faith in quality over quantity and had trained and prepared to
defeat a numerically superior enemy. Yet, as Mitsuo Fuchiday and Masatake
Okumiya explained in Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan (Naval Institute
Press, 1955), “a stronger Japanese force went down to defeat before a weaker
enemy.” How and why this happened is explained in Shattered Sword, the first
new English-language book on the Japanese side of the story since Fuchida and
Okumiya’s Midway was published fifty years ago.
Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have produced what will undoubtedly
become the definitive work on the Japanese navy at Midway. Although neither is
a Japanese linguist, they have acquired an amazing amount of information on
Japanese carrier doctrine, the planning that went into the Midway operation,
and the specific details of the air operations during the battle. Their narrative is
carrier-centric, told in terms of what would have been directly visible or other-
wise knowable from the bridges of the Japanese carriers. This is a highly effective
technique, one that produces a clearly defined picture of the carrier operations
and aerial doctrine employed by the Japanese at Midway.
The book is organized into three sections: “Preliminaries,” in which the origins
and “political machinations” that led to the Japanese plan of battle are discussed;
“Battle Diary,” a detailed narrative of the battle; and “Reckonings,” a reexamina-
tion of the myths surrounding the battle of Midway and an enlightening analysis
of why the Japanese lost this historically important battle. Readers familiar with
other recognized works on Midway will find a wealth of new information here.
Scholars, military buffs, and serious students of the subject will appreciate the de-
tailed, comprehensive battle diary that constitutes the bulk of the work. The text
itself is supplemented with numerous maps and well executed diagrams that are
extremely useful for interpreting the action. A great deal of additional informa-
tion on Japanese aircraft, carriers, airmen, and aviation losses at Midway is also
given, in the extensive list of appendices.
One of the most delightful aspects of this work is the emphasis that the au-
thors place on the importance of leadership and command. I was particularly
impressed by the way they compared and contrasted the personalities and leader-
ship styles of the two main protagonists of the battle: Chester W. Nimitz, the
commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku,
commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Much of the book focuses
on the errors committed by Yamamoto in “his schemes aimed at Midway.”
Parshall and Tully are right on the money when they state that “a commander’s
job is to orchestrate and direct the three major dimensions of combat—space,
1 4 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:55 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
152
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/22
time and force.” From their study they conclude that “Yamamoto’s plan [for the
Midway Operation] failed to address the concept of space in a flexible manner,”
that in “his attempt to be ‘divinely mysterious,’ he had rendered much of his fleet
purposeless through dispersion.”
Despite its formidable strengths, the Japanese navy committed at Midway a
series of irretrievable strategic, tactical, and operational mistakes that seem al-
most inexplicable. This forms the basis for the “unpleasant truth” of the authors’
compelling argument that “despite the Imperial Navy having opened the Pacific
war with one of the most daring military feats of all time—the massed carrier at-
tack on Pearl Harbor—neither Yamamoto nor Naval GHQ truly comprehended
the strengths and weaknesses of the world-class weapons system [the aircraft
carriers of the First Air Fleet] they possessed.” Lastly, scholars will appreciate
Parshall and Tully’s efforts to debunk the legion of myths resulting from Mid-
way, the most persistent being that in defeating the Japanese the U. S. Navy mi-
raculously triumphed against overwhelming odds. This mistaken concept, as
the authors rightly point out, “has been echoed endlessly in almost every Ameri-
can text on the battle until it has been accepted as holy writ.”
While Shattered Sword gets high marks all around, it is not flawless. Historians
and academics accustomed to more scholarly writing may find some of the sty-
listic trappings somewhat disconcerting. The use of contemporary jargon and
colloquialisms is, at best, misplaced. Similarly, their decision to pack the
endnotes with reams of additional supporting information was unwise; further,
the index is so poorly constructed as to be almost unusable. It is deplorable that
the publisher, having acquired such an exceptional scholastic achievement,
failed to take care of these deficiencies and so spoiled an otherwise superb book.
Unlike Shattered Sword, which breaks new ground, The Unknown Battle of
Midway by Alvin Kernan merely retraces the steps of those who have come be-
fore. Kernan, a university professor of the humanities, served in the U.S. Navy
during World War II as an enlisted man and was aboard the carrier Enterprise
during the battle of Midway. The subject of this book, the destruction of U.S.
torpedo planes at Midway, is a worthy project, one that warrants further inspec-
tion and analysis. If Kernan’s idea is sound, however, his execution leaves much
to be desired. Readers of the Naval War College Review and other students of naval
history will find nothing new here. On the contrary, the book is so full of errors
and misconstructions of fact that it only further distorts the reasons behind the
tragic slaughter of the U.S. torpedo planes and their aircrews.
Although the author was an aviation ordnanceman, he confuses the 1,949-
pound Mark XIII-1 torpedo employed at Midway and the 2,216-pound Mark
XIII-10 of 1944. Much of the technical information cited in this book is either
outdated, inaccurate, or incorrectly analyzed (e.g., the U.S. Navy did not develop
R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 4 7
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its early warning radar from the British; U.S. aerial torpedoes did not have
magnetic exploders; and the torpedo protection system is not a part of a ship’s
armor). The author’s lack of technical expertise can be quickly discerned, and
it frequently leads to errors in Kernan’s analysis of the battle.
Missing is any useful analysis of U.S. carrier doctrine or discussion of the
command decisions that necessitated a “maximum effort” on the part of each of
the U.S. carriers present at Midway. Yes, the destruction of the American tor-
pedo planes was tragic, but as Parshall and Tully have shown in Shattered Sword,
the courageous attacks by the Navy’s torpedo squadrons critically affected the
course of this monumental battle.
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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CAN THRIVE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Heymann, Philip B., and Juliette N. Kayyem, eds. Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2005. 194pp. $30
In the midst of a cacophony of charges
and countercharges concerning recently
revealed warrantless U.S. government
wiretaps of American citizens, this
compact book strikes a refreshing
note—calm, balanced consideration of
the tension between security and liberty
in the post-9/11 world. The editors, a
Harvard Law School professor and an
acting executive director for research at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, convened a group of experts in a
variety of professional terrorism-related
fields to explore “how American de-
mocracy can thrive best” in the war on
terror. Over eighteen months, the ex-
perts (from both ends of the political
spectrum and many with previous U.S.
or British government service) devel-
oped specific criteria to guide future de-
cisions concerning the law and practice
applicable to combating terrorism at
home and abroad.
Happily, the book’s detailed recom-
mendations for the executive branch
and Congress reject extremes in favor
of a thoughtful balance between the
president’s need for extraordinary pow-
ers and Congress’s duty to provide
oversight. The recommendations cover
ten major areas that include coercive
interrogations, indefinite detention,
targeted killing, intercepting communi-
cations of U.S. persons, information
collection, and identification of individ-
uals. Any bias in the approach is, as the
authors acknowledge, toward account-
ability, transparency, and accurate reas-
sessment. On the other hand, the
recommendations refrain from suggest-
ing guidelines or restrictions on the
commander in chief’s broad war pow-
ers in zones of active combat outside
the United States.
This work is particularly useful for
readers who are or will be addressing
terrorism-related issues within the ex-
ecutive or legislative branches. The rec-
ommendations provide a possible path
to broad consensus on these conten-
tious topics. Readers ideologically com-
mitted to an extreme viewpoint (in
favor of either maximum security or
maximum liberty) will find much to
criticize, while those who seek a balanced
approach, though they will also take issue,
may find that adopting the moderate
viewpoint of the recommendations will
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enhance more rapid agreement among
the various stakeholders in the
government.
The work’s one drawback is a lack of
detail, in that it reflects a “distillation of
views and opinions” based on “honest
and difficult discussions” in a series of
closed-door meetings. Accordingly, the
reader must speculate on the rationale
underlying the specifics. Those seeking
to implement these recommendations
would benefit by a clearer understand-
ing of the viewpoints analyzed and why
they were resolved in a particular way.
For example: What indicators of reli-
ability were presumed to prohibit the
introduction of information obtained
through “highly coercive interrogation”
techniques in a trial of the informing
detainee but to allow the information in
the trial of other detainees? What value
is served by providing an individual
captured in a zone of active combat a
hearing before a competent tribunal
when there is no doubt as to his/her
status as a prisoner of war? What com-
peting legal rationales were considered
when concluding that an al-Qa‘ida
leader located in Yemen was not en-
gaged in “active” combat against the
United States?
This criticism is minor, in any event,
since executive and congressional lead-
ers must answer these questions for
themselves and on behalf of the Ameri-
can public, if the recommendations are
implemented. The book’s value lies in
modulating the shrillness of the dis-
course and in proposing a reasoned,
rational way forward for the ultimate
benefit of the nation.
JANE G. DALTON
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
Naval War College
Purkitt, Helen E., and Stephen F. Burgess. South
Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. Blooming-
ton: Indiana Univ. Press, 2005. 322pp. $24.95
North Korea’s prime motive for devel-
oping and possessing nuclear weapons
is probably regime security. Leader Kim
Jong-Il’s rationale would be that absent
weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
the international community would
find some way to dismantle a repressive,
autocratic regime that is completely out
of phase with twenty-first-century norms.
Authors Helen Purkitt and Stephen
Burgess argue in their analysis of South
Africa’s weapons of mass destruction
programs that in the latter part of the
twentieth century the white ruling elite
made similar calculations, premised on
idiosyncratic political ideology and na-
tional emotions as much as on rational
neorealist power assessments. South Af-
rica’s nuclear, biological, and chemical
capabilities (unilaterally abandoned by
the mid-1990s, after majority rule was es-
tablished and Cold War threats had re-
ceded) arose from its white leaders’ alarm
over rising regional threats unleashed by
decolonization, détente, and correspond-
ing American timidity vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union in Africa, and growing interna-
tional opposition to apartheid.
The book is analytically sound if some-
what inelegantly written. The authors—
Purkitt, a professor of political science
at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Burgess,
an assistant director of the U.S. Air
Force Counterproliferation Center as
well as an associate professor at the U.S.
Air War College—systematically illumi-
nate South Africa’s furtive route to
clandestine WMD know-how and arse-
nals. Steps included exploitation of
South Africa’s own natural resources
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(uranium), dual-use technology, po-
rous arms-control regimes, and techno-
logically advanced states that perceived
themselves as comparably besieged (for
instance, Israel and Taiwan). Careful
not to oversimplify, the authors also
note the organizational, personal, and
cognitive factors that enforced this ef-
fort. Pertinent circumstances included,
respectively, the desire of the Defense
Ministry and military to maintain maxi-
mum control over the national industrial
base; the friendship between chemical
and biological weapons czar, Dr. Wouter
Basson, and Prime Minister P. W. Botha;
and the Afrikaners’ conception of them-
selves as “God’s chosen people.”
Marring the book’s narrative flow is an
awkward structure whereby overlap-
ping themes are examined discretely.
This produces considerable redundancy
and, occasionally, the obtuse presenta-
tion of old information as new material.
More aggressive editing would have
remedied the problem, which in any
case is ameliorated by an appendix of
policy lessons. Despite its faults, how-
ever, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction embodies an assiduous and
authoritative marshaling of facts about
one country’s secret enterprise in ac-
quiring weapons that, without benefit
of hindsight, few might have expected it
to covet. Purkitt’s and Burgess’s work
also contrasts the halcyon days of
nonproliferation immediately after the
Cold War ended—when South Africa
was a “trendsetter” for wider disarma-
ment—with the present dysfunction of
nonproliferation regimes. South Africa’s
conversion to a majoritarian democracy
facilitated benevolent neorealist behav-
ior. Grimly, the authors note, however,
that “today’s states that have weapons
of mass destruction are not likely to
replicate South Africa’s democratic dis-
armament.” Dutifully, they sketch how
nonproliferation incentives and mea-
sures will have to change in order to
stop the spread of WMD. The book,
then, has more than just historical rele-
vance; it should be considered a timely
as well as an accomplished contribution
to the nonproliferation literature.
JONATHAN STEVENSON
Associate Professor of National Security Affairs
U.S. Naval War College
Kaplan, Robert D. Imperial Grunts: The American
Military on the Ground. New York: Random
House, 2005. 421pp. $27.95
Robert Kaplan’s book Imperial Grunts
is an account of a war journalist cum
travel writer visiting U.S. military com-
mands worldwide. Kaplan travels
through “barracks and outposts of the
American Empire,” from Yemen to Co-
lombia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa,
introducing readers to “imperial grunts”
(U.S. Marines and Army troops and the
Navy and Air Force personnel who sup-
port them) at these forward-deployed
locations. His ten previous books in-
clude foreign affairs accounts (Soldiers
of God: With Islamic Warriors in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, Vintage, 2001)
and travelogues (Surrender or Starve:
Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and
Eritrea, Vintage, 2003). Kaplan is cur-
rently a correspondent for the Atlantic
Monthly.
Kaplan lauds the personal initiative of
midlevel commissioned and noncom-
missioned officers he meets in his travels,
and he champions them as, collectively, a
superior source for operational knowledge
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and force mentorship. A recurring
theme is the failure of a top-heavy bu-
reaucracy of “big military/Army/Navy”
that is “organizationally miscast for
dealing with twenty-first-century insur-
gencies,” versus smaller, more efficient
Marine, special forces, and civil affairs
units. One example is the transforma-
tion of “big military” control over the
Afghanistan battlefield. In 2001, master
sergeants were empowered to call in
B-52 airstrikes that arrived within min-
utes; by 2003, approval of task force
concepts of operations required three
days of paperwork and senior-officer
authorization.
Kaplan holds out the ethnic composi-
tion and language skills of U.S. South-
ern Command personnel as exemplary.
He posits that, for the twenty-first cen-
tury, “indigenous culture must be ap-
preciated before anything can be
accomplished with its inhabitants” and
that “cultural and historical knowledge
of the terrain is more likely than techno-
logical wizardry to dilute the so-called
fog-of-war.” Kaplan states that in Af-
ghanistan the “American Empire . . . was
weakest” because of an absence of lin-
guistic skills among deployed military
personnel. “This . . . neglected part of . . .
defense ‘transformation’ . . . had nothing
to do with the latest weapons systems.”
According to Kaplan, future military
operations should optimally leave small
footprints. In the Philippines, he ob-
serves, Army civil affairs teams, part of
the U.S. Army Special Operations Com-
mand, functioned like relief charities or
nongovernmental organizations—they
built schools, dug wells, and provided
medical assistance. These personnel
“represented the future reality of Spe-
cial Operations: the Peace Corps with
guns, the final articulation of uncon-
ventional war.”
Contrary to media reports of poor mili-
tary morale due to overdeployment,
Kaplan states that “with Army Special
Forces and the Marines I had met only
two kinds of troops (from 2002–2004):
those who were serving in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, and those who were jealous
of those who were” and “those in the
Special Operations community whom I
had met (in the Philippines) and in
eastern Afghanistan were having the
time of their lives.”
Imperial Grunts is intended to be the
first of several books on “imperial
maintenance on the ground, and seek-
ing a rule book for its application.” The
strong opinions of the author notwith-
standing, those desiring to learn about
military personnel deployed worldwide
in the war on terror can benefit from
reading this account.
ZYGMUNT F. DEMBEK
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve
Parrish, Thomas. The Submarine: A History. New
York: Penguin, 2004. 576pp. $17
In this excellent and rather lengthy
book, Thomas Parrish uses detailed vi-
gnettes to illustrate how submarines,
the men who operated them, and the
organizations that produced them
changed naval warfare between great
powers during the twentieth century.
The author does this with a deft hand,
providing a wealth of details concerning
many notable personalities and techni-
cal facts of his arcane subject in a way
that both informs and entertains. One
has only to read the first three pages,
which quickly discuss the short and
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tragic life of the Confederate submarine
CSS H. L. Hunley, to get an accurate
feel for how the rest of the book will
progress. Parrish maintains this fast
pace as he relates the legend of David
Bushnell’s Revolutionary War submers-
ible vessel, the Turtle; Robert Fulton’s
submarine efforts; and those of other
early inventors. His discussions on
World War I are more substantial, and
his penchant for detail emerges in his
short biographies of some of the major
figures of the time. He ties their careers
to submarine technology, not only de-
scribing Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s
rise to high command in the German
navy but quoting the admiral’s observa-
tion that his success was bound to the
development of the torpedo. Parrish
then traces the development of both the
German and British fleets and the grand
strategies that led to their acquisition.
For the next ten pages, we are told the
riveting story of how Lieutenant Otto
Weddigen, commanding the six-
hundred-ton submarine U-9, with a
crew of twenty-six men, sank the Brit-
ish cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue
with just three torpedoes in less than
two hours in the early days of the war.
In that battle 1,459 British men died,
which at the time represented the worst
butcher’s bill, and arguably the most
stunning defeat, in the history of the
Royal Navy. As Parrish later observes, the
century of the submarine had arrived.
Parrish treats his discussion of World
War II equally well. He relays, among
other things, Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
rise, U-47 commander Lieutenant
Günter Prien’s attack in Scapa Flow, the
U.S. Navy’s participation in convoy es-
cort duty before the official declaration
of war, and the second Battle of the At-
lantic. He discusses the parallel Allied
and German code-breaking efforts and
the action/reaction technology cycle be-
tween submarines and those who
hunted them. Readers with an interest
in the U.S. submarine force’s contribu-
tions to victory against Japan will be
pleased with the author’s treatment of
that important campaign and of the
major figures involved.
If the book has a weakness, it is that
some important points receive scant
coverage. All told, nearly four hundred
pages of the book discuss the history of
diesel-powered submarines, while only
eighty-four pages are dedicated to nu-
clear boats. Yet even here the author
does a creditable job in describing the
development of American nuclear sub-
marines, evenhandedly discussing the
rise, behavior, strengths, and weak-
nesses of Admiral Hyman Rickover.
Oddly, Russian submarines receive little
attention, most of it devoted to peace-
time losses of the Komsolomets (the
Mike-class submarine) in 1989 and that
of the Kursk (an Oscar II) in 2000.
Submarine accidents also present the
few stumbling points. Parrish states
that all hands were lost when HMS
Thetis sank in 1939, when in fact three
members of the crew and a shipyard
worker escaped from the stricken sub-
marine. Similarly, he describes the USS
Scorpion as “shabby and seedy” and
“rickety,” citing these alleged character-
istics as contributing to its loss. How-
ever, these oversights are relatively
minor and do not significantly detract
from what is otherwise a fine treatment
of a complex subject. The book will ap-
peal to the interested layman, naval
professional, and, especially, to current
and former submariners.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY
U. S. Naval War College
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Showalter, Dennis E., ed. Forging the Shield:
Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st
Century. Chicago: Imprint, 2005. 236pp. $24.95
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s greatest
achievement as president came in the
area of foreign policy and related de-
fense matters. In the making and man-
aging of strategic policy he was a strong,
active, and effective leader. This book is
an uneven collection of essays devoted
to Eisenhower’s presidential influence
on foreign policy and national security,
essays that were presented at a sympo-
sium held in January 2005 at the Na-
tional Defense University.
The lead paper, “Reflections on Eisen-
hower, the Cold War, and My Father,”
by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an
interesting recollection of Nikita
Khrushchev’s attitude toward Eisen-
hower and the United States. According
to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown Univer-
sity professor and himself a veteran of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his
father, like many veterans of the “Great
Patriotic War,” viewed Eisenhower as a
former comrade in arms and thus wel-
comed his election as president. The el-
der Khrushchev was highly respectful of
the danger posed by potential nuclear
war and sought only equality in relations
with the United States and the Eisen-
hower administration. Questions emerge
as to how much new information Sergei
Khrushchev’s memoir-analysis reveals,
and how much is a son’s defense of a
father. However, to a large segment of
students, Professor Khrushchev’s reflec-
tions provide an interesting look at the
key foreign power’s opposing viewpoint
during the Eisenhower presidency.
The collection’s strongest work is Alan
Millet’s “Eisenhower and the Korean
War.” It was a conflict that Eisenhower
inherited when elected and one that he
knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike’s
indirect involvement from the period
when he was chief of staff after World
War II until his pledge in the 1952 cam-
paign that if elected “I shall go to Korea,”
a pledge that Eisenhower understood
needed rapid redemption.
With considerable insight Millet traces
Eisenhower’s efforts to end the war and
provide a defense policy for the long
haul, based on concepts that Ike later
set forth in his memoir. These concepts
relied on deterrence, stressed the role of
nuclear technology, placed heavy reli-
ance on allied land forces around the
Soviet periphery, and emphasized eco-
nomic strength through reduced de-
fense budgets. The outcome was the
New Look strategy of the 1950s.
R. Cargill Hall’s essay, “Clandestine
Victory,” is a competent account of the
development of increasingly sophisti-
cated aircraft and early satellites tasked
with aerial surveillance and of the intel-
ligence they provided, as well as of their
influence on decision making. How-
ever, the paper deteriorates into an ar-
gument for further eye-in-the-sky
commitments to counter twenty-first-
century terrorism. Hall’s argument
seems more public relations for an in-
stitutional constituency than a reasoned
scholarly analysis and conclusion. Ter-
rorism, at its most effective and fright-
ening, depends on surreptitious
individual initiatives that in general
defy large-scale overhead surveillance.
One area that perhaps could have been
developed more explicitly is Eisen-
hower’s role and technique in control-
ling the defense budgetary process and
strategic dialogue within his adminis-
tration. His principal secretaries of
1 5 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 2:04:57 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
160
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/22
defense were functionalists, and Eisen-
hower viewed their primary role as one
of keeping the Pentagon programs
within the budget, which was important
for carrying out his conservative fiscal
goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower
dealt directly with the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped
an important portion of the secretary of
defense’s role. He respected his secre-
taries as businessmen but in effect in-
sisted on being his own secretary of
defense.
Thematic throughout this collection is a
focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing
Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy,
relations with Moscow, the interrela-
tionship of politico-military-industrial
and techno-scientific affairs, and trou-
ble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia, the book ignores the
twenty-first-century challenges posed
for contemporary U.S. defense and for-
eign policy in the Southern Hemi-
sphere—Africa and Latin America.
For the sophisticated and knowledge-
able scholar, Forging the Shield likely
contains little new information, but it
will prove valuable to defense policy
and military history students needing
exposure to the Eisenhower era.
DOUGLAS KINNARD
author of President Eisenhower
and Strategy Management
Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics,
Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford, Calif.: Stan-
ford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. $57.95
Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s
creation of the world’s third-largest
navy by 1922, illuminates the workings
of the Japanese political system and the
evolution of both interservice rivalries
and civil-military relations in the de-
cades preceding World War II. He bases
his history on an impressive reading of
Japanese and English-language primary
and secondary sources to produce a
story with political implications far be-
yond the history of one service.
When the Meiji reformers took power
in 1868, their minimal naval forces
were part of their land forces. In 1871,
over the objections of the army, the
Military Ministry was subdivided into
two ministries, army and navy. In order
to secure funding to create a modern
fleet, the navy soon allied with the Sat-
suma clans, while clans from Chsh
were already allied with the army.
Together these clans brought the Meiji
reformers to power. The opening of the
Diet in 1890 brought fears among the
clans that democracy would erode their
power. Therefore, they solidified their
ties with the army and navy. Thus
highly politicized interservice rivalries
were inherent in the Japanese political
system.
Initial Diets were hostile to military
funding. War with China in 1894–95,
however, transformed the public per-
ception of the navy from a financial
burden into a service vital to Japan’s
national security and domestic prosper-
ity. This, combined with the large war
indemnity from China, produced mas-
sive naval budgetary increases. The na-
val mission expanded from defense of
the home islands to command of the
sea and defense of the empire. The
navy continued to press for a combat
mission independent of the army,
which retained responsibility for na-
tional defense and command over
naval forces in wartime. Interservice
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rivalries intensified. The navy assidu-
ously cultivated popular support
among politicians, journalists, disen-
franchised former samurai, and entre-
preneurs who dreamed of an empire in
the South Seas.
The navy used World War I to seize
German colonies and implement its
“southward advance” strategy for ex-
panding the empire in the Pacific re-
gion. The war also transformed Japan
from a debtor into a creditor nation.
These changed circumstances finally al-
lowed a Seiykai-navy alliance to deliver
greatly increased postwar naval bud-
gets. Previously, the naval budget had
occasionally exceeded the army budget,
but from 1917 to 1922 it did so consis-
tently and massively.
In response to those who believe that
Japan’s military muzzled its civil leaders
in World War II and that this accounts
for Japan’s rampage through the Pa-
cific, Schencking’s book shows that the
political parties had always worked
closely with the military and that, con-
versely, the military had always been
deeply involved in politics. This meant
ever-deepening interservice rivalries,
and also incomplete and incompatible
war plans that would spell disaster for
Japan and much of Asia and the Pacific
in World War II.
For nonspecialists, additional allusions
to political and budgetary issues beyond
naval appropriations would have put
the subject of the book into a broader
context. Nevertheless, Schencking pro-
vides one of the best descriptions of the
inner workings of the Japanese political
system that I have ever read. It details the
creation of the modern Japanese navy, the
civil-military politics necessary for its de-
velopment, the consequent army-navy
rivalries, and the implications for the
Japanese political system and for future
Japanese military strategy.
S. C. M. PAINE
Strategy and Policy Department
Naval War College
Black, Jeremy. The British Seaborne Em-
pire. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2004. 420pp. $40
Jeremy Black deliberately titled his book
to link it with two classics, works that
every maritime historian knows: C. R.
Boxer’s The Dutch Seaborne Empire
(1965) and J. H. Parry’s The Spanish
Seaborne Empire (1966). The planned
volume in that series that would have
provided an overview of the British
Empire was never completed, although
nearly twenty years later D. B. Quinn
and A. N. Ryan filled the gap for the
early phase with their England’s Sea
Empire, 1550–1642 (1983). Black’s con-
tribution shows a significantly different
approach as well as a much broader and
more nuanced view of the general theme.
Jeremy Black is a prolific writer who
has become widely known for his
broad, sweeping histories of British for-
eign policy in the eighteenth century
and of the history of European and
world warfare, as well as for his insight-
ful studies of maps and cartography. He
is fully experienced and eminently well
qualified to attempt a broad-based
study such as this.
Although Black’s title suggests a general
history of the British Empire, his de-
tailed focus is not on the earliest period
but on the three hundred years from
the Union of Scotland and England in
1707 to the present. To provide linkages,
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however, he has written a hundred
pages that describe the origins of the
empire, racing from pre-Roman times
to the mid-eighteenth century. From
that point forward, Black expands out
into his larger study, tracing both the
British Empire’s rise and its decline. In
this Black is careful to give weight to
the three elements of his title: the
“Britishness” of that empire, the com-
plexity of its maritime basis, and the
distinctive differences with other types
of imperial powers. The book is a dense
collation of factual detail, but the pic-
ture that Black paints and the perspec-
tive that he presents are interesting. He
links maritime exploration, trade, mi-
gration, and naval affairs in a broad
context while at the same time bringing
in the wide range of cross-cultural is-
sues involved. Even beyond that, Black
characterizes the British Empire as the
power that gave indirect rise to America
and was America’s immediate predeces-
sor as a global superpower. This linkage,
as Black reminds us, allows a reader to
begin to think about the connections
between consecutive global powers.
Imperial history has largely been ig-
nored until recently in academic circles,
but Black’s work clearly succeeds in un-
derscoring the importance of the Brit-
ish Empire’s maritime nature in its
distinctive contribution to the develop-
ment of the modern world. Black con-
cludes that “if the British Empire is
blamed for many of the aspects of mod-
ernization and globalization, it also
serves as a way of offering historical
depth to a critique of American power,




Budiansky, Stephen. Her Majesty’s Spymaster:
Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth
of Modern Espionage. New York: Penguin, 2005.
235pp. $24.95
For many years the U.S. intelligence
community has been dominated by a
subculture enraptured with intelligence
collected by technical means. Despite
the wealth of intelligence these means
provide, they do not always lead toward
an understanding of how an opponent
thinks. Many current and former intel-
ligence officers have argued for over a
decade that the United States must im-
prove both its human intelligence and
counterintelligence capabilities; events
since 9/11 have reinforced that view
with a vengeance.
History provides many examples of ef-
fective intelligence organizations in the
days before technical means, and Stephen
Budiansky, a journalist and military
historian, has chosen for his subject one
of the best for his latest book. Budiansky
describes the intelligence successes of
Sir Francis Walsingham, first as ambas-
sador to France and later as Principal
Secretary to the Privy Council of Queen
Elizabeth I. In the latter role (at the time,
akin to a chief of staff) Walsingham not
only coordinated domestic and foreign
policy but ran the kingdom’s primary
secret service.
Walsingham was a legend in an era
filled with men of legendary stature.
Where others were self-promoting, he
was unobserved. Where many bragged
of power and connections, he wielded
power quietly and subtly, but always ef-
fectively. His painstaking attention to
detail and his deep understanding of
human nature made him the ideal
spymaster.
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The focus of “Mr. Secretary’” (as he was
known) was maintaining England’s in-
dependence from the maneuverings of
Spain, France, and Rome. Budiansky
describes how Walsingham’s skill in
gathering and analyzing information
complemented (if not always easily)
Elizabeth’s talent for political and dip-
lomatic intrigue. England, at the time a
small fringe state tottering between
Protestantism and Catholicism, was
vulnerable to the machinations of the
great powers of the day. Walsingham
played critical roles in countering plots
against Elizabeth, the most famous be-
ing that of Mary, Queen of Scots.
Walsingham’s role in the defeat of the
Spanish Armada provides a textbook
example of what intelligence can and
sometimes cannot provide. He devel-
oped a comprehensive collection plan
and employed a network of agents
throughout Europe to gather informa-
tion. He never blindly trusted any one
source, using multiple agents against
the same target. As the Armada prepa-
rations came to a head, Walsingham
commissioned naval reconnaissance
missions of key Spanish ports, and al-
though his work provided strategic
warning to the crown and the Royal
Navy, contrary winds prevented tactical
warning.
Walsingham understood that intelli-
gence must support decision making—
after all, he was a major player in both
domestic and foreign policy—and en-
sured that the information he provided
was focused on those ends. Upon be-
coming Principal Secretary, he was in-
formed that the job required him to
know everyone and see everything. By
the time of his death, both his support-
ers and enemies believed him unsur-
passed in this regard.
While Walsingham’s network did not
survive him (he left no written legacy
for his successors to follow), the mem-
ory of his effectiveness lives on.
If this book has a fault, it is the lack of
discussion on Walsingham’s impact on
later incarnations of the British secret
service. Nonetheless, several maxims at-
tributed to him remain sound guidance
for today’s intelligence and policy pro-
fessionals. “Knowledge is never too
dear” speaks for the value of good intel-
ligence. “An habit of secrecy is both
policy and virtue” reminds us that suc-
cess requires constant effort. Finally,
“See and keep silent” remain watch-
words for today’s intelligence profes-




Berube, Claude, and John Rodgaard. A Call to the
Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitu-
tion. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005. 299pp.
$35
Charles Stewart was one of the preemi-
nent officers of the early sailing navy.
He is best remembered for the brilliant
victory he gained over HMS Cyane and
Levant as captain of USS Constitution
during the War of 1812. Less well known,
however, are the significant contribu-
tions Stewart made to the sea service
over the remainder of his career—a ca-
reer that witnessed the birth, growth,
and evolution of the Navy during its
first six decades of existence. As a cen-
tral figure of the formative period in the
Navy’s history, Charles Stewart has long
merited greater scholarly attention than
he has heretofore received.
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In A Call to the Sea, Claude Berube and
John Rodgaard redress this neglect with
the first book-length study of Charles
Stewart’s life. Both Berube, a Brookings
Institution LEGIS Fellow, and Rodgaard,
an intelligence analyst, are Navy Re-
serve officers with numerous historical
publications to their credit. Their por-
trait of Stewart is drawn from a range of
secondary sources, as well as research in
manuscript collections that document
the public and private dimensions of
the 1812 hero’s career.
A Call to the Sea examines the major
personalities, places, and events that
shaped and defined Charles Stewart’s
life, from his birth in Philadelphia on
28 July 1778 to his death ninety-one
years later at Bordentown, New Jersey.
Among the career highlights that
Berube and Rodgaard explore are
Stewart’s participation in three wars
(the Quasi-War with France, the Bar-
bary Wars, and the War of 1812); his
service as commander of the Mediterra-
nean, Pacific, and home squadrons; his
role as a naval administrator, first with
the Board of Navy Commissioners and
later as commandant of the Philadel-
phia Navy Yard; and his consideration
as a presidential candidate in the elec-
tions of 1840 and 1844. The authors
also shed light on Stewart’s private life
and relationships, in particular his
troubled marriage to Delia Tudor of
Boston, which ended in divorce in 1828.
Berube and Rodgaard have produced a
biography that is highly favorable to its
subject. The authors give Stewart high
marks as a combat commander, as a
mentor influential in shaping the Navy’s
junior officer corps, and as an adminis-
trator receptive to the technological and
social changes that were altering the
face of the Navy during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century.
A Call to the Sea is an informative biog-
raphy of one of the antebellum Navy’s
most intriguing and distinguished offi-
cers. As such, it should appeal to a wide
general audience. Naval historians,
however, may well be disappointed with
this work. Berube and Rodgaard have
failed to exploit fully the large body of
official papers that document Stewart’s
sixty-two-year naval career, some of
which are readily available in print.
This, coupled with the authors’ over-
reliance on secondary sources in assess-
ing Stewart’s life, has resulted in a
biography lacking in critical rigor and
fresh interpretive insights. For this rea-
son, the definitive biography of Charles
Stewart remains to be written.
CHARLES BRODINE
Naval Historical Center
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Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War
against Napoleon, by Kevin McCranie.
Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida,
2006. 256pp. $55.
Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of
Unconventional Warfare, by Hy S.
Rothstein. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2006. 218pp. $26.95.
Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from
the Sea: Amphibious Operations from the
Last Century, edited by T. T. A. Lovering.
U.K.: Royal Navy, 2005. 495pp.
Appeasement & Rearmament: Britain
1936–1939, by James P. Levy. Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
188pp. $19.95.
The Ash Warriors, by C. R. Anderegg.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2005. 146pp.
“Behind Bayonets”: The Civil War in North-
ern Ohio, by David D. van Tassel. Kent,
Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2006. 125pp.
The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disas-
trous 1942 Expedition, by Robin
Neillands. Indianapolis: Indiana Univ.
Press, 2005. 292pp. $35.
Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Sec-
retary General and Military Action after
the Cold War, by Ryan C. Hendrickson.
Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press,
2006. 172pp.
Escalation and Negotiation in Interna-
tional Conflicts, edited by I. William
Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure. New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.
334pp. $29.99.
Fire at Sea: The Tragedy of the Soviet
Submarine Komsomolets, by D. A.
Romanov. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books,
2006. 266pp. $35.
The Ghosts of Iwo Jima, by Robert S.
Burrell. College Station: Texas A&M
Univ. Press, 2006. 262pp. $29.95.
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in
Iraq, by Ahmed S. Hashim. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006. 482pp.
MACV: The Joint Command in the Years
of Escalation, 1962–1967, by Graham A.
Cosmas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 2006. 524pp.
Manufacturing Human Bombs: The
Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers,
by Mohammed M. Hafez. Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,
2006. 124pp.
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Industrializing American Shipbuilding:
The Transformation of Ship Design and
Construction, 1820–1920, by William H.
Thiesen. Gainesville: Univ. Press of
Florida, 2006. 302pp. $55.
The Naval Institute Almanac of the U.S.
Navy, by Anthony Cowden. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 247pp.
On Board: My Life in the Navy, Govern-
ment, and Business, by Paul R. Ignatius.
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